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ABSTRACT 
This study critically examines and assesses the effects of two internationally sponsored 
local governance programmes formulated, designed and implemented by Afghanistan’s 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and Independent Directorate 
of Local Governance (IDLG), their purported aim to build village and district level 
institutions and change the way local populations shape their governance relations. 
The study adopts a set of theoretical lenses including hybridity and ethnography of aid 
combined with a historical political economy approach which aims to show how, 
mediated by local power structures and gender relations, these interventions unfolded 
in practice and had complex and unexpected outcomes on the ground. The study is the 
result of fourteen months field research conducted in Kabul (to look at national level 
processes), one village in Behsud, Nangarhar and two villages in Yakawlang, Bamyan.  
The study presents Afghan districts and villages as micro-site(s) of intervention, where 
central government programmes are only one among many interventions led by 
different national and international actors and institutions. The selection of local 
governance programmes by the two institutions is based on different (at times 
conflicting) rationales: MRRD’s programme followed ‘legal-rational’ bureaucratic logic, 
while IDLG, though following a similar logic in its policy papers, in practice was heavily 
influenced by the existing patronage-based networks related to the government’s key 
political elites. Furthermore, the international sponsors of these programmes supported 
these differing logics based on their short and long-term interests. The local actors 
embraced certain aspects of the interventions that furthered their interests in terms of 
capturing resources that strengthened their authority and resisted those aspects that 
challenged prevailing patrimonial power structures. Hence, studying these two 
examples generates insights into both the way power and gender relations work in 
Afghan society and the complex form of hybrid arrangements that emerges as a result 
of these encounters between international, national and local players.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1. Studying Local Governance Relations 
This thesis is shaped and influenced by my broader experiences as a development 
practitioner over the past decade and a half, during which time I have been involved in 
development programming at different levels – from being its recipient as a refugee to 
delivering assistance and working as a UNDP programme officer overseeing the 
formulation and operationalisation of some of the governance programme interventions 
at a macro level. In the course of these varying experiences and interactions with policy 
makers, practitioners, experts and scholars, I have come to realise that there is a 
significant level of ambiguity in the way local power relations and governance practices 
are understood in the context of Afghanistan, particularly in relation to how, historically 
and in more recent times, local governance relations have evolved as a result of 
varying forms of interventions. In this study, I look at the particularities of local 
governance in Afghanistan as a case, but also aim to situate this within the broader 
context of liberal interventionism.  
International efforts to intervene in developing countries have changed and evolved 
over the past decades. Local governance interventions have been implemented 
through different means and with different rationales, including programmes focusing 
on institution building, and direct service provision, as well as the channelling of 
resources through the military in order to ‘win hearts and minds’ and central 
government’s efforts to strengthen patronage networks of national elites in key and 
leading government positions. International actors, whether acting directly or through 
central government partners, aimed to bring developing countries under their orbit 
through a global system of governance, and by creating particular institutional forms 
and rules of the game at the local level.  
Central governments in developing countries often operate differently to those of so-
called advanced democracies given their historical trajectories of state-formation and 
state-building (Khan 2005). Hence, although these governments are heavily dependent 
on, or in some cases exist only because of, the financial and political support of these 
international institutions, they have their own agendas and interests in how these 
interventions are played out in their countries, interests which may or may not 
correspond with those of the international actors. The primary target of these 
interventions is the local population and their representatives or intermediaries. 
Therefore the site of intervention turns into an arena of power struggles where 
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sovereignty, legitimacy and authority is negotiated and contested among the 
population, local elites, central government, international and transnational actors and 
institutions (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008:269). 
This thesis therefore, explores the origins, rationalities and logics of external actors 
(including international and central government actors and institutions) in the 
formulation, design and operationalisation of local governance interventions. Local 
governance is defined as a set of institutions, mechanisms and processes through 
which people negotiate their interests and needs and mediate their differences by 
exercising their rights and obligations at the local level (Lutz and Linder 2004:16). The 
exercise of local governance involves formal and informal institutions and actors who 
take part in these processes.  
The thesis will investigate the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) of the Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) as a part of the global scheme of the 
World Bank’s Community Driven Development (CDD) model, and the Independent 
Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) at the national level in Kabul and how, as a 
result of interventions by the two institutions, local governance relations evolved in the 
case of three villages in Afghanistan: Qala-e-Janan Khan in the Behsud district of 
Nangarhar, and Katakhana and Akhundan in Yakawlang district of Bamyan.  
This thesis explores the competing agendas of different intervening forces and the 
question of who ‘owns’ the village and its governance affairs becomes a contested 
matter at the national level; at the same time the local population adopt a range of 
strategies in response to these interventions, from resistance, to collusion and co-
optation. The thesis challenges the notion of an unchanging ‘continuity’ of patronage 
structures at the local level (see Schetter 2013). The research revealed a two way 
process of adaptation and accommodation as well as subversion and resistance. This 
thesis also highlights the complex and discursive nature of liberal peace-building 
interventions (Heathershaw 2008) by unpacking different approaches to local 
governance programme interventions used by the central government and its 
international sponsors. Finally, I argue that, contrary to the assumption that local 
governance institution building is a product of a pre-defined blueprint to set up a 
modern form of state institutions in the villages and districts, governance relations and 
governance interventions should be studied as an empirical reality that will enable us to 
understand the actual form of relations that emerge as a result of these complex and 
competing processes. By adopting a historical political economy approach that is 
complemented with hybridity and ethnographies of aid, the thesis examines the 
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complex set of processes that resulted in the evolution of local governance relations in 
the selected sites.  
The thesis is based on fourteen months of field research and data collection conducted 
between July 2011 and September 2012 in Kabul and the Nangarhar and Bamyan 
provinces of Afghanistan.1 One hundred and forty one interviews were conducted with 
different actors involved in the processes of design, formulation and establishment of 
the NSP programme and IDLG institution and the village populations who were directly 
or indirectly involved in the implementation of the NSP and other interventions by the 
central government in their localities.  
2. Problem Justification 
The local governance relations that actually emerge as a result of local governance 
programme interventions in contemporary Afghanistan is under-researched (Schetter 
2013). Often, research on local governance relations has focused on following a 
programme or project cycle rather than a specific context and period (see, for instance, 
Boesen 2004; Kakar 2005; Barakat et al. 2006; Noelle-Karimi 2006; Brick 2008; Nixon 
2008; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2010; Beath et al. 2013 
Monsutti 2012). This has resulted in the existing limited understanding of local power 
relations and an in-depth analysis of the actors involved in these processes and the 
overall political economy of local governance relations. Some still consider Afghanistan 
local settings as led by ‘tribes’2 or operating as ‘mini republics’ (Pain and Kantor 2010), 
while others argue that governance relations are completely transformed as a result of 
democratic institution building through interventions such as the National Solidarity 
Programme (MRRD 2014).3 In my view, neither opinion represents a thorough 
understanding of contemporary power dynamics and governance relations that emerge 
as a result of these local governance interventions.  
Local governance programme interventions are predominantly influenced by, or based 
on, two assumptions: 1) that local institution building is a mechanical process that relies 
on following manuals and pre-defined steps and 2) that once these institutions are in 
                                            
1 I spent one full year (June 2011-July 2012) in the field; between July and September 2012, I 
gathered primary and secondary data from a distance, while I was based in London. 
2 See, for example, the US military literature on the understanding of Afghanistan: “one tribe at a 
time” (Major Jim Gant 2009) http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wpcontent/ 
uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf (accessed on 18.09.2014). 
3 See, for example, documents produced by the MRRD on impacts of the National Solidarity 
Programme. 
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place, they either completely dismantle what already existed or they exist in complete 
isolation from ‘traditional’ or customary structures and actors.   
In this study, I challenge both assumptions by arguing that: 1) what determines how 
institutions are formed is a complex set(s) of processes where negotiations, 
interactions and contestations occur between different actors and structures within a 
local setting and the formal and informal actors and structures that they have relations 
with, and 2) I argue that neither the institutions and structures established as a result of 
local governance programme interventions continue to function in isolation, nor do the 
existing power structures, elites and actors in the given context remained isolated from 
or neutral to these interventions. Instead, only by looking at a village or local setting as 
a micro site of intervention, learning about its power dynamics, and analysing its key 
actors in terms of socio-political and economic status and how they exercise public 
authority, influence different mechanisms of village governance and following the 
everyday practices of governance relations, are we able to understand actually existing 
governance relations and how they are affected by different programme interventions.  
There are different ways of looking at and studying these local governance programme 
interventions. I first draw upon writings on liberal peace-building, institution building and 
‘good governance’ where, by covering both its policy oriented and critical variants, an 
entry point is created for understanding the declared goals and underlying logic of 
international interventions in the area of governance. I then draw upon historical 
political economy perspectives to examine governance, not as an ideal type model, but 
as an empirical reality that is shaped by competing material interests and power 
relations in specific contexts at particular historical moments. Chapter two further 
expands on both these approaches in order to set out a theoretical framework for the 
rest of this study.  
3. Research Purpose, Questions and Methods  
The purpose of this thesis is to present an exploration of the complex dynamics 
surrounding the implementation and effects of local governance programmes in the 
context of a hyper-politicised and multi-mandated intervention in Afghanistan. By 
adopting a set of theoretical lenses including hybridity, ethnographies of aid and a 
historical political economy approach, I look at governance as an empirical reality 
rather than a blueprint model to be replicated in varying contexts. Inspired by Tania 
Murray Li, in this thesis, I do not judge the programmes’ success rate, nor do I aim to 
present recommendations on how they could be improved (Li 2007). I rather aim to 
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present first, an understanding of the origins, rationales and logics underlying these 
interventions in the national and broader context of liberal interventionism and second, 
to examine the complex and hybrid form of governance relations that evolves as a 
result of the local governance interventions.  
The following are the central research questions that guided my research:  
The overarching question is:  
How have local governance programmes and policies been designed and 
implemented in Afghanistan and what effects have they had on local power 
structures? 
My key sub-questions are:  
1. What were the underlying rationales and interests behind the MRRD and IDLG 
interventions and how was this reflected in their design and planning at the 
national level?  
2. How were the MRRD’s NSP and the IDLG interventions, including their gender 
conditionality, received by elites and the wider population of women and men at 
the local level?  
3. What effects did these interventions have on local governance and power 
relations, and how, if at all, did they differ from those intended by the programme 
planners and implementers? 
4. How does this research relate to and contribute to wider theoretical and policy 
debates on the efficacy and desirability of local governance programme 
interventions in conflict-affected contexts? 
Methods and ethics 
Methodologically, this study follows an extended case method based on qualitative 
multi-sited ethnography. A flexible multi-sited approach enabled me to follow people, 
connections, associations and relations across space or in multiple locations (Falzon 
2009:1-2). For instance, I chose Kabul to investigate how local governance programme 
interventions were formulated, designed and negotiated between different international 
and national actors, and villages and districts in Nangarhar and Bamyan provinces, in 
order to examine how these interventions affected local power dynamics and 
governance locations in those localities. The informants for this study varied from 
ordinary men and women in the selected villages to senior Afghan government 
politicians and leaders and international actors including military and civilian members 
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of different donor communities. The primary data for this research were collected 
through a variety of methods including semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation notes, key informant interviews and focus group discussions.  
Research in conflict-affected contexts has its own sensitivities and requires 
precautionary measures that the researcher should consider for her/his own safety as 
well as the safety and protection of her/his informants and other supporting persons. 
Although the topic of this study did not -on the whole -involve sensitive matters that 
could endanger an informant, I have been particularly careful to ensure informants’ 
anonymity on potentially sensitive matters. I also kept a very close eye on political and 
security developments through the course of research.  
As an Afghan with previous experience occupying different roles from development 
practitioner, advocate for social justice, women’s rights/human rights and civil society, 
and indeed a student of Development Studies, I have not only experienced these 
interventions in different ways, but also have contributed to the way these processes 
are shaped, both indirectly and directly. In this thesis, while I take a more reflective and 
critical approach by examining and questioning some of the notions, my prior 
experience means that I am both an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’.  
Selection of field sites 
This thesis looks at districts and villages as micro site(s) of local governance 
interventions. To this end, I selected one village in the Behsud district of Nangarhar 
Province and two villages in the Yakawlang district of Bamyan Province.4 These 
selections were made on the basis of their diversity in terms of their geo-strategic 
importance, history of relations with the central government, diversity of population in 
terms of socio-political identities, proximity to government institutions, etc. For each 
context I provide a broader historical and political economy analysis of governance 
relations in Nangarhar and Bamyan, followed by an overview of the post-2001 period.  
4. Outline of Chapters 
This thesis consists of eight chapters.  
Chapter one, (this chapter), outlines the purpose and aim of the thesis, explains the 
reason for selecting this topic and the particular case studies and offers a brief 
summary of the following chapters.  
                                            
4 A third location in Herat Province was also planned initially but, due to travel and security 
limitations, had to be abandoned. 
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Chapter two sets the conceptual framework for the thesis by engaging with the 
broader literature on liberal intervention and governance, ethnography of aid and 
political economy approaches. The key argument that the chapter follows is the 
necessity of approaching governance as an empirical reality rather as an ideal blueprint 
that is to be replicated. By focusing on the power relations and material interests of 
both the intervening forces as well as the recipients or subjects of the intervention in a 
particular context and time, this chapter first introduces the literature on liberal peace-
building and 'good governance’ in order to understand the declared goals and 
rationales of international actors and their efforts to build and promote local governance 
in conflict-affected settings. It then draws on the critique of this literature, followed by 
expanding briefly on the ethnography of aid and how that helps us in the study of 
programmatic interventions; and, finally, explores a historical political economy 
approach for further in-depth analysis of the context in which these interventions take 
place. By examining the literature on (neo)patrimonialism, patriarchy and its 
relationship to patrimonial and neopatrimonial systems of rule, hybrid political orders 
and political settlements as lenses that provide an entry point for studying local 
governance programme interventions in Afghanistan, the chapter develops a 
theoretical framework drawing upon these lenses in order to study local governance 
relations in the context of liberal interventionism. 
In chapter three, I introduce the methodological choices that shaped the overall 
process of this research. The research focused on studying the reciprocal relations 
between the different actors and institutions involved in the programmes in particular 
site(s) of intervention(s). The chapter starts by explaining my position as an 
‘insider/outsider’ in the course of this study. It then introduces the extended case 
method, followed by the research design where I explain the selection of the research 
methods and then elaborate on the criteria used to select the research sites. Finally, I 
consider the ethical and security challenges of carrying out research in a conflict-
affected context. 
Chapter four outlines the context of the research by providing background on how 
local governance relations in Afghanistan have evolved historically. This chapter shows 
that local governance relations in Afghanistan cannot be studied solely with reference 
to the formal practices and actions of government officials or international forces; it 
demonstrates that local governance relations are frequently the inadvertent result of 
unplanned and informal processes of bargaining, conflict, contestation and negotiations 
that take place between local elites and different formal and informal intervening actors 
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and institutions. The chapter examines key episodes and features of changing patterns 
of local governance relations in the pre- and post-2001 periods showing that, in order to 
understand local governance relations in the post-2001 context, it is necessary to 
appreciate their evolution over time – from the imperial interventions of the 19th and 20th 
centuries to the contemporary efforts that have continuously reshaped local power 
relations. The chapter provides an overview of local governance interventions in the 
pre-2001 historical context, then draws on conceptual understandings of ‘the local’ or 
village governance and the village itself and how they have changed in different 
historical periods. Finally, it assesses broader sub-national governance relations in the 
post-2001 period.  
Chapter five provides the ‘view from Kabul’ or the national level processes that result 
in local governance interventions. It examines how these programmes and different 
interventions were formulated, negotiated, designed and operationalised at the national 
level. The chapter specifically explores the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) of the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the emergence of the 
Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) as a sub-national governance 
institution as two major processes that influenced the way local governance 
programme interventions are carried out. It highlights the agency exercised by 
domestic actors in these processes and questions the notion that governance 
programmes are typically imported blueprint models that are solely formulated by 
international experts. By looking at the processes of negotiations and interactions that 
took place between different international and national actors, the chapter 
demonstrates the influence of a varying range of seemingly extraneous interests and 
objectives including changes in international donors’ policies, national elections and 
changes in the positions of national elites.  
Chapters six and seven provide extensive case studies on the effects of the local 
governance programme interventions in the particular contexts of selected districts and 
villages in Nangarhar and Bamyan provinces.  
Chapter six introduces Nangarhar Province as one of two research sites where the 
two local governance programme interventions were implemented. It examines how the 
MRRD and IDLG’s village and district governance interventions were received by the 
local population of the village of Qala-e-Janan Khan in the district of Behsud. The 
chapter first provides the historical background to the political economy of governance 
relations in Nangarhar and highlights how its geopolitical and strategic location has 
affected its governance relations within the province and with the central government. 
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By exploring interactions between internationally sponsored governance programmes, 
the chapter demonstrates the hybrid arrangements that emerged as a result of these 
encounters. It then introduces the village’s and district’s socio-political and economic 
characteristics and critically examines the MRRD programme interventions in these 
sites from their introduction to implementation, including how their gender conditionality 
was introduced and responded to in practice. This is followed by an examination of the 
IDLG’s local governance interventions and how they were received by and benefited 
village and district elites and the general population.  
Chapter seven focuses on Bamyan and highlights the differences between this 
province and Nangarhar, especially in terms of its history of local governance and 
turbulent relations with the Afghan state. I first provide a historical overview of 
governance interventions in Bamyan, looking at the socio-economic and political 
factors that have shaped Bamyan governance relations historically and how they have 
evolved in the post-2001 context. I then introduce the political economy of governance 
relations in the district of Yakawlang and the two chosen villages to set the scene for 
the examination of the MRRD and IDLG’s interventions. The chapter moves on to 
examine different phases of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) implementation, 
including how the village elites responded to gender conditionality and the way in which 
women in the selected villages of Katakhana and Akhundan used this to strengthen 
their role in local governance relations. The chapter then assesses both the MRRD and 
IDLG interventions at district level.  
Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis by first presenting a brief overall summary 
of the chapters and then summarizes the key findings in relation to the research 
questions. It concludes by outlining the broader theoretical implications of this study in 
the field of local governance in conflict-affected settings and identifying the limits of the 
research and areas for further research and investigation.   
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Debates on Liberal Peace-Building, State-Building and Local 
Governance 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter engages with the broader literature on conflict, intervention and 
governance, with a view to providing a theoretical framework for studying local 
governance programme interventions in Afghanistan. It first looks critically at the 
literature on liberal peace-building and ‘good governance’ in order to understand the 
declared goals and underlying logic of international actors’ efforts to build and promote 
local governance in conflict-affected settings. It then draws upon critiques of this 
literature, inspired largely by a historical political economy approach. It is argued that in 
the study of local governance interventions, the most convincing approach is to 
combine alternative peace-building frameworks such as hybridity and ethnographies of 
aid with a historical political economy approach which focuses on governance as an 
empirical reality rather than an ideal type model, as well as on power relations and 
material interests in particular contexts and times.  
The chapter is divided into six sections including the introduction. In the second 
section, I introduce key terms and concepts. In section three, I focus on the logics and 
rationales for intervention through state-building and institution building by liberal 
democracies. I outline debates on the security development nexus, state-building, good 
governance and gender relations. This then leads to a discussion of the World Bank’s 
Community Driven Development (CDD) as a model of local governance programme 
interventions. The section follows critiques of liberal perspectives on governance and 
critically engages with literature on alternative approaches such as hybridity and 
ethnography of aid. In section four, I elaborate on historical political economy 
approaches and concepts such as patron-client relations and the study of 
(neo)patrimonial systems of rule and will expand on its links with hybridity. I will then 
elaborate on linkages between patriarchy and patronage-based systems, and finally 
this section will conclude by expanding on literature about political settlements and elite 
coalitions. In section five, I will summarise a proposed theoretical framework for this 
thesis. Section six will provide a summary of the chapter.    
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2.2. Defining key terms 
In this section, I define the key terms used in this thesis; governance, ‘good 
governance’, local governance and public authority.  
Governance has become central to the mainstream development discourse over the 
past two decades. Governance has been defined in broad terms as “the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann et al. 2002:4). This 
definition covers both state and non state sources of authority, an examination of which 
reveals who has power, who makes decisions and how other players make their voices 
heard. Borzel and Risse further define governance as “the various institutionalised 
modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to 
provide collective goods” (Borzel and Risse 2010:114,116 cited in Goodhand 2014:2). 
This consists of structure and process; governance structure refers to its component 
institutions and actors, while governance process refers to the coordination between 
actors in rule-making and the provision of collective goods (ibid.). As noted, 
governance is not solely exercised by the state and one can distinguish between the 
state, competitive systems (markets) and networks (where interests are negotiated) 
(ibid.). Although the state can have a central role, as Borzel and Risse note, other 
organisations may replace the state when its presence is limited or contested as, for 
example, in war-time. Hence, governance operates with or without the presence of 
formal state administration (ibid.). However, they argue, ‘a shadow of hierarchy’ exists 
with the state using its power to explicitly or implicitly impose rules or laws over non-
state actors for public, as opposed to self, interest (ibid.).  
Good	   governance The World Bank defines governance as a “way in which power is 
exercised in the management of the economic and social resources of a country, 
notably with a view to development” (Agere 2000:3). The UNDP identifies various 
desirable dimensions of governance, which include it being participatory, transparent 
and accountable, as well as effective and equitable and supportive of the rule of law 
(United Nations 2006). Similarly Hirst (2000) and Munshi (2004) define ‘good 
governance’ as a model of governance that promotes the rights of individual citizens 
and the public interest, creates an effective framework that is able to ensure stable 
regimes, rule of law, efficient state administrations and a strong civil society that is 
independent of the state (Hirst 2000; Munshi 2004:4 cited in UN 2006:4). Following the 
World Bank, other international institutions began to pick up on the term ‘good 
governance’ and it became a defining principle for all kinds of development 
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interventions (UN 2006); one example discussed later is the gender conditionalities of 
the World Bank and UNDP in Afghanistan. 
Local	   governance refers to a set of institutions, mechanisms and processes by which 
people at the local level negotiate their interests and needs, mediate their differences 
and exercise their rights and obligations at the local level (Lutz and Linder 2004:16). It 
involves the distribution of resources shaped by underlying power relations and 
collective norms in a given territorial setting whether it is a community, a village or a 
collectivity of villages.5 Local governance is heavily shaped by local elites who are also 
connected to socio-political structures and processes beyond their local settings (de 
Waal 2009). As mentioned earlier, governance involves actors in addition to, or other 
than, formal government institutions. I use public authority to mean the exercise of 
authority by local governance actors for multiple purposes including protection from 
external threats, managing external relations, peaceful resolution of internal conflicts, 
and playing a gatekeeping role in the provision of resources and collective goods and 
services (IDS 2010:9). 
2.3. A liberal approach to the study of local governance interventions 
2.3.1. Liberal peace-building, ‘fragile’ states and the security-development nexus 
In this study, governance interventions are examined in the context of a broader post-
Cold War shift towards liberal interventionism manifest in numerous ‘peace operations’ 
including the former Yugoslavia (1991), Bosnia (1992-1995), Kosovo (1998-1999), East 
Timor (1974-1999), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Haiti (1994-1995), Côte d’Ivoire (2002-
2004 and 2010-11), DRC (1998-2003), Burundi (1993-2005), Iraq (2003-2011), 
Afghanistan (2001-present) and, most recently, in Libya (2011).6 Whilst these 
interventions varied in character, not least in their legality, all involved wide-ranging 
efforts to transform the conflict-affected countries through reforms of the state, 
institution-building, women’s rights, civil society and the promotion of a free market 
economy. These interventions were often justified in terms of ‘protecting’ the 
population, promoting democracy and human rights, etc. The growing focus on 
governance is reflected in increased funding, with OECD governments providing over 
US$10 billion a year for governance interventions globally (IDS 2010). 
                                            
5 Some use the term ‘local governance’ to explain a much broader spectrum that consists of 
overall sub-national governance relations or any form of governance beyond the centre. 
6 It has to be noted that each of these conflicts have their own characteristics. I have not 
included the Syrian war here because the UN Security Council’s proposal for direct intervention 
was vetoed by China and Russia in February 2012. 
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As Richmond points out, liberal peace-building has historical roots that precede the end 
of the Cold War. Contemporary debates on the liberal peace resonate with Augustinian 
thinking on ‘tranquillity of order’ (Saint Augustine 1991 cited in Richmond 2005:3) and 
Hobbesian thinking about containing the state of nature.7 However, central to 
contemporary liberal peace-building is the idea that sustainable peace can be achieved 
through the simultaneous pursuit of conflict resolution, market sovereignty and liberal 
democracy (Pugh and Cooper 2004).  
Although the entrance of ‘good governance’ to the development discourse preceded 
the multi-mandate peace operations of the mid to late 1990s, over time there was a 
growing convergence between peace-building, state-building and ‘good governance’. 
State-building and ‘good governance’ converged under the institutional umbrella of the 
United Nations in the form of the ‘New York Consensus’.8 State-building was seen as 
the antidote to ‘fragile’ and ‘failing’ states which were viewed as disordered, chaotic, 
tribal, primitive, violent and exclusionary (Orford 2003:43 cited in O’Reilly 2012:535). 
These various pathologies created an imperative for Western states to intervene in 
order to stabilise and modernise ‘fragile’ and ‘failing’ states. Therefore, intervention was 
legitimised on the basis of changing the socio-political and economic conditions in the 
target countries (ibid.). This was done through introducing different reform measures 
and programmatic interventions that aimed to build institutions and effect behavioural 
change.  
This convergence between peace-building, development and ‘good governance’ has 
been characterised as a security-development nexus (Duffield 2007). State-building is 
seen as a project through which wealthy Western states deal with emergent security 
threats from ‘under-developed’ or ‘poor’ countries (Kalher 2009:287) and state-building 
support to those countries is justified as an investment in the security interests of 
wealthy countries (Scott 2007). Hakimi (2011) characterises post-Cold War exogenous 
state-building as: “… a deeply conscious, overtly ambitious, internationally conceived, 
externally financed and highly regulated enterprise to reconstruct states in the 
aftermath of conflict in developing countries” (Hakimi 2011). Post 9/11, the war on 
terror has resulted in a harder, more militarised edge to international peacekeeping. In 
the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, according to counterinsurgency (COIN) 
doctrine, building ‘good governance’ is a crucial element in the battle for hearts and 
                                            
7 For an interesting discussion of such tensions see Gabriella Slomp (1996) cited in Richmond 
(2005:3). 
8 According to Kahler (2009:298) the New York Consensus incorporated democratisation and 
respect for human rights as compulsory elements of liberal state-building that has been part of 
the liberal democracies’ foreign policy for a long time. 
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minds (Fitzsimmons 2013:1-2). As discussed in later chapters, though international 
actors may invoke ‘good governance’, their actual practices on the ground may be 
responsible for promoting ‘bad governance’. 
The ostensible goal of peace-building operations is to provide security, establish rule of 
law, ensure effective delivery of goods and services through a functional formal state 
and thus create political legitimacy (Brinkerhoff 2007 cited in Fritz and Menocal 2007). 
The building of central government authority through the centralisation of the means of 
legitimate coercion is meant to increase the state’s surveillance of unruly borderlands. 
Given that these interventions happen in conflict settings, additional components and 
norms are added such as ‘peace-building’, conflict resolution, security sector reform 
and so on. Linked to these programmes are particular rules and conditionalities 
associated with conflict, democratisation, state reform, corruption, gender and so forth.  
2.3.2. State-building and ‘good governance’ 
State-building and the promotion of good governance and democratisation have 
become central to the project of liberal peace-building. Heathershaw, for example, 
describes democratisation as the ‘discursive cousin’ of the liberal peace, as each share 
the same ontological and epistemological roots and have become defining features of 
international engagement with states in the post-Soviet and post-colonial era 
(Heathershaw 2008:599). Developed Western democracies provide the reference point 
for state-building. Ghani and Lockhart argue that failing states can be ‘fixed’ by building 
core functional capacities (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). Capacity building projects are 
meant to build the formal institutions of the state so that governance systems and 
structures are brought into line with the Weberian model.  
 ‘Good governance’ initiatives have the common objectives of tackling corruption, 
establishing a vibrant market economy, enabling governance reforms and supporting 
democracy (Khan 2004:4). An underlying assumption is that the promotion of ‘good 
governance’ leads to institutional structures that “prevent the emergence of rents and 
associated rent-seeking activities” (ibid.).  
The state, in these terms, is viewed as a transferable set of institutions and procedures, 
independent of history and context. There are several problems with this view. First, 
this highly reductionist and functionalist view of the state, is blind to what Abram (1988) 
calls the ‘idea of the state’ – that the state is not to be sought as a ‘thing’, but rather ‘a 
claim’ or ‘a message of domination’ that can only be understood based on its 
moralities, principles and practices of government affairs (Abrams 1988:81 cited in Li 
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2005:385).9 Second, the ‘good governance’ agenda is ahistorical – state-building is 
seen to be a planned, conscious process that can be designed, whereas historically the 
process of state-formation was an imminent, unplanned process with unforeseen 
outcomes that involved conflicts, negotiations and bargaining. Third, the liberal 
approach with its institutional template, fails to engage with the complexity of 
institutions which North et al. understand as “patterns of interaction that govern and 
constrain the relationships among individuals” (North et al. 2009:58). Institutions are 
shaped by formal and written rules, laws and regulations as well as by informal sets of 
norms and shared beliefs and world views used as ‘means’ to enforce their rules over 
those under their leadership (ibid.). Liberal institution-building tied to a Weberian 
worldview often overlooks existing structures based on customary social norms and 
unwritten rules.  
2.3.3. Gender, state-building and governance 
Following the definition of good governance given in the earlier section of this chapter, 
one of the core principles of the ‘good governance’ model is equity or ensuring that 
men and women benefit equally from resources and authority. In this section, I look at 
different logics that underlie liberal interventionism with regard to gender relations and 
how it becomes a conditionality for institution building and programmatic interventions.  
There is a significant gap in the study of the gendered and gendering nature of state-
building and governance in the context of conflict affected settings (Scott 2007; O’Reilly 
2012). According to Handrahan, there is need to further explore the complex ways in 
which masculinities and femininities continue to be “(re)constructed, (re)produced and 
maintained in relation to other forms of identity” (Handrahan 2004, cited in O’Reilly 
2012:530). O’Reilly points out that relations between gender and liberal interventionism 
are mutually constitutive and reinforcing and that gender identities are seen as an 
“enabling condition of liberal interventionism and vice versa” (O’Reilly 2012:538-9). 
Studying the Bosnian and Balkan conflicts, O’Reilly looked at how notions of femininity 
and actual/potential vulnerability justified and bolstered “hegemonic masculinity” (ibid.). 
The idea that women in developing countries are oppressed and need protecting is part 
of the underlying logic and justification for liberal interventionism (Kandiyoti 2005). 
Kandiyoti, drawing on feminist scholars, shows how women’s rights and participation 
have become an iconic characteristic of liberal interventionism. Kandiyoti, like Abu-
                                            
9 Tania Murray Li points out that state needs to be seen as a ‘claim’ or “a message of 
domination - an ideological artefact attributing unity, morality and independence to the disunited, 
amoral and dependent working of the practice of government” (Abrams 1988:81 cited in Li 
2005:385). 
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Lughod, argues that Western interventions are justified by supporting women in Muslim 
countries (ibid.). This has been coined as ‘feminism as imperialism’ or a continuity of 
colonial meddling (Kandiyoti 2005:1; Abu-Lughod 2002). Kandiyoti also refers to Arat-
Koc’s findings that connect women’s oppression to cultural and religious practices 
which, on the one hand was seen as justifying ‘humanitarian war’ or an obligation to 
‘protect’ women and, on the other, highlighting the limits of the intervention in bringing 
about real change (Arat-Koc 2002, cited in Kandiyoti 2005:1). Whether gender 
conditionalities in broader governance or local governance interventions have been 
effective or not, the rhetoric of women’s rights and the moral obligation to save and 
support them has been integrated in the majority of the policies, programmes and 
projects that are sponsored by intervening forces.  
Most international donor institutions see gender equality as an important element of the 
good or effective governance model. For instance, the World Bank Group states in its 
publications that it has been promoting gender equality in development since 1977 
(World Bank 2014b). For the Bank, social development, gender and inclusion are part 
of its core conditionalities. The Bank has made specific ‘corporate commitments’ that 
obligates the institution to support all poor countries that are recipients of its funds in 
this regard (ibid.). The Bank helps these countries by incorporating gender into their 
country strategy (creating a ‘vision’), helps diagnosing ‘key gender issues’ (identifying 
problems) and then proposes programme interventions that can overcome these issues 
(World Bank 2012). Some have criticised the Bank for not including gender equality as 
a fundamental concern of ‘good governance’ (UNRISD 2004:182). The critique 
highlights the failure to develop gender-specific capacity across all public institutions 
that require reformation such as the civil service, judiciary and broader public sector.  
Although on paper such approaches appear smooth and regulated, the way each 
recipient country deals with this is a complex process with different factors involved. 
The Bank’s purpose in the above example of helping ‘poor’ countries on gender 
equality, could be interpreted as a form of transnational governance where it aims to 
contribute to expanding a liberal form of democracy with its core elements such as 
democratisation, social inclusion and protection of human rights in exchange for 
provision of resources. The recipient country’s responses may be shaped less by its 
agreement with the values and principles underlying gender conditionality, than its 
desire to secure the material and financial resources that the Bank provides.  
While the declared purpose or rationale for women’s inclusion in socio-political and 
economic spheres has been based on the logic that improving gender equity will lead 
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to economic growth (Kandiyoti 2007b:514), as this thesis will demonstrate, the 
patronage-based political dynamics characteristic of countries subject to liberal 
interventions, takes this logic to a different direction (ibid.). Using illustrations from 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Kandiyoti points out that technocratic approach to gender 
programming that is blind to these political dynamics, frequently has unintended or 
perverse effects, leading to aid dependency and limited political gains for women 
(ibid.).  
2.3.4. State-building, governance and power 
State-building, institution-building and governance are the product of underlying power 
relations and material interests. As Ottaway and Lieven argue, in war to peace 
transitions, outcomes are generally shaped by raw coercive power rather than by 
externally created formal organisations (Ottaway and Lieven 2002). Michael Mann 
makes a distinction between two forms of state power: despotic power and 
infrastructural power (Mann 1986:169-170). Despotic power, according to Mann, “refers 
to the capacity to coerce and rule without reference to subjects or groups in civil 
society” and infrastructural power is defined as “the capacity to actually penetrate 
society and to implement logistically political decisions” (ibid.:170). The notion of 
infrastructural power resonates to some extent with Foucault’s concept of biopower. 
Tania Murray Li, for example, draws upon the Foucauldian notion of governmentality to 
examine and understand interventionism. In her book The Will to Improve (2007) she 
notes that development schemes in Indonesia can be understood as a biopolitical 
project aiming to foster the wellbeing and welfare of the population. Development is 
inseparable from the will to govern which involves "men in their relations, their links, 
their imbrication with...wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with all its 
specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc; men in their relation to...customs, 
habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc; and lastly, men in their relation to…accidents 
and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc (Foucault 1991a:93, cited in Li 
2007:6).  
Foucault’s notion of governmentality enables us to understand and analyse how 
governments set certain conditions and rules aiming to “improve the welfare of the 
population” (ibid.). Li points out governments often aim to shape human conduct 
through calculated means (ibid.:275). These calculated means are not necessarily 
solely based on coercion, as it would be impossible to force every individual to follow 
rules that are set by governments (ibid.). Li also points out that interventions are not 
developed ‘once and for all’ but are continually open to change and adaption. The 
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agents of development are rarely monolithic, often consisting of ‘heterogeneous 
assemblages’ that include “forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, 
practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgement, 
architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscriptions, 
techniques and so forth”(Rose 1999:52).10 Hence, in the context of liberal 
interventionism, these heterogeneous assemblages include, for instance, diplomats, 
military instructors, government officials, development experts, aid workers, local 
elders, warlords, etc., each one representing a constituency and based on the interest 
of their constituency, they follow the rules and take action in the process of 
interventions.   
Although Foucault’s work focuses more on the actions of governments, it can also be 
applied to the way different international institutions operate globally. According to 
Duffield (2005), Chandler (2009) and others, liberal interventionism can be understood 
as a form of ‘bio-politics’ aiming to discipline and control the behaviour of unruly 
populations on the global periphery. This is not to argue that ‘sovereign power’ or 
traditional geopolitics disappears from the picture. As seen in many interventions, geo-
strategic and military interests may be prioritised over liberalisation or the two may, in 
fact, go hand in hand (Kelly 2009). Kegley and Hermann (1995) observe that Niccolò 
Machiavelli in 1513 and, three centuries later, Immanuel Kant in 1795 wrote of ‘illiberal 
imperialism,’ explaining how the forces of liberal states or ‘republican governments’ use 
non-liberal ways to intervene in other countries due to foreign policy interests (Kegley 
and Hermann 1995:2).11  
2.3.5. The World Bank’s Community Driven Development example  
Two common features of externally promoted democratisation/good governance 
programmes have been decentralisation and participation. These emerged as key 
tenets of state reform programmes in the 1990s and have increasingly merged with 
promotion of governance and conflict reduction in ‘fragile’ states. Therefore ‘the local 
terrain’ and state-society relations have become a growing focus for both development 
workers and peace-builders. The Community Driven Development (CDD) initiative by 
the World Bank can be seen as one such example of a local governance intervention.  
                                            
10 See also Foucault (1980:194), cited in Li (2007:6). 
11 “Immanuel Kant recognised in 1795: the republican forms of government might be prone to 
practice illiberal methods to achieve their foreign policy goals, and that this impulse might 
undermine the prospects for democratic peace to prevail” (Kegley and Hermann 1995:2). 
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Community Driven Development is one of the World Bank’s major components of 
assistance to various developing and under-developed countries (Barron 2010). In the 
mid-1990s the World Bank started to take the CDD approach as a “mechanism for 
development and investment lending in various development organisations” (ADB 
2006:1). According to an Asian Development Bank (ADB) review, the CDD is “an 
umbrella term encompassing a wide range of projects that actively include beneficiaries 
in their design, management, and implementation” (ADB 2006:5). The World Bank 
defines CDD as “a development approach that gives control over planning decisions 
and investment resources to community groups and local governments” (Dongier et al. 
2003). In exchange for the provision of resources such as block-grants, communities 
are expected to accept the rules, regulations and conditionalities introduced by the 
CDD intervention. Conditionalities here include local participation and contribution to 
projects and, most importantly, inclusion of women in the programmes. The key 
expectations from CDD interventions are: 1) enhanced ‘sustainability’; 2) improved 
‘efficiency and effectiveness’; 3) ‘poverty reduction’; 4) more ‘inclusive’ development; 5) 
’empowerment’ of poor people, and building social capital, 6) strengthened 
governance; and 7) complementarity of market and public sector activities (Dongier et 
al. 2003: 13-14; ADB 2006:6; van Domelen 2007; Baird et. al. 2009; Binswanger-
Mkhize et al. 2010).  
Although CDD is not solely designed for conflict-affected countries, over the last two 
decades the approach has been increasingly deployed in such contexts (World Bank 
2005; World Bank 2006; Barron 2010; World Development Report 2011). According to 
Wong (2012:iv), the World Bank supported over 400 CDD projects in 94 countries to 
the tune of over $30 billion by 2005.12 A World Bank paper indicates that CDD holds 
‘dual platforms’, one ‘addressing community needs’ and another as an ‘instrument’ for 
‘empowerment’, especially in war-affected environments where physical and social 
structures have either ‘collapsed’ or their ‘capacity is minimal’(World Bank 2005:1). This 
point also indicates the World Bank’s role in supporting countries ‘transitioning from 
conflict’ is on the rise (ibid.). Additionally the Bank’s lending increased from two to ten 
per cent between 1989 and 2003, confirming that CDD is indeed is an important 
‘instrument’ for the Bank (ibid.).  
                                            
12 The World Bank (2005) stated that there were 86 active CDD projects in conflict-affected 
areas by 2005. The increase in the number of projects within so few years could also be seen 
as an indicator for the popularity of funding these projects, despite the problematic 
measurement of success. 
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Li (2005) undertook an extensive study of a CDD intervention in Indonesia that 
operates under the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). She elaborates on how 
this scheme is operationalised: building village infrastructure, allocating funds for each 
village and making proposals individually for each village or at sub-district level. She 
points out how these small projects are usually conventional (roads, bridges, irrigation, 
etc.) and do not lead to community disagreement. She adds that ‘social experts’13 have 
worked on mapping every single stage or step of project planning for on-going ‘fine-
tuning’ (Li 2005:384). For villagers, as she points out, access to funds comes in 
exchange for changing their behaviour as prescribed by the World Bank’s programme 
(ibid.). Li argues that the World Bank logic was to build institutions on top of a “clean 
slate not just physically but socially constructing a new society in which the delinquent 
structures of the old order would not intrude” (Li 2006:1). Barron et al. on the other 
hand, see the KDP in more positive terms, as an attempt to support the development of 
a legitimate and effective mechanism for resource allocation that also encourages the 
broader process of democratic institutional reform (Barron et al. 2011:xi). According to 
Barron et al. this programme is not necessarily designed for conflict resolution 
purposes, but it does provide a venue to examine relations between the development 
programme and local conflicts (ibid.). They point out that KDP contributed positively to 
the reconfiguration of citizen-state relations at the local level in many cases (ibid.). 
Epistemological understanding of the CDD approach 
The CDD approach is based on the concept of Community Development (CD) which 
has its own historical background and roots in the developed as well as the developing 
world. There are different approaches to community development, but most focus on 
some form of bottom-up community development in which different methods are used 
to enable the local population to analyse and identify their problems and decide their 
needs and priorities. Paulo Freire’s (1970) model emphasizes the importance of 
allowing the local population to be self-reliant and promoting bottom-up approaches. 
His Pedagogy of the Oppressed, influenced by Marxist thought, provided an extensive 
class analysis in which he highlighted the importance of participating and uniting for a 
common cause and, more specifically, by elaborating the relations between ‘the 
coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’ he provided a framework that later became the inspiration 
for participatory development across countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Freire 
1970; Mansuri and Rao 2004).  
                                            
13 Li defines ‘social experts’ as anthropologists who have carried out an ethnographic study of 
the villages and their power relations. 
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The Indian cooperative movement and Gandhi’s notion of village self-reliance and 
small-scale development that emerged as forms of resistance against colonial rule and 
the effects of modernisation are another example of community development work. 
Sinha elaborates on the origins of community development work and various types of 
interventions in India, which influenced later versions of CD such as the World Bank’s 
CDD (Sinha 2008). However, in the process, the radical philosophies of Freire and 
Gandhi disappeared. In the World Bank’s hands participation became a formal and 
technical process, steered by central governments and international institutions 
(Kothari 2001). 
The focus on local communities is not new, and goes back at least as far as the 
colonial period, particularly the late nineteenth century (Sinha 2008). Sinha, for 
instance, argues that a ‘development regime’ emerged in the early 20th century in India. 
This regime merged “institutional expertise, and state power imperatives”14 and, it is 
argued, there remain strong continuities between the colonial, post-colonial and liberal 
development regimes (ibid.:59). 
Sinha contends that right from the early days, in rural development policy the colonial 
authorities were only one of many actors, which included nationalists and American 
philanthropists who all pursued different sets of interests (ibid.). Therefore Sinha’s 
analysis shows a complex amalgam of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ initiatives and actors 
in which community development was co-produced and negotiated.  
CDD as conflict prevention ‘tool’ 
A World Bank paper emphasises that CDD is a ‘mechanism for preventing the 
emergence of violence’ (World Bank 2006), hence not only does CDD focus on conflict-
affected countries in general, but its approach can be considered a conflict prevention 
tool (Cliffe et al. 2003; Barron 2010). The experiences of Indonesia and later, East 
Timor, present two different contexts in which CDD programmes were applied. While in 
Indonesia CDD was used to dilute or decentralise the power of a strong centralised 
government, in East Timor the CDD intervention opened space for ‘social-construction’ 
of a ‘new society’ (Barron 2010), meaning the CDD intervention was used not only to 
disburse resources but also to build new institutions or rules by excluding village chiefs 
from decision-making roles in projects (Barron 2010:23). These two models were 
                                            
14 Ludden defines a ‘development regime’ as being an ‘institutional configuration of effective 
power over human behaviour, that also has legitimate authority to make decisions that affect the 
wealth and well-being of whole populations. (…) a development regime includes institutions of 
education, research, media, technology, science and intellectual influence that constitute a 
development policy mainstream’ (Ludden 2005: 4042, cited in Sinha 2008:59). 
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popularized in the early 2000s, leading the Bank and its donors to replicate them in 
many other countries including Afghanistan where the model was adapted as explored 
in later chapters. 
In East Timor, as Cliffe et al. point out, CDD was used as a ‘tool’ for building ‘new’ local 
governance institutions (Cliffe et al. 2003). Similar to the Indonesian experience, in 
East Timor the CDD intervention was framed as a Community Empowerment Project 
(CEP) and the implementation process included formation of village councils which 
acted as ‘program agents’ for the population and then ‘elected’ male and female 
representatives to the sub-district councils to ‘prioritise’ community needs and, based 
on that, prepare proposals for funding. In East Timor, the programme also added a 
condition that no ex-Indonesian or traditional leaders or heads of resistance structures 
could be elected as heads of these councils (ibid.:8). In the language of the 
programme’s designers, given that the overall intervention was about ‘state-building’ 
and ‘institution building’, conditionalities were placed on who could participate in the 
leadership of the councils. Barron’s review of the World Bank’s CDD experiences in 
‘conflict-affected’ and ‘post-conflict’ areas of the East Asia and Pacific region indicates 
that while donors in such areas often develop separate projects for security, 
development and economic recovery, the CDD approach was ‘different’, seeking to use 
one intervention to address all three at the local level (Barron 2010:15). In one example 
that Barron highlighted, it was claimed that the CDD contributed to resolving security 
issues as well as development and economic recovery. Although Barron concludes that 
the CDD is “no ‘magic bullet’ response to conflict” (ibid.:28), his review points out that 
the CDD projects did contribute to poverty reduction, building ‘social cohesion’ and 
‘strengthening local institutions’ (ibid.). 
2.3.6. Critiques of the Liberal approach  
As outlined above, liberal notions of ‘good governance’ are based upon a one-size-fits-
all model of Weberian institution-building. This is the desired end-state and societies 
which depart from the model are seen to be deficient and require ameliorative 
measures. The liberal approach has been described as a problem solving approach in 
the sense that the model is taken as a given and the problem to be solved is one of 
finding the best institution-building solution to reach this goal. State-building is about 
expanding the state’s authority and presence by building up a legal rational 
bureaucracy. Liberal peace-building therefore is a highly normative and ambitiously 
transformative endeavour. However in practice its prescriptive recipes, in many cases, 
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did not work effectively, leading to a growing critique and efforts to fix, revise or find 
alternatives to this approach.  
The liberal response to the poor track record of exogenous state-building has been to 
attempt to refine the approach, rather than questioning its fundamental assumptions. 
Reformist measures have included Roland Paris’ argument that peace-builders should 
attempt institutionalisation before liberalisation (IBL) since rapid democratisation or 
liberalisation of the economy in a transitional context, where state institutions are weak 
and unable to deal with the distributional conflicts and tensions that liberalisation 
creates, runs the risk of bringing about a return to open warfare (Paris 2006). Others 
argue conversely that the problem is that reforms are not sufficiently rapid and far-
reaching – they have been too timid and have failed to remove or neutralise reform 
resistant elites and institutions (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
Second, the realist response has been to argue for more modest and limited ambitions 
in post-war contexts. Donors should be satisfied with ‘good enough’ governance 
(Aguirre and van der Borgh 2010), and peace-building should focus on ‘stabilisation 
first’, which, by its nature, will be an elite-driven and highly pragmatic process (ibid.). 
The key argument for this approach is that it is impossible for external actors to change 
the behaviour of political elites which is rooted in the needs, experiences and histories 
of non-Western societies and polities (Roberts 2009).  
Third, critical international relations theorists drawing on Foucault expose the 
underlying workings of power in liberal peace-building. Interventions, they claim, are 
linked to neo-imperialist logics and intentions or to a biopolitical order (Mallaby 2002; 
Etzioni 2004; Paris 2006). Mark Duffield argues that the need for intervention is 
generated by the way in which global economic systems subordinate the status of war 
affected societies (Duffield 2007). The implications of this position are the need to 
intervene less, in addition to rather vague calls for a new ‘solidarity of the governed’ 
(ibid. 232-234). 
2.3.7. Alternatives to the Liberal approach 
Hybridity and Peace-building 
Linked to some of the above-noted critiques has been a growing body of scholarship 
that has attempted to grapple in more complex and nuanced ways with the workings 
and effects of liberal interventionism and development programming on the ground. 
This work challenges some of the sweeping critiques as well as the more positive 
assessments of liberal peace-building. One strand of this body of research has been a 
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growing focus on the ‘informal’, ‘traditional’ or ‘illiberal’ forms of governance that may 
exist in the shadow of, or sometimes in opposition to, the state (MacGinty and Williams 
2009; MacGinty 2010, 2011). Such analysts have advanced the notion of “hybrid 
political orders” as both an analytical and prescriptive framework. This approach 
encourages international strategies to “focus on local realities, local institutions, local 
knowledge and local agency” (Aguirre and van der Borgh 2010: para 14). It 
emphasizes communitarian ideas of local ownership, cultural sensitivity, local 
participation, social service provision and protection (Pugh et al. 2009:394-395; 
Richmond 2009). MacGinty and Williams point out that different aspects of the liberal 
peace can be deeply illiberal as they promote a highly specialised form of liberalism 
that is often highly prescriptive and reflective of western norms (MacGinty and Williams 
2009:5). For many, building peace means questioning the myth of “enduring state 
sovereignty” and accepting weak state boundaries, the legitimacy of non state 
formations and learning to live with “the reality of statelessness” (Aguirre and van der 
Borgh 2010: para. 15). MacGinty argues that the concept of hybridity is not about 
grafting together the two separate entities of ‘local’ and ‘global’ in order to create a third 
category. Rather it assumes that actors, norms and practises are the result of prior 
hybridisation (MacGinty 2011:211). MacGinty’s analysis of hybridity provides an 
alternative approach to studying the liberal peace in the sense that it acknowledges, 
(and to an extent valorises) local actors’ agency and their different forms of resistance. 
It therefore provides a useful lens for exploring ‘actually existing’ peace-building and its 
complexities on the ground. However, Mallett (2010) points to the difference between 
looking at hybrid political order as an analytical tool to understand ‘post-conflict’ 
contexts and as a practical tool for engagement in peace-building and suggests that 
institutionalising the concept of hybridity uncritically will result in short-sighted and risky 
outcomes. He argues that “overcoming a romanticisation of the ‘local’ and recognising 
the often adverse motives and actions of ostensibly auspicious local actors are 
requisite for both robust analysis and good politics” (Mallett 2010:67). 
Ethnographies of Aid  
In parallel with the work on hybridity in the context of liberal peace-building, there has 
also been a growth in a related body of research on ethnographies of aid. This 
research focuses on the discursive practices and process of aid and development 
assistance drawing on ethnographic methods (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Mosse 2005; 
Lewis and Mosse 2006). The power of ethnographic description and analysis lies in its 
unpacking of socio-political relations, brokership and translation in particular settings at 
particular moments of time. This work examines how interventions are received, 
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understood and interpreted by different actors at multiple levels (Mosse 2005:8). 
Scholars looking at the ethnography of development and aid rightly challenge the 
notion that interventions are about duped perpetrators (or the powerful Western 
development institutions) and the victims who are caught up in a “space-age juggernaut 
on auto-pilot” (Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal 2003 [draft], cited in Mosse 2005:6). The 
new ethnography of development, according to Mosse, questions “monolithic notions of 
dominance, resistance, hegemonic relations and the implications of false 
consciousness among the developed (or the developers)” (ibid.). 
In the following section I will further expand upon how these perspectives, combined 
with a political economy approach can provide a more convincing framework for 
studying local governance relations in patrimonial societies.  
2.4. A political economy approach to studying local governance 
The critiques and particularly the alternative views on the critiques of liberal peace 
interventions begin to take us towards a serious engagement with governance as an 
empirical reality rather than an abstract, ideal-type model. Concepts and frameworks 
broadly inspired by a historical political economy approach are particularly relevant. 
The political economy approach contends that the economy or the structures of 
production and patterns of economic activity, cannot be understood without looking at 
political interests, the organisation and balance of power and social relationships 
(Cramer and Goodhand 2014). A political economy approach “[…] reveals the workings 
of power not only through visible coercion that is direct in its effects but also in material 
basis of relationships that govern the distribution and use of resources, benefits, 
privileges, and authority within the home and society at large.”(True 2012:7) Following 
this approach will enable us to understand the internal dynamics and sources of power 
in a society. The historical aspect of the political economy approach helps advance an 
understanding of how and why certain individuals, groups or classes have more power 
than others, and how these power relations change over time (ibid.). By following this 
approach, I will look into local power relations and the role of men and women of 
different socio-political and economic status in society with regard to local governance 
practices in particular.  
In the following section I elaborate upon the various literatures that deal with 
governance from a broadly political economy perspective. These ideas and concepts 
will subsequently be drawn upon when studying local governance in Afghanistan. 
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2.4.1. Understanding patrimonialism and patron-client relations 
Local governance interventions by central governments and international donors do not 
take place on a blank slate, but in a context where there are pre-existing institutions 
and governance practices. Patron-client relations and the patronage based system of 
rule have been common in most Asian regions as well as in other parts of the world 
(Scott 1972b; Schmidt et al. 1977; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt and 
Roniger 1984; Erdmann and Engel 2007; Ilkhamov 2007; Guistozzi 2011). Patronage-
based systems of rule are thought to have preceded the emergence of modern nation 
states. Erdmann and Engel write that under colonial regimes, ‘traditional’ forms of 
domination were prevalent, and the modern or ‘legal-rational’ sphere of domination was 
limited to colonial capitals. Hence, relations between the majority of people and the 
ruling power beyond the colonial capitals were all based on patrimonial rule (Erdmann 
and Engel 2007). Under this system of rule, the less privileged commit themselves to 
‘patrons’ to secure their access to resources such as land, jobs, wealth, physical 
protection or direct assistance, particularly in times of scarcity or high need (Scott 
1972a:9). Beekers and van Gool characterize patrimonial relations as “reciprocal 
political exchange between actors commanding unequal resources” (Lemarchand and 
Legg 1972:151, cited in Beekers and van Gool 2012:6). In this system ‘patrons’, who 
are considered as high-status individuals, provide resources and physical protection to 
‘clients’ or people who are considered as lower-status. The clients repay their patrons 
by offering their loyalty, labour or political support (Beekers and van Gool 2012:6).  
Scott posits three different characteristics of patron-client relations: 1) imbalance of 
exchange, where patrons provide types of services that clients are unable to access 
otherwise; 2) face to face interactions that result in building personal relations that go 
beyond tribal, blood or other links between the two; and 3) diffuse flexibility, in which 
the link between the patron and client is very flexible and mutually dependent, and the 
nature of the exchange builds strong and fluid relations as opposed to explicit 
contractual relationships (Scott 1972b:93-95). In Scott’s view, relations between 
patrons and their clients are not solely coercive, but rather both participants have other 
choices open to them. There is reciprocity, meaning the patron provides services to the 
client and the client maintains loyalty to patrons. In some cases, clients seek services 
from more than one patron and there are circumstances where clients coerce patrons 
to provide services (ibid.).  
Therefore patronage systems are frequently viewed as ‘traditional’ and ‘indigenous’, 
relics of a pre-state era. Scott characterises patrimonial relations as a ‘moral economy’ 
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where “the irreducible minimum terms the peasant/client traditionally demands 
(‘expects’ is perhaps more appropriate) for his deference are physical security and a 
subsistence livelihood” (Scott 1976, 1977a:22 cited in Beekers and van Gool 2012:6). 
In diverse historical political cultures of different parts of the world, including West 
Africa, Southeast Asia and Southern Europe, the legitimacy of power is more based on 
whether those in positions of power share their wealth with the less resourceful to a 
satisfactory level or not, than on equality of wealth between the two (Guyer 1997:228; 
Scott 1977a:22: Pitt-Rivers 1971:61-3, cited in Beekers and van Gool 2012).  
Referring to non-state or informal structures in local settings as ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ is 
challenged by David Sneath in his book The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, 
Kinship Society, and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia. He first challenges the 
notion that clan oriented organisations preceded the state, arguing they were an “ipso 
facto creation of the state, which were then in turn maintained by these new elites 
throughout the creation of sophisticated genealogies” (Sneath 2007:152). Sneath 
argues that blood and kinship based clans and tribes, as commonly discussed, have 
never actually existed among, for instance, the Mongols (ibid.). He suggests that using 
terms such as ‘tribal’ or ‘clan’ to explain local power structures is problematic. Local or 
indigenous power structures are, according to Sneath, aristocratic orders that have 
different technologies of power associated with the state, such as taxation, military 
power, territorialisation, etc. They lack only bureaucratic power (Elverskog 2009). 
Consequently, as an aristocratic order holds all the different features of a modern state 
with the exception of central bureaucratic authority, he calls it ‘headless’. A parallel 
could be drawn with Afghanistan, where popular accounts of tribal and clan based 
traditions, ignore the fact that tribal structures have been shaped by their interaction 
with the state.  
Clientelism emerges as a result of the patrimonial system of rule. Kaufman points out 
that while clientelism takes different shapes in different contexts, it manifests three 
particular traits: 1) society is divided between persons with unequal power and status; 
2) there are reciprocal relations between patrons and clients that are self-regulating 
and inter-personal and their maintenance often depends on the level of returns that 
each actor expects from the other; and 3) the relationship is highly personalised and 
based on person to person or group interests that are, at best, perhaps loosely in 
accordance with public laws and societal norms (Kaufman 1974:285, cited in 
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002:3). Under clientelism the economic dependency of 
clients on their patrons is of primary significance while other aspects of the relations 
between them such as kinship, social, etc. are only secondary (Brinkerhoff and 
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Goldsmith 2002:2-3). As Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith put it, it is a form of ‘instrumental 
friendship’, though not a balanced one, as patrons often choose to focus on the poor 
and take advantage of their lack of or limited information and autonomy.15 The most 
important point to keep in mind is that patrimonialism evolves and takes new shapes as 
a result of changes in societies, and may continue to exist even when it appears to 
have vanished (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002:38).  
In sum, what we learn from studying local governance relations through a patrimonial 
lens is that the absence of formal government institutions does not necessarily means 
a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, but rather that in regions across Africa, Latin America, 
Southern Europe and Asia the social contract is organised around patron-client 
relations where the populations have specific forms of relations in which the distribution 
of resources is conducted by ‘patrons’ or a group of persons or elites who have access 
to resources and higher status, to ‘clients’ who are less privileged and considered lower 
status.  
2.4.2. Neopatrimonialism and hybridity  
In the earlier section (2.3.7) I introduced hybridity, as an alternative approach for 
studying liberal peace-building interventions. I have also highlighted some of its limits. 
In this section I further develop the concept of neopatrimonialism and hybridity in the 
context of liberal peace-building in patrimonial societies.   
Neopatrimonialism refers to a patrimonial system of rule that is combined with rule-
based or legal rational bureaucratic administration or the formal state in a broader 
sense. Under a neopatrimonial system there can be a relatively functional state and 
democratic structures, but the relations between actors and these structures are based 
on patronage rather than merit or institutional channels. Therefore there is a ‘dual 
political system’ where patrimonial political and economic relations exist in parallel to 
modern bureaucratic systems (Cammack 2007:600, cited in Beekers and van Gool 
2012:12). Neopatrimonial systems of rule are shaped by personalised political relations 
and networks which, in Reno’s words, may constitute a ‘shadow state’ (Reno 2000) that 
leaves the formal government institutions like ‘an empty shell’(Ferguson 2006:9 cited in 
Beekers and van Gool 2012:12).  
Under patrimonial rule distinctions between public and private interests are intentionally 
kept vague and official public posts are given to people as personal favours. In 
                                            
15 See section 2.4.3 for further elaboration on the monetisation of relations under neopatrimonial 
relations. 
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exchange for material rewards, clients mobilise political support for their patrons 
(Beekers and van Gool 2012). According to Khan, one of the key characteristics of the 
neopatrimonial state is the personalisation of power, based on modern forms of 
exchange between patrons and clients, where clients provide political support in 
exchange for their patron’s payoff with provision of resources, jobs and security (Khan 
2005).  
Neopatrimonialism, as Beekers and van Gool point out, is a modern phenomenon as it 
is linked with the rise of the organisation of modern states that is incorporated in the 
broader modern international system (Médard 1982:179; Budd 2004:2, cited in Beekers 
and van Gool 2012:12). Historically, neopatrimonial systems emerged as a result of the 
formation of modern state institutions introduced by colonial authorities. For example, 
Beekers and van Gool discuss the case of Nigeria, where pre-colonial political systems, 
characterised by competition between chiefs (or patrons) who were the main resource 
distributors to their dependants (clients), maintained this in the process of colonial 
sponsored state-building. Under the colonial system, these chiefs became dependant 
on clients and clients became dependant on the colonial government.  
One of the key characteristics of neo-patrimonialism, is its adaptability, shown by its 
existence in almost any kind of polity from multi-party, to civilian, military, capitalist or 
socialist, authoritarian or democratic (Médard 1982:184, cited in Beekers and van Gool 
2012: 17-18). According to Médard, patrons and brokers in clientalist networks need 
particular skills and capacities: “a skilful leader has to learn how to reconcile his own 
search for booty and spoils with the redistribution of those [state] resources necessary 
to get political support and strengthen his position” (Médard 1982: 167, cited in and 
emphasis by Beekers and van Gool 2012:13). Modern bureaucracies require skills that 
perhaps a traditional patron, particularly in geographically bounded agricultural 
economies, would not have. Hence these newly founded political relations can result in 
the emergence of a new type of leader that is literate, educated, more ‘urban’ and 
bureaucratically competent. The neopatron’s power base is not solely his patronage 
network, but his skills and abilities to ‘navigate the bureaucratic maze’, or understand 
how elections work and ‘get things done’ in the ‘modern institutions’ of government 
(Brass 1966; De Zwart 1994, cited in Beekers and Van Gool 2012:13). One 
manifestation of the agility and adaptability of neo-patrimonial networks is the sudden 
change in physical appearance of men in Afghanistan who had formerly operated as 
more traditional patrons (as khans, warlords or strongmen). These leaders shaved off 
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or trimmed their beards and wore western suits to look more ‘modern’, whilst still 
maintaining their positions of power as governors, ministers, vice presidents, etc.16  
Therefore elites exploit niches and spaces between the formal and informal systems; 
rather than trying to reform or build the formal system; they benefit from its seeming 
disfunctionality and lack of transparency (Beekers and van Gool 2012). Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith point out that “the state exists to serve the rulers, not the ruled” (Brinkerhoff 
and Goldsmith 2002:8). As the examples from Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate, 
neopatrimonial rulers could turn the state into a private commercial syndicate (Reno 
2007, cited in Beekers and van Gool 2012). Robert Wade, in his study of Indian canal 
irrigation systems, shows how officials bribed their way into lucrative posts and, once 
there, used their power to extract rents in order to earn back their investments, as well 
as pay upwards to protect their positions and satisfy their superiors. This system often 
operates in a way that it ‘trickles up’ with rents going to officials at a higher level (Wade 
1982, cited in Beekers and van Gool 2012). 
As Khan points out, interventions to install new institutions and reconfigure socio-
political relations in local settings seldom result in the establishment of legal-rational 
bureaucratic institutions or, for that matter, ‘good governance’ (Khan 2005). Instead, 
the whole process can be captured by elites and patronage networks who become key 
recipients of these interventions and resources. Local elites play an important brokering 
and gatekeeping role, ensuring their and their client’s interests are maximised by 
maintaining their control over resources and ensuring that intervening actors do not 
bypass them to get direct access to their local clients.17 According to Barzilai-Nahon, 
the power of gatekeepers often arises from their skill and ability to preserve the status 
quo by resisting measures that change the political environment against their interests 
(Barzilai-Nahon 2008:23-4). But brokers do not merely respond to circumstances, 
following the normative scripts introduced by intervening forces; they are active agents 
who play a role in (re)shaping the environments in which they function (Bierschenk et 
al. 2002, cited in Lewis and Mosse 2006:11). As the development regime is composed 
of an amalgam of different actors and institutions, there are always opportunities for 
brokerage between these different actors.  
Khan notes that in advanced countries power distribution, resources and incomes are 
shaped and enforced by formal institutions (Khan 2010). But in developing countries 
                                            
16 See the following chapters for further elaboration and examples on this point. 
17 For further illustration of this point refer to chapters six and seven where empirical examples 
from the field are provided. 
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the distribution of power is derived from organisational abilities that may not be based 
on the capitalist sector or formal institutions. He contends that this is linked to the way 
colonial rule operated in these contexts (Migdal 1988; Boone 1994; Reno 1995; 
Mamdani 1996). The legacy of indirect rule during colonial times in Africa, for instance, 
resulted in decentralised legal administrative institutions, which empowered local chiefs 
and left the central state weak and ineffective (Reno 1995). As a result, informal 
institutions such as patrimonial governance and patron-client relations became crucial 
in the distribution of resources and power (Khan 2010). Khan further posits that there is 
a strong interdependency between formal and informal institutions in developing 
countries.  
Patrimonial systems of rule create friction and conflict during processes of 
democratisation as the opening up of the political system challenges vested interests 
and established rent seeking opportunities. For instance during elections, competition 
between rival groups based on patron-client networks often results in further control 
and power for one patron who may hijack election procedures. Goodhand points out 
that attempts to introduce open competition such as elections can result in an outbreak 
of violence as it may force the renegotiation of the distribution of rents (Goodhand 
2014:4). Similarly, governance reforms related to institutionalisation, bureaucratisation 
and transparency work against the underlying interests of patronage based forms of 
governance (ibid.). However, Khan argues, this does not mean that patronage based 
government is necessarily anti-reform and anti-developmental – in some situations elite 
coalitions may emerge that promote economic growth, poverty reduction and 
channelling of resources, for instance when patrons support export-led industrialisation 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002:38-9). 
As Beekers and van Gool point out, ‘ordinary people’, particularly those who are not 
part of a strong patron-client network, experience a considerable level of insecurity 
under this system. Coping strategies are deployed to deal with this instability, including 
strengthening cliental ties with patrons through bribery and exchange of votes 
(particularly during elections), racketeering and banditry, public protests, etc. (Beekers 
and van Gool 2012:18). They highlight the importance of direct engagement with 
neopatrimonial politics in order to deal with day to day problems, in conditions of 
resource scarcity and where the powerless have few or no choices but to ally 
themselves with one group or another to survive and get access to resources (ibid.:24-
25). 
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According to Erdmann and Engel, the key difference between patrimonial and 
neopatrimonial rule is that in the latter, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic 
institutions co-exist and are co-productive. Under the neopatrimonial system, the 
exercise of power is unpredictable and unstable and though lip service may be paid to 
legal-rational procedures, social practices are often personal and informal (Erdmann 
and Engel 2007:114). Furthermore, it is argued that although neopatrimonialism 
involves some redistribution of resources, it lacks the moral standing of traditional 
patron-client relationships (Beekers and van Gool 2012). Under neopatrimonialism, the 
state becomes the main vehicle of accumulation and patron-client relations are 
monetised – they are tied together through financial flows rather than kinship relations, 
and this, as well as their transnational dimensions, makes them, according to (de Waal 
2009), far less stable. Neopatrons only indirectly depend on villagers and city dwellers. 
And the overall notion of exchange as a principle in patron-client relations is replaced 
by extraction, where the neopatron relies on clients when in need of political support, 
but in return is not systematically accountable if he does not deliver (ibid.:17).  
In Afghanistan, for instance, the neopatrimonial networks that emerged in war time 
were central to the ‘combat economy’ but also to the coping and shadow economies 
that enabled people to survive and accumulate during this period (Goodhand 2005). 
2.4.3. Patriarchy and (neo)patrimonialism  
In the earlier sections of this chapter, I elaborated on the aspirational goals of ‘good 
governance’ which include participation, transparency, accountability and an equitable 
form of governance as its core principles.18 Yet in developing countries, the ability to 
control violence and accumulate and distribute resources is the key governance 
capacity that matters (Khan 2010); hence, any action that restricts political elites’ ability 
to do this will be resisted or subverted by them. Examining and, indeed, changing 
gender relations in societies under a patrimonial system of rule requires first an 
understanding of how gender relations or the different roles that men and women play 
in the society work. Charrad describes the linkage between patriarchy and patrimonial 
rule as follows: 
The connections of patriarchalism as authority expressed in the household over 
the kinship group and the structure of rule over a larger population have far-
reaching implications. They mean that family arrangements and symbols are 
                                            
18 See sections 2.2 and 2.3.3 of this chapter. 
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extended into the public sphere and that the patrimonial ruler ‘owns’ his subjects 
as he does his wife and his children. (Charrad 2011:52) 
Charrad’s explanation of the gendered dimensions of patrimonial rule draws upon 
Weber’s description of patrimonialism as a “special case of patriarchal domination-
domestic authority decentralised through assignment of land and sometimes of 
equipment to sons of the house or other dependents” (Weber 1922/1978:1011, cited in 
Charrad 2011:52), although she also points out that Weber does not resolve whether 
patriarchalism constitutes the ingredients of patrimonial rule or if patrimonial rule can be 
exercised without patriarchalism (ibid.). In developing countries, patrimonialism is in 
part about controlling violence and the distribution of resources. Often women are used 
as a form of currency to strengthen political coalitions or resolve disputes and conflicts 
between rival groups through bartering them in marriage. Such practices limit women’s 
individual agency, however, there are also examples where women have exercised 
agency within the limited spaces at their disposal (Tapper 1991:21-23).   
Under a neopatrimonial regime, the monetisation of economic relations discussed 
earlier also has implications for gender relations. Customary ties, kinship and shared 
values do not entirely disappear but, with the change in the currency or the ‘economy of 
affection’ that is replaced by the power of money, there is also change in social 
relations. In the words of Hyden (1983) the ‘economy of affection’,19 or the social ties 
and obligations that were in place under a traditional form of patrimonial relations, has 
been replaced by this new form of relations that is entirely monetised. Kandiyoti 
considers how the years of war, particularly the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, have 
transformed ‘traditional’ forms of social control where decisions about women’s dress 
and mobility and relations between men and women which were previously under 
household, kinship group and community elders’ domains in terms of social control, 
were mandated by decree and enforced by groups of armed young men representing 
the state, or Taliban regime (Kandiyoti 2005:10). Kandiyoti argues that this approach 
not only oppressed women, but potentially also disempowered the non-Taliban men by 
“robbing them of their prerogatives” (ibid.). Kandiyoti’s example reflects the social 
aspect of the changes that are linked to the political economy of war and how externally 
funded factions were able to rule the population and change the social norms.  
                                            
19 Hyden (1983) refers to peasant societies in eastern Africa where the relations between the 
peasants and landlords were mainly based on network of interactions, communications and 
support among structurally defined groups that were connected by blood, kin, community or 
religion (Hyden 1983:8). 
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Protracted conflict has affected gender relations in other ways For example, war-
induced migration forced families to flee to urban centres in Iran and Pakistan. People’s 
mobility and migration resulted in them gaining access to modern and secular 
education that in turn, has changed men’s as well as women’s views about the position 
of women in society and their public role. Hence patriarchy under (neo)patrimonialism 
should not be seen as static, but rather a phenomenon that is constantly changing, 
both reflecting and generating broader societal shifts.  
2.4.4. Political Settlements and elite coalitions 
Studying and analysing the balance of power between different groups and classes, 
and the formation and evolution of institutions has been part of historical political 
economy since Marx (Moore 1966, cited in Di John and Putzel 2009). Historical political 
economy explains transitions from one to another mode of production, for instance from 
feudal systems to capitalism. More recently, discussions on political settlements have 
re-emerged in historical political economy discourse. Khan describes political 
settlements as “a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and 
also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability” (Khan 1995, 2000, 2010:4). 
According to Parks and Cole, the key elements of a political settlement include actors 
and their interests that are reflected in the way they shape or re-shape institutions to 
sustain formal or informal political settlements (Parks and Cole 2010:6). Khan also 
highlights important differences between political settlements in developed or capitalist 
systems and developing countries In developing countries revenues and sources of 
support for formal institutions are either external (e.g. foreign aid) or via patron-client 
relations (Khan 2010). 
Jones et al. focus their attention on the ‘informal’ dynamics between political actors, 
especially ‘elites’, with a specific focus on “formal re-negotiations of political 
arrangements” through deals on power sharing, constitutional conferences, peace 
deals and so on (Jones et al. 2012). Parks and Cole introduce secondary political 
settlements as “the arrangements among powerful local elites to control political 
competition and governance below the national level” (Parks and Cole 2010:18). 
Secondary political settlements are linked to the way local governance relations are 
settled and negotiated between local elites and the state or other relevant actors and 
institutions.  
Here, it is important to draw on Di John and Putzel’s definition of ‘elites’: 
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Elites are defined as: a) those in possession of valued assets in agriculture, 
manufacturing, services (main capitalists); b) those who wield substantial power of 
adjudication over the distribution and allocation of property rights (traditional 
chiefs, landlords, regional political leaders); c) those who possess authority to 
bargain on behalf of rural communities or organised religious communities 
(traditional leaders, religious leaders); d) those who lead political party 
organisations. (Di John and Putzel 2009:15) 
Di John and Putzel (2009) argue that states emerge as a result of coalitions of ‘elites’, 
and their ‘bargains’ are often about the allocation of rents. They argue that bargains 
can take different shapes in order to maintain the interests of elites, for example, 
protecting a landowner, supporting existing capitalists or creating new capitalist groups. 
In short, the aim is to maintain support for elite groups and their loyalty. 
In conflict-affected settings, military commanders or strongmen who gain their 
legitimacy through their control of violence become central to the elite bargain.20 In 
many contexts the outcomes of ‘elite bargains’ are not always positive and productive. 
For instance, in a case study from Zambia, Lindemann points out that while ‘inclusive 
elite bargains’ may bring peace for a temporary period or avoid a civil war, they do not 
contribute much to economic development or a sustainable peace (Lindemann 2011). 
2.5. Local Governance Interventions: An Alternative Theoretical Framework 
As demonstrated in this chapter, there are various theoretical debates on the nature of 
liberal interventions in conflict-affected settings. Critiques of liberal peacebuilding come 
from different theoretical and political standpoints. None have a monopoly of 
explanatory powers.  
Alternative frameworks such as hybridity and ethnographies of aid, provide a more 
promising approach to studying such interventions in particular contexts. It is proposed 
here to draw upon these alternative approaches which provide a more ‘bottom up’ 
perspective, and to meld them with political economy approaches that will expose 
underlying power relations and material interests. It is hoped that such an approach will 
enable a more insightful exploration of questions related to power and agency, 
institutions and patriarchy in the contexts of local governance interventions in 
Afghanistan.  
                                            
20 The following chapters in this thesis further elaborate on examples of elites in Afghanistan. 
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Therefore I have attempted to develop a theoretical framework based upon ‘systematic 
eclecticism’ that combines historical political economy complemented with a hybridity 
lens and ethnography of aid in order to expand our knowledge of the study of power 
relations, and goverance interventions that evolve as result of liberal interventions in 
particular time and places.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the broader theoretical framework for the thesis by engaging 
with two inter-related bodies of literature that provided an analytical lens for the study of 
local governance in Afghanistan. These included literature on liberal peace-building 
and on historical political economy. The chapter, after defining terms, explored the 
literature on liberal peace-building, institution building and ‘good governance’ and 
community driven development. This literature looks at governance in highly stylized 
and normative terms. It is a model that can be transferred wholesale and is imbued with 
all sorts of positive values and dimensions – it promotes participation, accountability, 
broad-based development, citizen’s choice, conflict prevention and so forth. I have 
argued that this view of governance bears very little relation to actually existing 
governance in developing countries, nor does it accurately reflect the interventions of 
international actors themselves, who frequently depart from the norms and values they 
purportedly promote. I pointed out that depending on time and context, the evidence 
available shows us that liberal peace-building and interventionism can be as much 
about bio-politics or changing the socio-political relations, norms and behaviours of 
people as it can be about geopolitics where the interest of liberal states can determine 
which aspect to prioritise. 
In the second half of the chapter I turned to historical political economy approaches 
where I provided a set of concepts and frameworks far more relevant and analytically 
convincing, particularly in relation to the context I am studying. Historical political 
economy is understood as an approach that enables us to explain how power operates 
through the material basis of relationships that govern the distribution of resources, 
privilege, benefits and authority, not only through coercion and its direct effects, but 
also through meeting people’s needs. The chapter introduced patrimonial and 
neopatrimonial lenses for the study of existing governance relations in the socio-
political context of developing countries that are affected by conflict and interventions.  
I argued war, conflicts, mobility of people, migration and, above all, monetisation of 
these socio-economic relations due to the aforementioned factors change the nature of 
patrimonial society, not simply to a liberal society, but a far more complex form of 
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relations that emerges as a result of liberal interventionism in these contexts. The 
chapter discussed the relations between patriarchy as a system of thinking in 
(neo)patrimonial systems by assessing the underlying logics used by ruling men who 
limit women’s access to public space.  
The chapter argued that external financial, political and military dependency is an 
important factor in defining elites in the sites of interventions. Hence, patron-client 
relations need to be seen in the much broader context of interventionism and its 
implications for local governance relations. I aim, in subsequent empirical chapters, to 
apply a collection of these frameworks to studying local governance programmes in 
Afghanistan.  
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Chapter Three 
Methodological Approaches to the Study of Local Governance 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain my research design and methodological choices and the 
challenges I faced during the field research. My methodological choices were shaped 
by the scope and nature of this study and the theoretical framework presented in 
chapter two. Rather than treating international actors, the central government and local 
elites and populations as discrete categories, I was more interested in the blurred 
boundaries between these groups and their complex interactions. The purpose of this 
research is to study the reciprocal relations between them in different site(s) of 
intervention. These sites were Kabul (to understand the broader national level 
processes of designing, justifying and negotiating local governance interventions) and 
districts and villages in Nangarhar and Bamyan (where specific Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance (IDLG) programmes were applied and implemented. In order to analyse 
and understand the rationales and backgrounds of intervening forces and local actors I 
followed an ethnographic approach and used the extended case method, drawing upon 
ethnographic techniques, for empirical data collection. However, I was not able to 
spend lengthy periods of time in the same locality because of cultural and security 
concerns that are elaborated upon further below. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections including the introduction. In section two, I 
describe my position in the research as an ‘insider/outsider’ and discuss the 
implications this position had for my entry into the field sites and engagement with 
informants. In section three, I expand upon the research questions that were introduced 
in chapter one; in section four, I elaborate on the methodological approaches employed 
to investigate local governance relations; section five introduces the extended case 
study as a methodological approach that helped the course of this study, the research 
methods and criteria for selection of field sites. Section six highlights the ethical and 
security challenges of conducting research in a conflict-affected setting and section 
seven summarises the methodological approach adopted for this study. 
3.2. My position as an ‘insider/outsider’ researcher 
In the study of development interventions, there is an important distinction to be made 
between the positioning of evaluators and critical researchers (Mosse 2005:2; Li 
2007:2; Monsutti 2012). I would position myself as a ‘critical insider’ who does not study 
local governance interventions to prescribe a normative recipe for changing or 
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replicating such interventions in other contexts. Rather, my study aims to provide a 
broader and more in-depth analysis of the different dynamics surrounding governance 
interventions, and how they influence local histories and power relations in particular 
settings. In other words, my aim is not to ‘assess’ these interventions or judge them as 
a ‘success or ‘failure’. As Mosse (2005) points out, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are both 
“policy-oriented judgements that obscure project effects” (Mosse 2005:11). Mosse 
further draws upon Apthorpe’s observation that “even if projects fail as practice they 
may nonetheless succeed as code or policy argument in the wider arena” (Apthorpe 
1997:4, cited in Mosse 2005:11). Hence, my aim in this study is more directed towards 
what Norman Long deems the production of ‘knowledge for understanding’ (Long 
1992:4). By bringing my field experiences and empirical data into this thesis, I intend to 
contribute to the broader understanding of local governance relations in the context of 
international interventionism (Mosse 2005:11).  
The ‘insider’/‘outsider’ dilemmas 
As ethnographic research involves dealing with people, their daily lives, the way they 
think and share their stories, it is critical to consider ethical issues while carrying out the 
research. However, as O’Reilly (2005) indicates, ethical concerns should not result in 
avoiding research on difficult subjects, but should encourage reflectivity and self 
awareness on the part of the researcher (O’Reilly 2005:60). For instance, given that 
this research project took place in a conflict-affected context, it was crucial to ensure 
the safety and security of informants and interviewees as well as myself. I ensured the 
confidentiality of research subjects in general, particularly in instances where I felt not 
mentioning their names could protect them. I explained the purpose of the research to 
each informant prior to all interviews and sought their consent, mostly verbally where, 
prior to interview, they agreed with me to use the information they provided in my 
research. Respecting cultural and customary norms in each community is a very 
important aspect of conducting field research in any setting, particularly in rural and 
remote areas. I made sure that I followed these norms in a respectful manner during 
the research. In all of my field research in the two provinces (Nangarhar and Bamyan) I 
avoided carrying a smart phone or voice recorder and (in some cases) a camera as I 
realised carrying these could lead to 1) attracting more attention to my presence in the 
villages that could potentially include some security risks and 2) making people who 
were not comfortable being recorded feel uneasy.21 In some instances, informants 
asked me not to use a particular story or event in my research as a condition of their 
                                            
21 In Nangarhar it was especially not common and I was told it is to do with the fear informants 
had from the pro-Soviet era where government spies would use small tape-recorders to record 
interviewee voices and then the interviewees would find themselves in prison. 
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sharing it, which I followed and respected. I did not take many pictures during the field 
research, as I was sensitive to local populations’ feeling exploited by visiting outsiders 
who took lots of pictures from the field, without returning to give anything back to the 
community.22  
I acknowledge my position as an ‘insider’ in studying my own society. However, as 
Bartunek and Loius (1996) point out, although I am considered an ‘insider’ relative to 
expatriate researchers who study Afghanistan, the villagers with whom I interacted 
considered me an ‘outsider’ because I did not necessarily have shared kinship, ethnic 
or religious identities with any of them (Bartunek and Louis 1996:12). For instance, 
Nangarhar is my native province, but I come from a different tribe and district from the 
village I studied, which for the most part has a reputation for politically opposing the 
regimes that my extended family participated in. This was not a conscious decision, but 
I learnt about it as I carried out the research. In Bamyan, I was a Pashtun23 (by 
ethnicity), Sunni (by religion) woman carrying out research in predominantly Shiia 
Hazara and Sadaat communities. Nevertheless, in both contexts, as an internationally 
educated Afghan woman who was interested in studying her own country, I was 
considered in the words of Abu-Lughod to be ‘a dutiful daughter’, who was mostly 
welcomed, respected and trusted. However, at times, I was also challenged and 
confronted for being an independent woman travelling alone (Abu-Lughod 1988). This 
certainly brought a different quality of knowledge from the field in comparison to that of 
a complete ‘outsider’, nevertheless, I acknowledge bias as inevitable and also the 
importance of valuing balance and avoiding bias as far as possible (Aguilar 1981:22, 
cited in Ellen 1984:130).  
As part of my previous job I carried out programmatic and policy reviews and policy 
advocacy. This background clearly had an impact on this study. In the course of the 
past decade, I have often identified myself as a development practitioner and later as a 
‘civil society activist’. In the four years of my PhD research, I have tried to distance 
myself from the ‘activist’ role in order to see things more critically and look at my own 
work and role from a distance. I leave the judgement on how successful I have been in 
this to the reader. Consequently, on the one hand this thesis is written from the 
perspective of a native activist, while on the other, I have taken a critical approach by 
                                            
22 This understanding is mainly based on my years of experience as a development practitioner 
working in refugee and rural communities. 
23 This part of my identity is visible in my first name, even if by principle I chose not to share my 
ethnic background with people. 
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trying to explore questions that were not considered ‘appropriate’ in either of my 
previous roles as a development practitioner or as a ‘civil society activist’.  
3.3. Research Questions  
The research questions are organised as follows: First, there is a broader question, 
then four sub-questions. I used sets of guiding questions for each of the four sub-
questions during interviews with informants.24  
The broader research question is: 
How have local governance programmes and policies been designed and 
implemented in Afghanistan and what effects have they had on local power 
structures? 
Below are four sub-questions and a set of guiding questions for each sub-question:  
1) What were the underlying rationales and interests behind the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance (IDLG) interventions and how was this reflected in their design and 
planning at the national level?  
1.1. What processes resulted in the formulation and design of the MRRD’s 
National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and IDLG’s establishment as an 
Independent Directorate of Local Governance?  
1.2. How was the gender dimension of the intervention made part of both the NSP 
and IDLG’s Sub-National Governance Policy and how was this dimension 
negotiated with local actors? 
1.3. How did the shifting agendas of international donors and national government 
re-shape their engagements with local actors? 
2) How were the MRRD’s NSP and IDLG interventions, including their gender 
conditionality, received by elites and the wider population of women and men at local 
level? 
2.1. Who were the key actors or elites at the local (village and district) level and 
how were they more influential than others in terms of ‘representing’ the rest of 
the population or being elected as Community Development Council (CDC) 
members? 
                                            
24 Annex one presents examples of key informant questions and semi-structured questions used 
during interviews.  
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2.2. How was the NSP introduced and the CDC established in local villages and 
who participated in the process of CDC formation and overall NSP 
implementation in the village(s)?  
2.3. How did village elites and the CDC leadership deal with NSP conditions such 
as the overall criteria for NSP standards, gender, participation etc.?  
2.4. What forces at the village level influenced decisions over conditionalities? (For 
instance, what role do different actors such as khans, maliks, mullahs, NGOs, 
commanders, political leaders, etc. play in this?)  
2.5. What was the role of the qaryadar, how do villagers become qaryadars and 
what does the process of registering a qaryadar involve? 
3) What effects did these interventions have on local governance and power relations, 
and how, if at all, did they differ from those intended by the programme planners and 
implementers? 
3.1. What role did the CDC leadership play in the overall governance of a village? 
To what extent could the CDC leadership be separated from actual or 
‘customary’ village leadership?  
3.2. After completion of NSP implementation, were CDCs still active in attracting 
resources to their villages, or did they dissolve once the block-grants had 
been spent? 
3.3. How has the creation of CDCs affected existing power relations, local 
leadership and local elites’ relations with the state at district level and 
beyond?  
4) How does this research relate to and contribute to wider theoretical and policy 
debates on the efficacy and desirability of local governance programme interventions in 
conflict-affected contexts? 
4.1. What are the merits and limitations of the literatures on liberal peace-building 
and the political economy of state-building and what insights do they provide 
in relation to local governance programmes in conflict-affected settings? 
4.2. To what extent have writers attempted to bridge the gap between these two 
literatures and approaches and does this provide a convincing lens for 
studying local governance programmes? 
3.4. Methodological approaches to investigating local governance 
A historical political economy approach provides the theoretical framework for 
investigating local governance interventions in this thesis. Methodologically, this 
approach is operationalized through multi-sited ethnography in order to study local 
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governance programmatic interventions in more than one location (Falzon 2009:1-2). 
Shore and Wright point out that the study of programmes and policies are crucial in 
understanding how they influence and (re)shape society in different ways (Shore and 
Wright 1997). In the study of a nationwide programme and policy for building modern 
governance institutions, ethnographic accounts of the formulation process and 
implementation on the ground, when joined with the accounts and narratives of the 
recipients of these interventions, will help us respond to the key question of this thesis: 
How have local governance programmes and policies been designed and implemented 
in Afghanistan and what effects have they had on local power structures? 
  
This study was influenced by Long and Long’s ‘actor-oriented’ approach which 
emphasises the agency of individuals whilst also recognising the constraints of the 
wider environment in which they operate (Long and Long 1992, Long, N. 2001). Long 
pointed out that actions are never solely about the individual, but rather take place 
within a network of relations (Long, N. 2001:49-50), shaped by organising practices that 
are bound by social conventions, values and power relations (ibid.). A qualitative 
approach, that involves tracing and analysing the processes of negotiations and 
interactions, is required to understand power relations and their on-going changes and 
reconfigurations in the course of interventions. Focusing on a specific setting at a 
particular moment in time enables a more precise form of analysis of the power 
dynamics that shape and reshape the overall nature of local governance relations.  
Mosse (2005) provides an extensive discussion of two different approaches to studying 
programmes and policies: the instrumental and the critical approach. The instrumental 
approach mainly takes a ‘problem-solving’ perspective and seeks to improve the way in 
which development is conducted. Meanwhile, the critical approach looks at policy as a 
‘rationalising technical discourse’ that conceals the dominating bureaucratic power’s 
‘hidden purposes’ (Mosse 2005:2). He argues that neither of the two views reflects the 
complexity and contingency of policy development and the relationship between the 
policy/programme and practice (ibid.:2-3). Similarly, Shore and Wright have pointed out 
that the key is to capture the interactions and/or disjunction between various sites or 
levels involved in the processes of development programme and policy implementation 
(Shore and Wright 1997:14). Therefore, they suggest ‘studying through’, which means 
“tracing ways in which power creates webs and relations between actors, institutions 
and discourses across time and space” (ibid.). This approach entails multi-sited 
ethnographies that enable us to look at the way broader intervention logics and 
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rationales are translated into policies and connected with the everyday practices of 
governance in a given context through implementation of the programme interventions.  
It is important to note here that gender is an important aspect of this research. 
Methodologically, instead of separating out the question of gender relations and how 
they are affected by the process of local governance interventions, I have integrated 
this question into the overall study and looked at it in a broader way.  
In sum, investigating and studying local governance interventions requires a qualitative 
and multi-sited ethnographic approach that allows us to follow the events that shape 
and rationalise these interventions and their result in changing local power dynamics 
and governance relations. Thus, these methodological choices are, indeed, in line with 
my research in which I have taken a historical political economy approach to studying 
local governance programme and policy interventions. 
3.5. Research Design 
3.5.1 Extended Case Method as research method 
This study mainly takes an ethnographic approach. Drawing on Burawoy’s work, I see 
ethnography as an action in which the researcher writes about the world through 
participant observation (Burawoy 1998:6). Moreover, I use the extended case method 
as a methodological framework to study local governance interventions and how they 
change local governance relations in a given time and context. The extended case 
method is an open-ended form of method first developed in the 1950s-1960s by Max 
Gluckman and his students at the ‘Manchester School’ (Gluckman 1958; Van Velson 
1960; Burawoy 1998). The key point of this method is its openness, allowing the 
researcher to engage with “what natives actually were doing” rather than what they 
ought to do (Burawoy 1998:5). In other words, it focuses on practices, and takes these 
practices as an entry point to understand power relations that both enable and 
constrain people’s actions. The method enables the researcher to learn about changes 
that are taking place in the society that he or she is studying. Norms are understood not 
as internalised and then executed, but as a field of competing interests (Burawoy 
1991:278). As Burawoy points out, the extended case method has the ability to “dig 
beneath the political binaries” such as the local and central and the coloniser and 
colonised (Burawoy 1998:6). 
In the study of local governance interventions I used multi-sited ethnography, following 
and gathering data on a set of processes and the interpretation of the processes in 
different geographical locations. The extended case method enabled me to follow 
  45 
processes (governance interventions) across time and location looking at people’s 
practices, their inter-relations and their understanding and interpretation of these 
events. Like Burawoy, I found this method relevant because of the diversity in the 
nature of actors participating at multiple levels in local governance interventions 
(Burawoy 1998; Van Binsbergen 2006). 
Moreover, this method enabled me to open up the scope of the study, to look at the 
everyday practices of governance in situ, as well as observing policy making processes 
at the national level. The method’s ability to capture change and to go beyond binaries 
was useful as I intended to provide a perspective on subjects of intervention who have 
agency and at the same time highlight the shifts or changes in local governance 
relations that occurred as a result of war, conflict, mobility and migration. In contrast to 
some earlier work, where scholars used the metaphor of a ‘mud-curtain’ separating the 
villagers or ‘the local’ from outsiders (Dupree 1973),25 the use of this method enabled 
me to focus on the inter-relations between the local recipients of the governance 
programme interventions and the intervening forces that include central government 
and its international sponsors.  
I used various research methods for data collection such as semi-structured interviews, 
participant observation, a number of focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews26 and open-ended conversations with individuals and groups at the national 
level in Kabul and, in the two provinces, Nangarhar’s Behsud district headquarters and 
Qala-e-Janan Khan village and Bamyan’s Yakawlang district headquarters and the 
(administratively merged for the purposes of the CDC) villages of Katakhana and 
Akhundan. The selection of the three locations depended very much on security and 
safety, the willingness of persons/institutions/organisations to facilitate the first 
introduction and, more importantly, the willingness of the local population and members 
of the local village councils to participate in the research. I sought formal permission in 
cases of meeting local government authorities, whereas for meeting local villagers, I 
mainly relied on their own consensus to take part in the research as informants. 
The time frame for this study was the post-2001 context (2001-2012)27; however a pre-
2001 historical context of local governance interventions and local governance relations 
in the broader Afghanistan context is provided. For specific histories of the villages, 
however, I mainly relied on local informants’ narratives.  
                                            
25 Also see chapter four 4.3 for more on this. 
26 In the following section 3.5.2, I elaborate further on these methods. 
27 This thesis was completed in September, 2014, hence some of the additional analysis 
through secondary sources and my observations from this period are also included. 
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3.5.2. Selection of Research methods  
Semi-structured interview: This was the main form of interview technique used. I used 
semi-structured interviews to interview 110 informants (91 male and 19 female) in all 
three locations. These included men and women at the village level, district officials 
(mostly men), provincial officials and national level informants. I had a list of prioritised 
questions but only used them in accordance with the informant’s consent about what 
he/she was willing to share and how much time he/she was able to spend answering 
questions. The advantage of the semi-structured format was that it allowed the 
informant freedom to provide (in some instances) information about the broader 
context. At the same time, it did not always elicit the specific data that I was looking for. 
I mitigated that with the help of the key informant’s format, where more specific 
questions were asked (see Annex One). 
Participant observation and observation notes: As mentioned before, I added brief 
observation notes for each interview explaining the context in which the interview was 
conducted and any relevant background notes on the informant. I also attended some 
social events and formal gatherings at national and local levels and wrote observation 
notes about what had been discussed; these observation notes became part of my 
primary sources for analysis in the empirical chapters in this thesis (see Annex One for 
examples). 
Key informant interviews: The key informant interviews were lengthier and more 
detailed interviews conducted with two categories of people. The first was national level 
actors with senior authority over the process of formulation, design and execution of 
local governance interventions. These involved senior or mid-level government officials, 
national development practitioners and some international experts. In Kabul I 
conducted five key informant interviews in total (four male and one female). The 
second was actors in the villages and districts who were directly involved in overall 
village governance and/or in the process of Community Development Council (CDC) 
formation. In total in both Nangarhar and Bamyan I conducted fourteen key informant 
interviews (eight male and six female) (see Annex One)  
Focus Group Discussion (FGD): I used this method when I had an opportunity to gather 
more than two informants in a place to discuss some key questions related to the 
socio-political context of selected site(s). Only one focus group was recorded; notes 
were taken in the others. Focus groups were usually same-sex, although on one 
occasion, in Bamyan city, I had an opportunity to have a mixed group of men and 
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women members of one council. In total I had four focus group discussions; two 
women, one men and one mixed group.  
Using these different methods together was helpful as it provided an opportunity to 
triangulate information received from different sources. I made a point of repeat 
interviewing most of the key informants, once at the first visits and another time in one 
of my last visits to the site. The focus group discussions had interesting dynamics; in 
Bamyan for instance, bringing women from both villages together for the FGD was 
helpful in showing the role of the female leader and her authority as a representative of 
women.28  
Although I had well-established connections with various Afghan NGOs active in the 
field sites in Nangarhar and Bamyan, I did not rely solely on this network for information 
and recommendations. I also searched for academic and other contacts; for instance, I 
contacted a distant relative who teaches at Nangarhar University to advise me on the 
selection of field sites and other matters. I preferred non-NGO contacts as a point of 
entry, mainly in order to distance myself from my previous role as an aid-worker-seen-
as-service-provider on the ground. Nevertheless, my background as a development 
practitioner and my wide range of contacts was extremely useful in conducting this 
study. Since the specific target sites in the country were not places I had interacted with 
directly before, knowing people and organisations who were able to assist me at the 
entry point was very helpful. Also, at a national level, the senior officials in IDLG and 
MRRD provincial/district departments changed rapidly. Most of the key actors I was 
seeking to (re)establish contact with were no longer in their posts. In some ways this 
was an advantage, as they seemed to be more generous with their time and willing to 
provide more ‘forthright’ responses to my questions. However, the responses of key 
national actors very much depended on their future plans. For instance, one informant 
who, I was told, was hoping to return to government in a senior advisory capacity, was 
much less open in his responses than another who had a private business and no 
immediate intentions to return to a governmental post.  
The actors and informants interviewed for this study were diverse in terms of their 
positions, authority and socio-political and economic status. I distinguish between 
actors and informants because not all informants were directly involved in the events 
and processes that I was examining through this research. Similarly, there needs to be 
a distinction made between actors and elites. I use the latter term only to define those 
                                            
28 Unfortunately, I was not able to bring men in Bamyan together as it was working season and 
they were not available to gather at the same time. 
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in the highest authority positions based on their socio-political and economic status. 
One important contribution of this study is its diversity of informants; perspectives on 
local governance have been collected from a broad range of people, from a farmer in a 
village to a very senior government official.  
My familiarity with the context and security conditions resulted in an efficient and 
(mostly) successful plan that enabled me to visit the field sites in accordance with my 
initial plans. One originally planned site (Herat) had to be abandoned due to travel 
security concerns in the district (Ghoryan); this did not affect my field study in any 
significant way. I was mostly based in Kabul and made five trips to Nangarhar and 
three visits to Bamyan province during the field research period, spending between five 
to ten days at each.  
My identity as a female Afghan national was both a strength and a weakness. My 
strengths were that I had no language barriers, and long-standing experience working 
in Kabul as well as in the two provinces. As a woman conducting research, I enjoyed 
the advantages of having access to both men and women in all the fieldwork locations. 
At the same time being a ‘local’ and a woman could also be a weakness or a challenge. 
For instance, I found some of the informants in government offices less cooperative 
than in my previous experiences of accompanying expatriate researchers. Their 
willingness to share information with an expatriate researcher could be seen as the 
price of potentially accessing resources, whereas as a national researcher with student 
status, I could not promise them anything in return. Also as an independent woman, 
travel and mobility, especially staying overnight in some of the local sites, was the most 
significant challenge I faced. I mitigated this challenge by staying in the cities most of 
time and by spending very few nights with the families in or near the selected village 
sites. As spending longer periods of time in the selected areas could have had security 
risks, instead I arranged shorter, but repeated visits. I was also aware of, and took 
precautions against the danger of over-reliance on the people/organisations who 
arranged my initial introductions – that this could put me in a position of bias at times. 
For instance, in Nangarhar, only the initial introductions were made by my guide. 
Similarly, in Bamyan, a local NGO staff member introduced me to one of the village 
elders, but did not accompany me to subsequent meetings.  
3.5.3. Selection of the Field Sites  
I selected two districts and, within them, three villages; the village of Qala-e-Janan 
Khan, Behsud District, Nangarhar Province and the villages of Katakhana and 
Akhundan, Yakawlang District, Bamyan Province. The reason for two villages rather 
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than one in Bamyan was because these two villages had officially ‘merged’ in order to 
form one Community Development Council. Given the fact that the study focuses on 
local governance interventions, national level politics around the decisions and 
operationalisation of interventions was important, hence Kabul’s inclusion as a field site 
where the focus was solely on studying national level institutions and actors and their 
role on local governance interventions. The two provinces, Nangarhar and Bamyan, 
were selected as site(s) of interventions or where the effects of MRRD and IDLG’s 
interventions were to be examined.  
There are a number of studies on local politics and local governance in Afghanistan 
carried out by researchers who used quantitative and qualitative methods and selected 
a wide range of sites. I, instead, preferred to limit the number of sites and go deeper 
into the analysis of the context and power dynamics in these settings. This approach 
undoubtedly has its strengths and weaknesses. The weakness is that in no way or 
form, can these two fieldwork sites be seen as representative of all other similar 
communities. The strength is the contribution such study makes in augmenting the 
current scarce ethnographic data at the community or village level in Afghanistan.  
As mentioned earlier, it is not possible for a study to be comprehensive and 
representative. I made an attempt to gather my primary data from a district and a 
village from two different parts of the country: the eastern province of Nangarhar, and 
the central province of Bamyan. Geographic and political criteria considered included:   
Geographical: what particularities do the district and villages have in terms of 
geography and its location? Distance and influence from centre: how far (or close) is 
the village from the district and the provincial capital? For example, one site is very 
close to the district headquarters and the other much further away.    
Political: the influence of the government and other intervening forces in the district and 
in the villages respectively; is the presence of central government felt at the local level? 
If yes, then in what forms? The geopolitics of the location was also considered – how 
important (or marginal) the site is to central government in terms of flow of resources, 
political elites’ relations to the region and what impact security and the political 
economy of the site(s) might have on central government and vice versa.  
At the village level, the existence of Community Development Councils (CDCs) was a 
key consideration for selection. I also took into account diversity in ethnic, language, 
sectarian (Sunni or Shiia), political and historical grounds.  
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At the district level I looked at the presence of the MRRD’s District Development 
Assemblies (DDA) and IDGL run programmes such as the Afghan Social Outreach 
Programme (ASOP) and development assistance provided by the international military.  
At the provincial level I considered, how significant the provinces were to the centre in 
terms of revenues and income, geopolitics, and the presence of international forces 
(See also broader political criteria above).  
In selecting the provinces and districts, I mainly used available secondary data and my 
existing knowledge of the political relations of the two provinces eventually chosen. 
After an initial visit to each province, and in consultation with some of the local 
informants and their views, the villages were selected. In Nangarhar, a university 
lecturer who was my key point of contact was helpful in introducing me to the villagers. 
In Bamyan, the regional director of a national NGO was my initial contact. I must point 
out here that the villages chosen were new places to me; I had no previous knowledge 
of them prior to this research. Although my previous work experience in Kabul, 
Nangarhar and Bamyan was an important asset in terms of building trust and 
connections and meeting informants, I knew no-one in the villages and, more 
importantly, no-one in the villages was aware of my working background. This enabled 
me to somewhat reduce the risk of the informants’ responses being shaped by my 
previous roles as a NGO leader or representative in the field.29 However, I assume my 
general status in the eyes of majority of informants (particularly in the provinces) as an 
educated woman arriving from Kabul and studying in the UK had an influence in their 
mostly positive responses about women’s role in local governance interventions.   
                                            
29 Previously, I had visited both provinces for purposes of programme assessments and delivery 
of services. 
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Table 1 Breakdown of the field research by groups, locations and affiliations 
Groups Location Positions # of Interviews 
MRRD Kabul Senior officials current & previous 
  
A total of  
34 interviews 
conducted in  
Kabul 
  
  
IDLG   Senior officials current & previous 
GIROA Kabul 
Relevant officials from other 
institutions 
NGOs 
Kabul, Nangarhar, 
Bamyan Development Practitioners 
Civil-Military 
Advisors NATO HQ, Kabul Advisors on governance work 
PRT Kabul, Bamyan 
Commander in Chief of PRT 
Bamyan 
International 
Advisors Kabul 
Experts on governance & 
development 
      34 
Provincial 
Government Nangarhar Relevant officials  14 
Provincial 
Council Nangarhar Previous PC candidate 1 
District HQ 
Behsud 
(Nangarhar) 
District governor & relevant 
officials 5 
Qala-e-Janan 
Khan 
Behsud 
(Nangarhar) 
Men & women of different age 
groups & governance positions 33 
      53 
Provincial 
Government Bamyan 
Provincial governor and other 
relevant officials 16 
Provincial 
Council Bamyan Members 2 
District HQ 
Yakawlang 
(Bamyan) 
District govern and relevant 
officials 14 
Katakhana & 
Akhundan 
Yakawlang 
(Bamyan) 
Men & women of different age 
groups & governance positions 22 
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  Total number of persons interviewed:  141 
 
3.6. Ethical and security aspects of the research 
In conducting field research in war zones or conflict-affected settings, there are two 
different dilemmas related to ethics and security; one is the protection and safety 
measures that the researcher takes for her/himself and the second is the protection 
and safety of the informants. My previous experience had indicated that in terms of 
security, especially if for the researcher, the field is her/his home country, there might 
not be a universally applicable code of conduct. Instead, it is crucial for the researcher 
to visit the areas with an open mind and well-informed updates on the security situation 
from a minimum of three sources. Wood also points out the importance of the 
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researcher’s own judgement when it comes to ethical dilemmas on the ground; she 
argues that “following abstract rules will not be sufficient” when conducting field 
research (Wood 2006:374), that is the researcher should use her own knowledge of the 
context and circumstances to take measures regarding her and her informants’ safety. 
For instance, when I visited one of the two rural field sites, I was advised locally not to 
arrive in the village by private vehicle, but rather to use local public transport. This 
proved very helpful in reducing my profile; in particular, arriving by public transport, I 
distanced myself from the typical aid worker who travels in expensive cars and is seen 
by the local population as a source of funding and resources. I also followed the local 
dress code for women and shared travel plans only with one or two reliable contacts 
who needed to be informed in case of emergency. 
Following security updates through different sources is also very important and there 
are often different ways of doing this. I learnt, from this (and other field experiences), 
not to rely on one or even two sources. I followed the International NGO Safety 
Organisation’s (INSO) Afghanistan updates, local media sources and kept in contact 
with provincial security officials that I had had contact with. I was fortunate in not 
experiencing any major setbacks to my planned schedule of research, but it is 
important to have a ‘Plan B’ and possibly a ‘Plan C’, understanding that research sites 
are prone to unexpected circumstances, and that unforeseen events might make Plan 
A difficult or even impossible.  
Lawson, in her review of Tania Murray Li’s book, highlights the importance of the 
researcher’s responsibility towards those who share time, information and insights 
(Lawson 2010). In a context like Afghanistan, where people have experienced 
numerous visits by experts and journalists who come, take pictures30 and then leave 
without any particular ‘return’ or benefit for the communities, I made sure to explain to 
my informants the purpose of my research, especially in language they could 
understand.31  
Sensitivity to the context of the informants is important in research investigation, but it 
is even more crucial in the fragile situation of a war zone. For instance, it is important to 
compose questions carefully and avoid pressing informants to respond if they feel 
uncomfortable. There were times that informants requested that I not even take notes 
                                            
30 I avoided as much as possible taking a camera to the field sites and taking pictures for this 
reason. 
31 My description was that the study would allow future sociology students to make use of and 
learn from the ethnographic data. I in no way implied that the study was another prescription for 
changing their lives. 
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about stories they shared; in these cases I respected their choice and did not include 
their material in the thesis.  
3.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I outlined the methodological approach adopted for this study. I began 
by highlighting how my position as an ‘insider/outsider’ affected the process of 
conducting the study. I discussed different methodological aspects of the study of local 
governance relations and pointed out that it requires a qualitative and multi-sited 
ethnographic approach to enable us to follow events that shape and rationalise 
programme and policy interventions that result in changing local power dynamics and 
governance relations. I chose the extended case method as a suitable qualitative 
approach for this study because it allows the researcher to engage with existing 
processes as they are, rather than how they ‘ought to be’. This approach has the 
openness required to focus on practices in order to understand power relations 
following a case that could be a process, an event or a set of processes and events. 
The chapter elaborated on the different criteria considered in the selection of field sites. 
Finally, the ethical and security challenges of carrying out research in a difficult 
environment in terms of security and conflict dynamics were addressed.  
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Chapter Four 
Setting the scene: a historical perspective on Afghanistan’s local governance 
relations 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will mainly follow a historical political economy approach to the study of 
local governance. It provides some background on how local governance relations in 
Afghanistan have evolved historically and examines some of the key episodes and 
features of changing patterns of local governance in the pre- and post-2001 periods, 
setting the scene for the empirical chapters that follow. In order to understand local 
governance relations in post-2001 Afghanistan, it is necessary to appreciate their 
evolution over time; from the imperial interventions in the 19th and 20th centuries to on-
going efforts by successive Afghan regimes to reshape power relations at the local 
level.  
As elsewhere, local governance relations are both constitutive of, and constituted by, 
broader political and social orders. In Afghanistan, the village has been central to 
efforts aimed at establishing order, authority and legitimacy. In a society where power 
is segmented and decentralised, central state elites have long grappled with the 
problem of how to extend their authority and build stable political relations between the 
centre and the periphery. Local governance, hence, is the product of a process of 
evolving interactions and contests involving domestic and international actors at 
multiple levels.  
Governance relations in contemporary Afghanistan cannot be understood through 
studying only the formalized practices and actions of the government and its official 
institutions. Rather, local governance institutions are frequently the inadvertent result of 
unplanned and informal processes of bargaining, conflict, contestation and negotiations 
(not least during extended periods of warfare) as well as the official interventions by the 
state. Hence, there are four critical components that need to be considered and 
studied: international actors and their resources, national level political elites, local 
elites and the local population. It is the recalibration of relations between these different 
elements that can help us understand the shifts in local governance relations over time. 
Therefore, this chapter attempts to explore how the relations and interactions between 
these different actors and institutions have shaped and been shaped by local 
governance relations. Section two of this chapter explores the pre-2001 history of local 
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governance relations and how it has evolved. This is followed by section three, where I 
introduce the concept of the village and how different scholars understand it. I then 
elaborate on the patrimonial relations that structure much of Afghanistan’s village 
governance by presenting an overview of village actors, institutions, and everyday 
practices of local governance. In section four, I cover broader sub-national governance 
discourses and debates in the post-2001 period to situate the particular programme 
and policy interventions discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
4.2. Pre-2001 history of local governance interventions  
Afghanistan has long been located at a crossroads of cultures, empires and people. Its 
turbulent history is linked to its position on a geo-political fault line – between imperial 
Russia and Britain in the 19th century and the Soviet Union and the United States in 
the 20th century. Global powers have sought, with varying degrees of success, to 
reform its governance institutions, and Afghan elites at the national and local level have 
sought to exploit its strategic location by extracting resources and support for their own 
agendas (Rubin 1992; Saikal 2004; Rubin 2006; Barfield 2010). Local governance 
relations are influenced and shaped by a broad interplay and bargaining between local 
elites, the global superpowers and national government elites. 
Prior to the formation of the modern Afghan state the region was incorporated into 
successive empires, including the Ghaznavids (10th – 11th century) and the Ghurids 
(12th century), or was comprised of a system of independent, local principalities known 
as Muluk-ul-Tawayefi (local fiefdoms), where each locality was led by its own ruler 
(Olesen 1995:21). From the 16th to the 18th century the area lacked a distinct political 
identity and was a buffer between the Safavid Empire of Persia, and the Mughal 
Empire of India. Mirwais Khan Hotaki was the leader of an indigenous attempt to gain 
independence from the Persian Empire in 1709, and won independence in 1713 of 
what is now southern Afghanistan. Finally in 1747, after the Persian Afsharid Empire 
disintegrated with Nader Shah’s assassination, Afghanistan emerged as an 
independent country led by Ahmad Shah Abdali. Abdali founded Afghanistan’s first 
empire, the Durrani, and was elected as the shah (king) through a Loya Jirga (Grand 
Assembly) (ibid.).  
The subsequent trajectory of state-formation was heavily shaped by superpower 
rivalries. In the 19th century, the British and Soviet empires attempted invasions several 
times32 only to realise that, given the architecture of the country and its society, direct 
                                            
32 Hammond points out there have been three invasions during the 20th century; in 1925, 1929 
and during Nadir Shah’s reign in 1930 (Hammond 1984:12-25). And, obviously, the three 
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rule failed to maintain the loyalty of the people and the state. Instead, indirect rule by 
sponsoring the government and its institutions, particularly the army, became the 
dominant form of engagement between Afghanistan and competing international 
powers.  
Afghan rulers depended upon external largess. As a rentier state, the country did not 
generate or mobilise sufficient resources to fund the state institutions domestically 
through taxation. Therefore, the Afghan state was unable to institutionalise taxation and 
create a social contract between the people and the state. For instance, the Afghan 
army that was sponsored externally was used mostly to prevent internal revolts rather 
than to defend Afghanistan from external aggressions (Rubin 1992). Often Afghan 
loyalty to one external sponsor was considered a threat by other world powers which 
would then sponsor rival groups.  
From Afghanistan’s perspective, although Afghanistan was not colonised directly, it 
acted for most of the colonial era as a buffer space between superpowers (Rubin 1992; 
Olesen 1995:20; Rubin and Armstrong 2002; Cramer and Goodhand 2002; Saikal 
2004; Barfield 2010; Monsutti 2012; Shahrani 2013). That often meant one or both 
superpowers had an interest in sponsoring the Afghan state and its strongmen. 
Whenever this balance was upset by one superpower exerting a stronger 
influence/sending more funds, its rival would support revolts, uprisings and 
insurgency.33 Hence, foreign subsidies and assistance historically allowed the Afghan 
rulers to maintain and consolidate their internal control and governance relations; 
however, the longevity of their rule was seldom assured (Cramer and Goodhand 
2002:893). 
Afghanistan’s borders were defined as a result of negotiations (and contestations) that 
mainly happened between two empires: the British and the Russian (Olesen 1995:28; 
Dorronsoro 2005:24). For the British, Afghanistan’s stability was a priority as they did 
not want disorder and chaos on their Indian frontiers. They sponsored an annual 
subsidy that was financed by taxing the people of India; between 1883 and 1901 
Afghanistan received a total of 28.5 million rupees from the British (Kakar 1979:90). 
                                                                                                                                
Afghan-Anglo (19th and early 20th century) wars are both examples of these attempts at direct 
invasion. 
33 In Afghan history, all these terms have been continuously politicised and instrumentalised. It 
is not fair to assume that there were no genuine or bottom-up revolts and uprisings, but as soon 
as signs of dissatisfaction were sensed by competing empires, they were hijacked and turned 
into a sponsored rebellion and hence, a more intense form of war broke out. This is indeed what 
the recent and contemporary history of Afghanistan tells us. 
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Additionally, Britain pledged to support the Afghan government during revolts and 
uprisings (Dorronsoro 2005:25).  
The alliances between the Afghan government and imperial powers followed a 
complicated trajectory. For example, in the final overthrow of Amanullah’s reign in 
1929, the Soviets and Germans supported the government, while the British supported 
Nadir Shah, Amanullah’s key opponent (Hammond 1984). By supporting Nadir Shah 
with funds and military support the British pursued their twin objectives of securing the 
frontier areas and limiting Russian influence. British support to the Afghan government 
continued throughout the rule of Nadir Khan and his son Zahir Shah during 1930s to 
1950s (Olesen 1995). Although, given national sensitivities, this support through Indian 
government or direct British government was not admitted openly (ibid.:174).34 
Superpower jostling for influence in Afghanistan continued after World War II through 
Soviet and American support to the Afghan military and economy (Dupree 1973:507-
530).  
Although the major external players in Afghanistan have been imperial powers, 
neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran have also been important.35 During 
the anti-Soviet war of 1979-1989 and onwards, Pakistan and Iran were considered key 
players in sponsoring different anti-Soviet factions on the basis of religious and ethnic 
relations. For instance, the Peshawar-based tanzims36 were sponsored by Pakistan 
and in chapter seven I focus in greater detail on the Shi’a anti-Soviet factions that 
were sponsored directly by the Iranian government and religious networks.  
As Kandiyoti points out, Afghan rulers often exploited superpower rivalries to mobilise 
‘locational rents’ in order to finance the state expansion (Kandiyoti 2007a). External 
efforts to influence events in Afghanistan have also had mixed results. At different 
times externally supported efforts by the central government to impose authority at the 
local level have enabled brutal policies of state expansion and consolidation which, in 
turn, encountered significant resistance sometimes resulting in the collapse of the 
regime (Gregorian 1969).37 For instance, Amir Abdur Rahman’s (1880-1901) British-
                                            
34 Olesen provides an example of how Nadir Shah in his 1931 speech said that he did not have 
support from a ‘foreign power’ yet after he gained power the British rendered support to him. He 
justified this by stating that ‘even King Amanullah received assistance from the British.’. 
35 See Giustozzi (2000:114) and Ibrahimi (2009a) on the Iranian regime’s role in supporting 
Hazara groups. 
36 The term ‘tanzim’ in the Afghan context, refers to the anti-Soviet Mujahiddin parties that were 
formed in Pakistan. 
37 It has to be noted that the encounters have not been entirely locally driven and motivated, but 
the broader superpower or empire competitions have always played an important role in pitting 
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sponsored state-building efforts in which he enlisted Pasthun groups in the subjugation 
of Hazarajat areas (Emadi 2007), although entirely enforced for the purpose of state 
centralisation, left a lasting imprint on the country’s politics in the years to come. Later, 
King Amanullah’s 1919 declaration of Afghanistan’s independence from the British lost 
the subsidies that had supported his government. As a result he had to rely on local 
taxation and, in the absence of systematic and institutionalised mechanisms, the larger 
burden of taxation fell on local elites and their clients. These attempts to increase 
taxation, combined with rapid social and political reforms, led to revolts against his 
reign. Once the revolts emerged, they were financed by the British, resulting in his 
overthrow.  
After a period of chaos in 1929, once Nadir Khan gained power he set up a system of 
rule that was conservative and status quo oriented. Barfield and Nojumi (2010) have 
pointed out that the ‘do-little’ policy of the Musahiban dynasty (1929-1973) of Nadir 
Khan and his descendants is an example of a minimalist approach to the expansion of 
state influence (Barfield and Nojumi 2010:42). The Musahiban rule was formed on the 
basis of a political settlement agreed upon by the state or the royal regime, the land-
owning elites and the clergy. In other words, state interests were mediated through 
local notables. The policy resulted in half a century of peace, the longest period 
Afghanistan has ever experienced (Barfield and Nojumi 2010:42). However, one has to 
bear in mind that while minimalism may have provided stability in that particular period, 
its long-term consequences were more problematic. Due to the lack of development in 
the countryside, a tremendous divide between the rural majority of poor and destitute 
and the small urban elite minority contributed to the emergence of major conflicts in 
Afghan society. These found expression in the political mobilisation of Islamists and 
communists, leading to the post-1973 bloody coups of the Soviet era and, more 
particularly, the post-1979 Soviet invasion.  
Finally, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’s (PDPA) attempts at land 
reform, education and women’s emancipation represent another example of the central 
government’s attempts to impose a system of governance at village level through 
heavy-handed and coercive means. Not only did it result in the collapse of the 
government, it also opened the door to the chaos and gradual collapse of formal state 
institutions throughout the 1990s. The Taliban rule in the mid-1990s was another form 
of autocratic centralised system of rule that could not reach beyond the district level in 
terms of expanding its authority. Nevertheless, these interventions were externally 
                                                                                                                                
rival factions against each other; this has been the case since at least the 19th century and 
perhaps before. 
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funded attempts by central governments, and local elites often succeeded in 
maintaining a strong form of patrimonial system in place that continued to rule villages 
and local settings. Rather than transforming this system, the wars since 1978 multiplied 
patronage networks and made them more competitive. In the next section I will explore 
the emergence of a new class of local elites as a result of war. As Rubin (1992) has 
pointed out, foreign aid not only produced a ‘rentier state’ but also ‘rentier 
revolutionaries’ (Rubin 1992:81; Cramer and Goodhand 2002:894). In other words, the 
aid dependency of Afghanistan was not only about the state being dependent on 
foreign subsidies – parts of society and its elites who challenged the state as anti-
government forces during the years of war (regardless of their ideological positions) 
have also been ‘rentier’ in the sense that they have depended on external support 
financially and politically.  
In the pre-1978 context, the rural elites were mostly influential khans or mirs 
(depending on context) who exercised public authority on the basis of land ownership 
and their relations with the state. During the years of war the monetisation of the rural 
economy through humanitarian assistance by NGOs and financial and military support 
to different commanders by the Western countries as well as religious networks in 
Pakistan and Iran, resulted in the weakening of the position of traditional leaders. In the 
following section, I will provide more details about how the emergence of this new class 
of war commanders has changed local power dynamics.  
In this section, I have discussed how historically, local governance relations are the 
product of complex interactions between international actors, domestic elites at the 
national and local level, and local relations more generally. As different periods of the 
pre-2001 context demonstrated, changes in the international political environment and 
its interest in Afghanistan led to alterations over time in the balance between local elites 
and the Afghan state  
This history of the region now known as Afghanistan informs us that neither 
intervention nor rule by outsiders are new phenomena. Historically, local groups have 
responded to interventions in different ways, including resistance, negotiations and 
entering into relations of mutual benefit (Ann Long 1992). Against this historical 
backdrop, I now turn from a national level analysis to a focused examination of the local 
by interrogating the definition and structures of an Afghan village. 
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4.3. Defining ‘the village’ and village governance 
In this section, for the purpose of clarity, I first elaborate on the literature about defining 
the village and what I mean by ‘the village’ in order to clarify the concept which is still 
widely contested among scholars and government actors. I then define ‘local 
governance’ the way it is understood in the Afghan context, followed by introducing 
village governance and examining the interactions between different actors and 
institutions.   
4.3.1. Local setting or village 
The term ‘village’ has been part of rural development discourse since the 1950s 
(Roussel and Caley 1994; Ellis and Biggs 2001, cited in Mielke and Schetter 2007). In 
Afghanistan, a village – also known as qarya, karia, deh, qalah (in Dari) or kelay (in 
Pashto) or qishlaq (in Uzbek and Hazaragi) – is understood as the smallest 
geographical unit with a physical space and its own social norms and socio-political 
order that continuously negotiates its relations with power structures in its immediate 
surroundings and broader formal and informal institutions.38 Similar to Ibn Khaldun’s 
analysis of medieval Arab society, in Afghanistan too, historically, a major part of the 
population was nomadic, later settling to form sedentary communities or what he called 
‘sedentary civilisations’ (Barfield 2010:56). These sedentary civilisations consisted of 
communities based on surplus agricultural production that enabled rulers to sustain the 
community and create a complex economy (ibid.) as well as a form of socio-political 
order to lead their everyday practices of governance. Villages often formed in response 
to needs for water and thus came to define a group of people who lived in it and shared 
resources such as water (Dupree 1973:132). Dupree identifies two types of sedentary 
village settlements: linear and nuclear. The linear type of villages, which are also 
common in Southeast Asia, are often located close to (and along) rivers or other water 
sources (Ahmad 1956 cited in Dupree 1973:132). The nuclear type are clusters of 
villages surrounding a city and, according to Dupree, this is more common in 
Afghanistan (ibid.). As Dupree explains “[in the Afghan village] a man a is farmer first 
and foremost”; although agricultural activities and animal husbandry are the most 
common professions, each village also has its specialists such as carpenters, masons, 
bricklayers, butchers, shoemakers and a mullah (religious leader) (ibid.).  
                                            
38 Dupree (1973) mentions qarya, deh, qishlaq, manteqa and kelay as different ways people in 
different parts of Afghanistan refer to the village. However, there are differences between 
manteqa and the other terms as a manteqa may include more than one village. See also, Mielke 
and Schetter 2007. 
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In literature discussing state and society relations, centre and periphery relations and 
sub-national governance, the term ‘local’ has been used for any locality (including 
provinces, districts and villages) outside ‘the centre’ or, more precisely, Kabul.39 In this 
thesis, I have used ‘local settings’ to refer to villages where elites are continuously 
engaged in negotiating their mutual interests with formal state institutions and other 
external intervening forces. Schetter argues that defining the ‘local’ in Afghanistan is 
difficult (Schetter 2013:272) and there is little consensus on what a village consists of 
or how it is defined constitutionally or politically by the state.40  
However, Ghani does provide a three-fold categorisation of villages in the form of 
kariajat (suburbs), karezat (villages dependent on underground irrigation channels) and 
mahalajat (quarters of the city) that were the main organisational pattern of settlements 
from 1747-1901. He also refers to a document from the 1880s that indicates that 
‘kariajat’ was defined by a political officer of the British forces as “(all) villages within a 
radius of about 20 miles round the city with a few isolated spots of cultivation to the 
northwest” (India Army, General Staff Branch, Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Kandahar 
1914/1980:228 cited in Ghani 1982:10).  
In Dari, qaryajat or kariajat is the plural form of qarya/karia or village. Thus this 
indicates that since the 1880s there has been recognition of villages, mainly for the 
purpose of tax collection, conscription and provision of services, linked to the state-
building and state expansion policies of the central government. However, there is no 
definition or taxonomy of Afghan villages linked to their territorial, demographic or 
ecological characteristics in official state documentation (Mielke and Schetter 2007; 
Pain and Kantor 2010; Schetter 2013). 
In some cases, the term community is used in the same way as village. Smith (2009) 
introduces ‘community’ as a term that, like village, is not clearly defined. She draws on 
Agarwal’s (1994) definition of community with a residency focus (e.g., the village 
community), or social grouping such as religious community, tribal community, etc. and 
notes that a person can simultaneously be a member of different communities (Smith 
2009:1). In Hazarajat, Monsutti notes the term manteqa is used for a collectivity of 
                                            
39 I note that here Kabul means the capital city where most of the central government’s 
institutions and offices are located (rather than the province). 
40 For instance, The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) define village in terms of number of 
population for their programme implementation: a Community Development Council was to be 
established for every 200 families. That meant that if a village had fewer inhabitants then they 
had to merge with other villages to meet the 200 family standard of the NSP. 
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villages in the same area.41 And, according to Roussel and Caley (1994), manteqa is 
understood as “a geographical area grouping together a number of villages and 
identified by its own inhabitants, as well as the inhabitants of the surrounding areas, by 
a single regional name” (Roussel and Caley 1994:5 cited in Monsutti 2005:84).  
Often villages are assumed to comprise a single tribe or family, however, depending on 
the context, location and considering the very long history of mobility of people in 
Afghanistan, not all villages are homogenous residences for a single tribe, ethnicity or 
religious sect. While the majority tribe or ‘descent group’ (qawm or kheyl in Pashtun 
populated areas, tayfa or gala in Hazara populated areas) often monopolises the 
leadership of the villages, there can be diverse groups of people from different kinships 
and ethnicities living in the same community; this is particularly the case in modern 
times due to the movement induced by protracted conflict and the refugee experience 
(Monsutti 2005).  
Afghan villages contain “a multitude of institutions that govern behaviour of the people 
inside it” (Harriss-White 2003, cited in Pain and Kantor 2010:15). Pain and Kantor 
(2010) use the ‘village republic’ concept to highlight the autonomy of villages. Although 
this may be valid in terms of internal governance relations, it is also important to note 
that Afghan villages and their leaderships have continuously been interacting and 
negotiating with formal and informal power structures beyond their boundaries. 
Schetter introduces the term ‘social order’ to avoid a state-centric perspective on local 
politics in order to provide an ‘unbiased’ analytical ground. He defines ‘social order’ as 
“all processes and actions in which humans organise themselves in any 
circumstances”(Schetter 2013:13), adding that, depending on context, the state may or 
may not be part of a social order.  
As Leftwich points out, institutions or orders are involved in producing or receiving and 
distributing or redistributing resources, and the way such practices are carried out is 
ineluctably political (Leftwich 1983:82). Schetter goes on to describe local politics as 
“social interactions in which social actors and agencies are deciding about the 
constitution of their lives on a daily basis” (Schetter 2013:273). Arguably this definition 
misses the intensely political nature of local governance in Afghanistan – as explored in 
the following empirical chapters, ‘the local’ has become a highly politicized domain, 
                                            
41 Manteqa is also used in some other parts of the country. Administratively in the past, it was 
considered as a ‘sub-district’ or alaqadari. However, the difference with manteqa is that the 
latter perhaps is not as formalised as alaqadari used to be in areas with a government 
presence. 
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particularly following the war years in which decisions about resources, authority and 
leadership have frequently been matters of life and death.  
For the purpose of this thesis I have used ‘local setting’, ‘village’ and ‘locality’ 
interchangeably to mean the smallest units of population gathered in commonly defined 
territory that constitute a recognized socio-political order and which negotiates its 
interest continuously with formal and informal actors and institutions beyond its 
boundaries. The social aspect of the order refers to the underlying norms, rules and 
beliefs that shape communities’ everyday interactions and arrangements while the 
political part is to do with the way they agree on who represents them, how they should 
be represented within and particularly outside their locality and how resources are 
accumulated and distributed.42   
4.3.2. Local governance 
In post-2001 Afghanistan, sub-national governance affairs are organised at four levels: 
provincial, district, municipality and village. Four sub-national governance institutions 
are formally recognised: the provincial governor’s office, district governor’s office, 
municipalities (provincial and district level) and provincial council. All these institutions 
are administratively connected to the Independent Directorate of Local Governance 
(IDLG) (Nijat 2014:22). Although the constitution requires elections for district and 
village councils, these have not been held and neither have been formally established. 
As a substitute, there has been a programme of semi-formal councils in district and 
village levels as elaborated upon later.  
The woleswali (district) is where formal governance institutions’ official presence ends. 
The state’s influence reaches further in an informal way through the khan or arbab or 
his representative known as the malik or qaryadar (village representative) who are 
often selected by village elites to represent their community in matters related to 
government.43 These matters historically included taxation, revenue collection, legal 
and judiciary related issues and security arrangements. The relations between the 
woleswal (district governor) and qaryadar are formal and bureaucratic, wherein the 
district court and security services have their own approaches to maintaining security in 
                                            
42 Here, by adding political I would like to draw on (Leftwich’s 2007:13) elaborations on politics 
as a process: “Politics as process – a necessary and pervasive feature of human society”. In his 
view politics consists of different activities from co-operation and resolution of conflicts to 
production and distribution of resources. Leftwich adds that these activities can be formal or 
informal, public or private, or a combination. 
43 It should be pointed out that even district borders are under constant debate, and changes 
are being re-negotiated continuously based on local interests and preferences in terms of 
religious, ethnic tribal representation, etc. (Mielke & Schetter 2007:74). 
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their territory and the social services such as health, education, agricultural and other 
economic amenities all have their own methods for interacting with actors and councils 
in the villages.44  
Wilde and Mielke theorise local governance45 in the Afghan context as:  
[t]he mundane exercise of power which involves decision-making and 
implementation processes within communities and concerning inter-community 
affairs, with the aim to realize peaceful coexistence and the provision of other 
collective goods in the local environment. This refers for example to the joint 
usage of everyday resources (i.e. their allocation, distribution, and accessibility), 
dispute resolution, and the provision of security. (Wilde and Mielke 2013:355) 
Saltmarshe and Medhi further point out that in Afghanistan’s post-2001 context, 
governance46 is seen as a web of interacting relations that includes formal and informal 
elements. They define ‘local governance’ as: 
The values, norms and conventions that different social, political and 
administrative groupings apply to meet their organisational goals, along with the 
interaction between them. Governance takes place in the form of action or 
influence that maintains or modifies these forms of behaviour and occurs at all 
levels of human organisation. (Saltmarshe and Medhi 2011:12) 
Although Afghanistan’s constitution is highly centralised, de facto power structures are 
extremely decentralised with local power holders managing local fiscal and political 
affairs with limited or uneven involvement from the capital/centre (Nixon 2008; Barfield 
1984; Cronin 2002). Nevertheless, customary or local institutions and state structures 
have not evolved in isolation from each other (Noelle-Karimi 2006; Schetter 2013; 
Cramer and Goodhand 2002). Rather, the way in which central power imposed rules of 
taxation, conscription and devised political representation in effect linked or co-opted 
‘traditional’ or local structures to the central government. For example, the concept of 
the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) was institutionalised by the early Afghan state-
builders and set a precedent for co-opting traditional modes of organisation and 
                                            
44 Miakhel (2012), for instance, discusses how such divisions happen with regard to security 
arrangements in Pashtun dominated areas. 
45 It is important to note that some have also used the term ‘local governance’ for provincial and 
district governance relations, but in this study, it mainly refers to village or community level 
socio-political relations. 
46 For these authors local governance includes governance relations in provincial, district and 
village levels in both formal and informal terms. 
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legitimacy, thus shaping the trajectory of both state and traditional leadership (Hanifi 
2004).  
Historically, local or village khans have variously had reciprocal or conflictual relations 
with the central government and with their client groups. Although they may not have a 
direct relation with central state elites, other mediating actors and institutions such as 
warlords, governors, district governors, NGOs and religious bodies have played a role 
in brokering between khans, populations and external structures. Hence, the khans’ 
interactions and negotiating positions allowed them to have a degree of autonomy from 
state structures and authority over people. Maintaining an independent capacity to 
mobilise means of coercion and generate resources locally enabled them to sustain 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state. In return for their autonomy they, to varying 
degrees, were subject to state provisions with regard to tax collection, conscription and 
liaising between the state and local population (Kakar 1979). Such traditional actors 
maintained their position, not as rivals to the state, but as actors who contributed to 
state-formation and state legitimacy at the local and national level. 
To some extent these hybrid governance structures persist in Afghanistan today. As 
Goodhand and Sedra note, the Afghan state constitutes “an amorphous ensemble” of 
forces or actors, institutions, and their interrelations and practices, where the 
boundaries between public and private, formal and informal, state and non-state, legal 
and illegal are continuously contested and blurred (Goodhand and Sedra 2013:242). It 
is from the interrelations between these different actors (and the institutions they 
represent) and their practices that our understanding of the state and its 
operationalisation in Afghanistan’s contemporary context is shaped.  
4.3.3. Patrimonialism and village governance  
Following the above discussions on the nature of local governance and the patterns of 
interaction between national and local level elites, here, I further develop how 
patronage-based forms of authority shape everyday practices of local governance in 
Afghanistan more broadly. First, though, it is necessary to further ‘unpack’ the Afghan 
village in terms of its internal institutions and actors and how they inter-relate. I then 
present an overview of how these actors, structures and relations have been influenced 
by different periods of the political turbulence that the Afghan state and its formal 
institutions have experienced over the past three decades.  
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Village actors, institutions and characteristics 
Unlike the state, Afghan villages47 are an enduring part of Afghanistan’s institutional 
landscape, operating similarly to what (Wade 1988) would call ‘village republics’ that 
are capable of providing public goods, security, dispute resolution and other basic 
services to the population.48 However, this capability of villages can best be understood 
when villages are studied through their relations with the state or other formal and 
informal institutions that interact with them. Relations between Afghan villages and the 
state have evolved and changed over the past decades. Dupree argued that Afghan 
villages had historically erected a metaphorical ‘mud-curtain’ that protected the village 
from the outside world (Dupree 1973:249) and Barfield (2010) suggests “village affairs 
[are] concealed from outside observation” (Barfield 2010:223). As will be explored 
further below, in many ways the years of war have opened up the villages to the 
external world and new actors, and have torn down the ‘mud curtain’. This does not 
mean that village elites have completely opened up to all forms of interventions. While 
village leaderships maintain their gatekeeping role, with the emergence of new actors 
and changes in the political and economic relations as a result of war and various 
forms of interventions, power dynamics have changed and are no longer keeping the 
village isolated from outside world. This is due to a range of factors that include the 
experience of conflict, war and migration, as well as changed expectations of the state 
as a result of warlord and then Taliban rule. And the return of generous international 
subsidies and development assistance to the Afghan state over the past decade has 
changed the state’s role from extractor of resources from the locals as was common in 
the past to one of provider of services through donor-funded state interventions. Hence, 
local populations do not solely relate to government through the courts in cases of 
criminal charges, or through taxation and conscription, but in fact, expect to receive 
goods and services from the government.49 Hence, while patron-client relations still 
lead local politics, the relations between village patrons and the state have evolved 
over recent years.50   
                                            
47 Given that each government institution follows their own definition of the village, there is no 
agreed number for all villages in Afghanistan by the central government. It ranges from 28,500 
(MRRD) to 35,500 according to the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Office. 
48 Pain & Kantor (2010:14) explain the differences in understanding ‘village republics’ in the 
Indian model where the state has penetrated to the village level institutions and in Afghanistan 
where most villages operate on their own and have only a limited relation with the central state 
on a number of matters. 
49 Hakimi, for instance, elaborates in this regard from the local security point of view with 
examples of how local militias have been operating as part of the state projects rather than as 
an alternative to it (Hakimi 2013). 
50 The degree of this change depends on each context and it certainly varies from one region to 
another, but given the wide range of state interventions through provision of services such as 
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However, because of the extreme variability of the Afghan socio-political context, 
generalisations should be treated with caution. This variability means that every context 
has its own idiosyncrasies in terms of its leadership and governance structures. As 
Dorronsoro notes, villages in Afghanistan are not homogeneous entities with shared 
unified identity, class status and political affiliations (Dorronsoro 2005:11). Since the 
reign of Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901) communities in the south and centre of 
Afghanistan have lost such homogeneity (if it ever existed) as a result of his state 
centralisation policies.51 Although there surely are exceptions, in general, histories of 
migration, war and conflict and/or geographical and climate changes resulting in 
people’s movement have changed villages and the people living in them (Pain and 
Kantor 2010:8-9; Giustozzi and Ibrahimi 2012). Although people living in a given village 
share a space in the territorial sense, they can have different kinship, tribal, ethnic and 
religious affiliations and economic statuses.  
External interventions with the same components or packages, therefore, can lead to 
very different processes of bargaining, negotiations, interactions or contestation 
between the local elites and intervening actors and institutions in different locales. 
However, broadly a village is comprised of actors such as a khan or mir (depending on 
locality) who has a higher economic status mainly through owning land and property or 
other businesses; a malik or qaryadar or arbab who is appointed by the khan and local 
population to represent the village to outsiders;52 dehqans (peasants) who work on the 
land (for the khan mostly or other landowners); a mullah or imam who leads religious 
affairs and the mosque; a mirab, who distributes water; and kasabakaran or people 
with different technical skills such as barbers, carpenters, tailors, blacksmiths, etc.53 
Additionally, post-1979, there is the qomandan (commander) or sargroup (sub-
commander), and school principals, doctors, nurses, teachers, and NGO workers, etc. 
are also considered as actors residing in a given locality.  
                                                                                                                                
health, education and development assistance, I believe there are changes that need to be 
noted. 
51 According to (Olesen 1995:62) these policies included breaking of the traditional power 
structures that were acting independently in society, royal lineage, tribal and religious 
establishment and his goal was to merge their political and economic interests with those of the 
state (Dorronsoro 2005:11). 
52 According to Monsutti (2005:91) in the Hazarajat region, qaryadar referred to the person who, 
before the 1964 constitution, was known as mehtar and whose role was to represent a cluster of 
villages or a manteqa. The qaryadar was proposed by the heads of families and appointed by 
the government representative. This is very similar to what has been recently revived by the 
IDLG (Independent Directorate of Local Governance), but this time for each village rather than 
for a manteqa. See chapters six and seven for further elaboration on Qaryadar in modern 
days. 
53 Kasabakaran or professionals could be farmers as well as carrying out their profession. But in 
some cases, they remain engaged with their profession and are paid by the farmers in 
exchange for their services. 
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The role of rural women in everyday economic and political activities, particularly their 
role in local governance relations is somewhat less covered in research on 
Afghanistan. Tapper (1991) for instance, views women more as objects than players in 
the domestic politics of the household, although she acknowledges the indirect ways in 
which women can undermine men’s prestige or honour.54 I believe these can have an 
important impact on the male family member’s position and status in the society. 
Daulatzai, for instance, argues that rural women are not seen solely as objects, and do 
influence social processes (Daulatzai 2013:193-208) and Mielke points out the 
persisting importance of seniority in women’s role in local politics (Mielke 2013:245-
264).55 Rural women are indeed active economically and have positions as ‘the wife of’, 
‘the mother of’ or ‘the daughter of’ the village actors listed above. Because of the 
patriarchal system, women are not recognised in their own right politically, but rather as 
an attachment to the professions of their male relatives (Barakat and Wardell 2002:920; 
Ahmed-Ghosh 2003; Kandiyoti 2007a; Kabeer, Khan and Adlparvar 2011:19). Pain and 
Kantor study village level livelihood trajectories in four provinces, unpacking local 
institutions and governance practices (Pain and Kantor 2010:4). For instance, NGO 
workers as intervening actors perceive villages in the same area as ‘progressive’, 
‘conservative’ or ‘traditional’, based on responses from village elites to programme and 
policy interventions’ conditionality such as women’s inclusion or being ‘NGO friendly’ 
(ibid.:14). This also demonstrates the collective ways of expressing a position in the 
village that characterises a given local setting.   
There is a distinction between institutions and actors.56 In Afghan villages, the shura (or 
local council) of ‘elders’ mostly comprises village actors with the highest economic and 
social status,57 and operates as an institution controlling the distribution of roles, 
positions of power, resources and overall norms and behaviours that characterise the 
system of governance in a given village (Barfield 2010:222). The village elite’s authority 
                                            
54 According to Tapper who studied women among the Durrani tribe, men have complete control 
over women, particularly in terms of maintenance and protection. Men’s honour is therefore 
linked to the sexual behaviour of women and any sexual misconduct will result in dishonouring 
the men. Hence, there is an important power factor on women’s part in this matter (Tapper 
1991:221, 223). 
55 For further elaboration and examples of this, see the two empirical chapters in this thesis, 
particularly the sections discussing NSP conditionality and how villagers respond to it. 
56 Turner (1997:6) defines an institution as “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values 
lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human 
activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in 
reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment.” 
57 This includes the actor’s affiliations with the powerful actors within the immediate region 
(manteqa), district, provincial and or central government authorities; political or military groups 
(tanzims), NGOs (particularly ones who provide services in the area), private sector and so 
forth. 
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is mainly based on a combination of wealth, social rank and political networks outside 
the village (ibid.). Village shuras are where power lies, where the decisions on 
appointing powerful actors such as the malik, mullah, mirab, etc, occur. Shuras also act 
to resolve internal disputes and conflicts and determine village responses to external 
interventions. As the two empirical chapters (six and seven) detail, decision-making 
by the village elites is not transparent, while donor procedures require elections for 
Community Development Council membership and leadership. Some studies note that 
while there might be multiple shuras such as the Etehadya Dehqanan (Farmers’ 
Union), the village school committee, Afghan Local Police and other security-based 
committees, ulema (council comprised of religious scholars and clerics), and other 
donor funded committees, the elite shura often has the strongest authority. It is usually 
the elites who approve or select the members of each of these councils. In some cases 
where village elites act in competition with each other, they may push for their choice of 
members to each of these councils. Subsequent multiplicity of shuras can be confusing 
especially for those who are not familiar with local politics.  
Afghan politics and religion are intertwined, so the mullah as an actor and the mosque 
as an institution are important in villages. There is often one grand mosque and many 
small mosques in each village depending on the size.58 Roy (1986) elaborates on the 
importance of the mosque in the village, its authority and its socio-political position. The 
mosque is often located at the centre of the village, a place for communal gathering of 
men, although there are other places such as the tea-house or hujra that is (usually) 
owned by the khan(s), but the mosque, as a place to perform religious rituals and 
collective prayers is considered more neutral than a hujra (Roy 1986). It is not common 
for women to go to mosques. However, among the Shi’a population, there are 
hossainias where men and women congregate for prayers and, more often, for 
religious ceremonies. The mullah, who leads prayers, particularly the Friday mass 
prayers, takes care of ceremonial events (such as birth rites, weddings, funerals, etc.) 
and is selected by village elites. Roy points out that the mullah is not part of an 
institutionalised body and his selection is grounded in his “piety and for his wisdom and 
one who, frequently, comes from a family which traditionally provides the 
mullah…”(Roy 1986:31-32). The mullah’s role is ideological, and while contexts vary as 
to the degree to which the elites attend to the mullah’s edicts, his interpretation of daily 
events and preaching on politics, society and customary practices influence villagers’ 
understandings and the village’s reputation regionally and beyond. Only mullahs of 
                                            
58 A grand mosque or Masjid-e-Jameh is where Friday prayers and other large ceremonies such 
as Eid prayers are conducted. 
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government registered mosques receive a salary; others hold other jobs to earn a 
living.59   
There is a strong element of collective performance in village decision-making. Village 
decisions are not taken by an individual, but a collective. Pain and Kantor argue that, in 
general, collective actions are motivated by risks of resource (such as pasture and 
water) scarcity, while other social factors like social structure and demographic 
composition may also play an important role (Pain and Kantor 2010:17). They note that 
pre-1978, the distance between the state and rural villages and post-1978, the risks of 
war and conflict in Afghanistan factored in enforcing collective actions towards 
provision of services (ibid.). Nevertheless, village governance as a form of collective 
action does not necessarily mean goods and services or power and resources were 
accessed equally by all villagers. Rather, village patrons (meaning the elites, 
predominantly the khan and, later, strongmen) maintain their gatekeeping role to 
control access to resources, power and various aspects of village governance through 
a patron-client or patronage based system of governance. As discussed in the earlier 
theoretical chapter, patronage based governance indicates that patrons as individuals 
with high status maintain control over resources and the physical protection of lower-
status clients (Scott 1972a; Lemarchand and Legg 1972:151 cited in Beekers and van 
Gool 2012:6). In Afghan villages, clients could be the village population who were 
dependant on patrons to ensure their access to resources and privileges in their locality 
and sometimes beyond their locality.60 It is also crucial to keep in mind that patronage 
forms of governance relations in Afghanistan, and indeed elsewhere, are inherited 
historically from indirect imperial rule or later the colonies, where mediators were 
required for tax and revenue collection and ruling populations outside the centre (IDS 
2010:50).61 
4.3.4. Village actors and institutions during war (1979-2001) 
Despite the many different forms of intervention into villages during the war, none of the 
central government interventions managed to dismantle the on-going form of village 
leadership as a whole. 
                                            
59 “The mullah is often poor and his ‘job’ is a way of supplementing what he earns growing crops 
- an activity which continues to take up part of his time” (Roy 1986:31-32). 
60 Sharan (2011:1115) also explains broader national level political relations as being strongly 
based on the patronage based system of governance where the president uses state resources 
and positions to consolidate his power and strengthen patronage networks. 
61 See also chapter two, section 2.4 for further elaboration on this point. 
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As previously discussed, the Soviet invasion and its sponsored government took a 
rather radical approach in expanding their reform agenda based on what they claimed 
was their Marxist-Leninist ideology, by using the state apparatus to transform relations 
in the countryside and to maintain control over political order (Rubin 1992; Saikal 
2004). The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) deployed a combination 
of ‘repression’ and ‘reform’ (Rubin 1992). They mainly implemented their reform 
policies through the existing traditional power structure of khans and maliks (Barfield 
2010:231). At the village level, they created ‘revolutionary committees’, whose 
members were teachers or security officers sent from the centre with no linkages or 
prior understanding of village dynamics (ibid.). This was perhaps the first direct form of 
intervention in villages by the central government, and was only carried out in a limited 
number of villages where the government had control.  
During the Mujahiddin time, with no central direct governance over sub-national 
matters, traditional village leadership remained in place, and although new powerful 
actors gained more power and influence relative to the khans and maliks, they did not 
displace them or the role they played in the village executive. Cramer and Goodhand 
(2002) see this period as one of gradual collapse of the central government’s control 
over provinces and districts, wherein ethno-regional coalitions, sustained by external 
support and internally generated resources from expansion of the war economy, 
emerged (Cramer and Goodhand 2002:896).  
Successive wars empowered different military leaders and conflict entrepreneurs who 
rose to prominence at the expense of traditional power holders (Rubin 2002; Cramer 
and Goodhand 2002; Giustozzi 2003; Lister 2007). New factional and religious 
networks also strengthened their roles independently of the state with the help of 
different regional and international actors, and gradually captured the state, culminating 
in the Taliban regime. Although there is limited literature on the impact of the Taliban 
period (1996-2001) on local governance – and there were wide geographical variations 
– the authority or power of the mullahs as heads of the local mosques generally 
increased at the local level during Taliban rule (Nojumi 2004). According to some 
sources, the Taliban also continued to deal with khans and maliks regarding village 
governance,62 although Giustozzi argues their main counterpart in many parts of the 
country became the local mullahs or clergy (Giustozzi 2013:81).  
                                            
62 Interviews with village malik and mullah in Behsud #41 #42 dated 27.11.2011. 
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During the war period, one of the new class of actors that emerged were military 
commanders who became the key actors in provinces and districts, subjugating village 
populations through their sub-commanders and, in some cases, through the existing 
power structures of khans and maliks. In other words, growing decentralisation of the 
means of violence and the breakdown of customary conflict management systems 
undermined the gatekeeping role of local elites. Consequently, local settings were no 
longer in the hands of the ‘traditional’ shura of village elites alone, but depending on 
time and place, during the years of war other actors, particularly commanders under 
Mujhahiddin rule (1992-1996) and the mullahs (1996-2001), gained more authority and 
control over village affairs (Nojumi 2004; Giustozzi 2009; Giustozzi 2013). 
4.4. International interventions in the area of governance post-2001  
The post-2001 context of Afghanistan’s governance and state-building represents a 
case of complex governance relations as a result of too many different international 
interventions trying to support the state-building processes in the country. Monsutti 
(2013) notes that today’s Afghanistan cannot be comprehended only through the prism 
of a geopolitical struggle (Monsutti 2013:270). One of the key differences in comparison 
to the past is the multiplicity of intervening actors and institutions involved in the overall 
state-building processes. These actors include not only governments, but also 
transnational institutions such as the World Bank, the UN, the IMF, private companies, 
foundations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) funded through faith or 
political channels (Monsutti 2012:566). Such diverse actors, interests, and agendas 
have often targeted people in the same locality. Over three decades of war, these 
intervening actors as sponsors of the anti-Soviet war, charity work, religious institutions 
such as madrasas (religious schools) and mosques, development assistance (by 
NGOs) and so on have cumulatively played a significant role in reconfiguring local 
governance relations. Afghan communities have learned to extract and channel 
external resources whilst simultaneously resisting interventions that endanger their 
interests (Long 2001; Arce and Long 1992). As previously mentioned, the cliché of the 
‘inward-looking’ village is no longer a helpful way of understanding the power dynamics 
and bargaining positions of actors in all these layers of the country’s formal and 
informal structures.  
Post-2001 Afghanistan can only be understood if one holds two parallel processes in 
mind: one is the formal state-building process that presents “the theatrics of state-
building”(Mukhopadhyay 2014:22) with its own discourses, Weberian notions of state-
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building, and bureaucratic institutions establishing a form of liberal democracy.63 The 
roadmap for this, agreed at Bonn, Germany in 2001, outlines this track of state-building 
for Afghanistan where an interim government was established through a national 
consensus (or emergency Loya Jirga); a constitution was written; presidential and 
parliamentary elections were held and the state obtained its legitimacy through 
following these steps; and henceforth, the government was to operate as the 
machinery for enduring liberal democracy.  
The second parallel process is what Migdal considers “the real politics of many Third 
World societies” (Migdal 1988:32 cited in Mukhopadhyay 2014:22), where outcomes 
were not as intended or planned by intervening forces sponsoring state-building. In 
Afghanistan ‘real politics’ refers to a strong patrimonial system of rule where political 
groups and military factions (or politico-military groups) maintained their positions in 
order to gain their share of power throughout the state-building process. Although on 
the surface, Afghanistan appears to have completed all the Bonn Agreement’s phases, 
the existing regime is far removed from a Weberian model of democracy. It is important 
to look at both these parallel concurrent processes, as ignoring either would only offer 
an incomplete picture. 
 
During the Bonn Agreement the two processes were integrated from the beginning as 
Mujahiddin groups (war-time actors) and networks were incorporated into formal state 
structures. This system of rule is extensively studied by Sharan (2011; 2013) as a form 
of ‘elite network’ dominance who maintain their influence over governance relations 
through their patronage networks. Positions and authority are maintained by a 
combination of generating revenues and rents from local clients, and through 
participation in the ‘theatrical’ processes of state-building (Giustozzi 2007; Coburn 
2011; Sharan 2013), generously strengthened as well as politically recognised by 
international interventions at the Bonn Conference and onwards (Rubin 2006; Giustozzi 
2007; Sharan 2011).  
The presidential system allowed the president to have a full monopoly over the 
selection of governmental posts across provinces and districts, while his appointees for 
the ministerial cabinet required parliamentary approval. However, given that the 
foundations of the post-2001 government was based on the division of power among 
the elites, similar to his cabinet ministries, the president divided the key provincial post 
                                            
63 Also see, for example, Ottaway & Lieven 2002; Ghani et al. 2005; Rubin 2006; Ghani 2009. 
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choices among his close allies who belonged to different factions and parties.64 Key 
positions such as provincial and district governors, chiefs of police and mayors were 
appointed by the president, despite the fact that the mayoral positions were supposed 
to be electoral according to law (Nijat 2014:22). 
Both parliament houses, the Meshrano Jirga and Wolesi Jirga (upper and lower 
houses), were also filled by elected members who represent people by division of 
provinces and only a third of upper house members were selected by the president. A 
quota system was in place to ensure women’s participation in the parliament (25%) and 
half of the presidential appointees to the upper house were required to be women, too. 
Parliament’s main job as a legislative branch of the state was to pass or approve laws 
and bills and to also endorse the president’s appointed or introduced ministers. These 
tasks, particularly the latter, gave the parliament a strong hand in the bargaining of 
patronage based interests with the executive part of state in exchange for approving 
cabinet ministers (Humayoon 2010; Sharan 2011, 2013). The way parliament operated 
in the post-2001 political context, was mainly to act as a platform for negotiating 
factional and personal interests based on patrimonial forms of relations in their 
interactions within the parliament (passing laws) as well as in relations with the 
government (Sharan 2013). Women’s representation in the parliament remained 
symbolic in terms of addressing gender related matters and they have been widely co-
opted by the main parliamentary factions for their own purposes and interests (Coburn 
and Larson 2014; Roehrs and Kouvo 2013). 
The international footprint in Afghanistan’s post-2001 context is characterised by its 
generous political, economic and military support of the government. Given the broad 
and vague definition of governance by different intervening institutions, it is difficult to 
clearly define international support in terms of it (Goodhand 2014). However, it can be 
argued that the overall governance support included institution-building (both in terms 
of infrastructure and administration), public financing, public sector reform, rule of law, 
security sector reform, etc. The US government provided nearly $24.7 billion to support 
‘governance and economic development’ in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2013 
(ibid.). Based on a US Department of Defence report to Congress, ‘governance’ 
included reconciliation and reintegration, national and sub-national governance, judicial 
reform and rule of law, anti-corruption and human rights. Rubin et al. (2005:60) pointed 
out how particular interests, for instance, of the US government on security matters, 
resulted in more resource allocation and attention to the security sector than to the 
                                            
64 See, for example, the Killid Group’s Special report by Sadiqazad (2010). 
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civilian parts that were mainly supported through the World Bank. The international 
interventions also did not continue at the same pace. Throughout the years after 2001, 
there have been continuous shifts and changes in different countries’ (especially the 
US) policies towards Afghanistan that directly affected broader and local governance 
relations. For instance, during the earlier years, most US military engagements were 
counter-terrorism oriented, while by late 2009, the Obama administration announced its 
COIN strategy which emphasised much stronger linkages between the political, 
developmental and security aspects of the intervention.65 The increasing funding flow 
through military channels during the military surge (2009-2012) resulted on the one 
hand, in the creation of parallel structures and disruption of institution-building 
processes that were sponsored through non-military institutions and on the other, it 
also opened up opportunities for parts of the central government elites to use large 
sums of short-term oriented funding for the purpose of strengthening their own 
patronage networks. The following chapter (chapter five) will provide more evidence 
on the ground on how the broader shift in international policies added to the complexity 
of the governance interventions.   
State institutions and their international counterparts were not the sole intervening 
forces in Afghanistan’s sub-national politics. The international military, through its 
Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP), developed Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with the military commander in the province managing 
its budget.66 The military COIN approach blurred the line between military and civilian 
(NGO, development) actors. In some instances, as Monsutti (2012) stated, the bilateral 
development agencies of donor countries competed with the PRTs, while civilian NGOs 
became targeted by the Taliban or other factions on charges of being perceived as 
‘agents’ of the military (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012:15). COIN doctrine assumes that 
investing in development will result in more security, but Dorronsoro (2011) finds that 
there is no correlation between development aid and security, providing examples 
where the effect of aid on security was marginal as it did not result in strengthened 
state structures at the local level (Dorronsoro 2011:11). Massive intervention in local 
                                            
65 Scholars looking at political and, especially, military affairs emphasise the difference between 
Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Insurgency (COIN), for example, Hughes, citing Boyle: “[a 
counterterrorist] mission would focus exclusively on Al-Qaeda, while offering little or no support 
to the [Afghan government]; a COIN mission envisages a comprehensive commitment to 
defeating the Taliban and rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying Al-Qaeda operatives 
there.” (Boyle 2010:335 cited in Hughes 2011:126). 
66 Monsutti points out that the budget for CERP has increased from US $40 million in 2004 to 
US $1 billion in 2010. More importantly 60% of the USA’s reconstruction funds were also 
channelled through the Department of Defence (Johnson, Ramachandran & Walz 2011: 7, 9, 
cited in Monsutti 2012:564). 
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governance through the military has created yet more conflicts between different elites 
or patrons as they compete to gain more benefits from these resources.67  
The overall bureaucratic system of the state (including national, provincial, and district 
administrations) is defined in the Constitution (articles 71-80) (Nijat 2014:21). The 
Constitution calls for decentralised sub-national governance by delegating provision of 
services to local administrations.68 Nijat (2014) elaborates on four different levels of 
sub-national governance: provinces, districts, municipalities and villages. According to 
the Constitution, there should be elected councils for all different levels of governance 
including the provincial, district and village councils and mayoral positions, but as of 
2014 only provincial council elections have been held. However national and sub-
national bureaucratic posts were not allocated based on merit, but rather through 
patronage linkages with warlords or other political elites (ibid.:48). At the district level, 
there is an amalgam of structures and multiple donor-funded ‘councils’ in place. The 
MRRD has established District Development Assemblies (DDA) whose members were 
elected from the district’s village CDC (Community Development Council). But like 
CDCs in villages, DDAs are not constitutionally legitimate.69 As another example, 
recent additions are District Coordination Councils (DCCs) that, according to Nijat 
(2014), are ‘jointly owned’ by MRRD and IDLG.70 These examples suggest that 
creating more structures to ‘solve’ problems of instability and insecurity have created 
more chaos than order in practice.  
The key point that state institutions and actors are missing is that state-building cannot 
be limited to solely technical interventions, providing funding or setting up ‘councils’ to 
solve entrenched problems, and indeed the failure of these attempts to attain ‘good 
governance’ should be evident in the outcome of these on-going practices (Chandler 
2010; Suhrke 2007). These national governance dynamics show how myriad 
interventions by diverse actors, including transnational institutions such as the World 
                                            
67 Dorronsoro (2011:9,11) sees the international military’s involvement in local power struggles 
by taking sides through providing contracts or resources to one of the rivals as hugely 
problematic and a mistake. 
68 See Article 137 of the Afghan Constitution (2004). 
69 By law, the elections for both district and village councils should be organised by the 
Independent Election Commission (IEC) but this has not happened for either simply because 
they are donor-driven, programme funded institutions that are now being negotiated and 
competed upon as governing bodies. 
70 Chapters six and seven in this thesis will use the examples from selected districts to 
elaborate further on the complexity and conflict that initially existed between the two institutions 
(MRRD and IDLG) and this act of ‘joint’ ownership is perhaps an attempt to address the prior 
issue of parallel structures and chaos. However, it has to be noted that while the MRRD-
sponsored District Development Assemblies may not be constitutionally recognised, they have 
been sustained because of funding availability, whereas IDLG sponsored councils have already 
been dismantled. 
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Bank and the military’s efforts through COIN have, through their uneven resource 
distribution, contributed to further confusion and chaos at the sub-national level (Nijat 
2014:22).  
Finally, within the context of local governance and how actors and institutions are 
engaged, one cannot ignore the role of religious institutions and their competing 
sources of investment and support. Although updated research and studies are limited 
in this regard, an extensive level of support from Pakistan and some of the Arab 
countries, as well as Iran, continues to flow across the country supporting Sunni and 
Shi’a Afghan elites and communities respectively.  
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted the broader local governance relations historically and in the 
contemporary context, where international, national and local actors continue to 
bargain, negotiate and, sometimes, contest their interests in changing local governance 
relations.  
The chapter noted that villages have been central to creating order, authority and 
legitimacy. I argued that local governance relations cannot be studied solely or in 
isolation from their relations with the state and the way these are organised. I defined 
‘local governance’ as an ongoing process of interactions and negotiations between 
village or local settings’ elites and the formal or government institutions and actors as 
well as informal actors involved in the political and economic activities that these 
villages benefit from.  
I also argued that Afghan villages cannot be seen as homogeneous entities, neither 
can they be considered as areas with a complete absence of organisation or order. For 
the purpose of analysis, it is important to keep the particular context, history of events 
and different characteristics of each local setting (or village) in mind, and avoid drawing 
generalising conclusions.  
Further to this, I elaborated on how patron-client based local governance relations in 
Afghan villages changed from the pre-war period where the local elites were mostly 
exercising public authority on the basis of land ownership and their relations to the 
central state, to war-time political economy where monetisation of rural economy 
through political, financial and military support of external interventions resulted in the 
emergence of a new class of politico-military elites, one which continues to play an 
important role in the context of post-2001 political settlement.  
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I highlighted the evolution of the pre-war, war-time and post-2001 characteristics of the 
local governance. And how policy changes by international sponsors of the central 
government influenced the changes in the post-2001 governance relations.  
Looking at the role of women in different historical phases in local governance 
relations, the chapter demonstrated that radical approaches to change women’s status 
through political means were faced with resistance. The chapter demonstrated that 
women’s public role in village governance has not been recognised historically, 
although, in the context of post-2001 political context, quotas and conditionalities on 
women’s inclusion have, to some extent, contributed to formalising women’s public role 
in village governance; it was noted that this happened within the patriarchal system and 
not outside it.  
The chapter concluded that patronage based governance in Afghanistan is not solely 
dependent on the rent-seeking efforts of the patrons through local extractions, but also 
on incentives and support and recognition via international interventions through 
different intervening actors and institutions, including governments, NGOs and other 
transnational institutions and networks.   
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Chapter Five 
The view from Kabul: Negotiating local governance interventions at the national 
level 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines how two local governance programmes were negotiated, 
formulated, designed and operationalised at the national level. It specifically looks at 
the National Solidarity Program (NSP) of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development (MRRD), and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). 
Both institutions focused on institution-building and governance at the village and 
district level, but in other respects were quite different. The chapter highlights how 
competing agendas, logics and rationalities at the national level led to very different 
approaches to local governance. The chapter further reflects upon the ongoing conflict 
between the two institutions over the ‘ownership’ of local governance authority and the 
reasons for this conflict.  
The chapter critically examines the ostensible and actual goals of the programmes, the 
process by which they were formulated and designed by national and international 
actors, and how they were negotiated in practice. The chapter demonstrates the 
agency exercised by domestic actors in this process and questions the notion that 
governance programmes typically are designed by external ‘experts’ and consultants. 
In this case, this chapter highlights how programmes were negotiated and translated 
through interactions and negotiations between international and national actors and 
shaped by national politics. Analysing the process of negotiating programme design 
and formulation, the chapter shows the influence of a range of seemingly extraneous 
interests and concerns such as changes in international donor policy, national elections 
and their impact on local elections, and local resource distribution. 
The chapter has five sections, including an introduction. In section two, I introduce the 
MRRD’s district and village governance-focused programmes, and discuss how they 
were designed, funded and operated. The focus then shifts to the design process of the 
NSP as one of the largest MRRD programmes for village governance and service 
delivery. I further examine the declared and hidden goals of this programme. Another 
programme, the National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP), will be 
examined, but more briefly. NABDP is a large programme and I will only address its 
role in establishing the District Development Assemblies. In section three, I explore the 
reasons behind the establishment of the IDLG and how the programme became a point 
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of convergence for the Afghan central government and international military institutions 
(particularly the US), which had a common interest in strengthening local patronage-
based networks. In this section, I highlight the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ dimensions of 
IDLG’s work on matters related to district level governance. I conclude by outlining how 
the different and sometimes contradictory interests of international actors and various 
parts of the Afghan government both converged and diverged on specific issues and at 
particular moments in relation to local governance.   
5.2. MRRD’s national level engagements on local governance  
The MRRD was officially founded in 1988, but was to all intents and purposes inactive 
prior to 2002.71 However, after the Bonn Agreement, by revisiting its mandate with a 
strong focus on poverty reduction and social protection in rural Afghanistan, the 
ministry emerged as one of the most significant government agencies with nationwide 
coverage of development issues. Under the leadership of professional Afghan 
development experts, the ministry became one of the main recipients of donor funding 
for institution and capacity building at the district and village level. MRRD’s annual 
budget in 2013 reached US $504,722,800. One of its leading programmes, the National 
Solidarity Programme, alone spent US $1.8 billion between 2003 and 2014, with an 
annual budget of $265 million in 2013.72 Mohammad Haneef Atmar73 was chosen as 
the first minister of the MRRD on the recommendation of Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, 
then a finance minister in the newly established government of President Karzai.74 As a 
young and energetic member of the then interim administration, Atmar brought in a 
group of Afghan professional development experts who operated in line with the 
donors’ standards and expectations (Nixon and Ponzio 2007). Atmar’s exemplary role, 
which with one exception was followed by his successors,75 was instrumental in 
attracting donor funds to the ministry and it built a strong connection with the donor 
community by consistently demonstrating its technical expertise in managing 
                                            
71 MRRD’s official website http://mrrd.gov.af/en/page/65 (accessed 04.02.2013). 
72 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2013:97-98). 
73 Mohammad Haneef Atmar was a member of the Afghan intelligence organisation (Khad) as a 
young adult. He then moved to the UK to study for an MA degree in public policy and post-war 
reconstruction. He returned to work in development NGOs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Post-
2001 he served as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Minister of 
Education, and Minister of Interior. In 2011 he founded a new political party, the Rights and 
Justice Party, and he is involved in the political processes. Sources: 
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111109_Atmar_bio.pdf (accessed 04.07.2014); (Andrew and 
Mitrokhin 2005:408). 
74 Interview with Ashraf Ghani #123 dated 11.06.2012. 
75 The exception was Minister Jarrullah Mansuri, who got his position through his patronage 
network’s support. Interview with Minister Barmak, #86 dated 15.04.2012 
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development programmes.76 The senior staff of the ministry were primarily young 
Afghan professionals who had been educated abroad and had technical skills and 
experience in managing aid programmes. As a leading official of the ministry pointed 
out, the ministry is highly technical and no one without prior experience of working on 
large-scale development programming and public administration would be able to 
survive there for long.77  
At the time of my field research (2011-12) the MRRD ran six national programmes. The 
most high profile programme in terms of national coverage, scale of funding and public 
visibility was (and still is at the time of writing) the National Solidarity Programme 
(known as Hambastagi Mili). This was followed by the NABDP that focuses on district-
level institution-building and service provision, the National Emergency Employment 
Programme (NEEP); Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Irrigation Programme (Ru-
WatSIP); the Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme (AREDP); and the 
Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development – Facility (CARDF). On its website, 
the Ministry also outlines its gender policy of “promoting gender integration into all 
areas of rural development initiatives undertaken in Afghanistan” (MRRD 2011a:12). 
This policy mainly focuses on women’s participation in decision-making processes, 
giving less attention to analysing barriers that limit such possibilities and how they can 
be reduced.  
The MRRD approach is as much about local democracy promotion as about 
development. In this respect it resembles the Indonesian example of community 
development, as discussed by Barron (Barron 2010; Barron et al. 2011). The approach 
is based on the premise that building local level structures is necessary to sustain 
service delivery. Independent of this, the ministry emphasises promoting ‘democratic 
governance’ and related institutions as desirable in their own right. Nevertheless, as will 
be discussed below, recipients of NSP grants examined in this research understood the 
programme to be more of a service delivery mechanism than an instrument of 
governance or ‘democratic governance’. Provision of basic services and ‘strengthening 
local governance’ are both part of the mission statement of the ministry (MRRD 2011b).  
For the purpose of this thesis, I have selected two of the MRRD’s national 
programmes. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the NABDP. The NSP 
                                            
76 After Minister Atmar, Minister Ihsan Zia, previously his deputy, replaced him. He was followed 
by Jarrullah Mansuri and from March 2012, Wais Ahmad Barmak. Barmak, like Ihsan Zia has 
been one of the leading members of MRRD since Atmar’s leadership. 
77 Conversation with a senior officer who previously served at MRRD as executive director for 
one of its programmes, December 2013. 
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was chosen because of its history as one of the first post-2001 programmes on village 
governance with almost full national coverage, its political and economic importance in 
terms of the attention it attracted from donors and the wider public, and most of all, its 
significance in relation to local governance relations. I will then introduce the NABDP 
which, among its different functions, has established 388 District Development 
Assemblies (DDA) in 34 provinces of Afghanistan. I have looked at this programme 
specifically in relation to its work on forming district assemblies or councils.  
5.2.1. The National Solidarity Programme: Formulation and design process  
The NSP is not a rural development, but a rural upliftment that encompasses all 
government activities including health, education, agriculture etc. at the village level.  
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (2012) 
 
Figure 1: A background page in a national NGO (Sanayee Development Organisation)’s 
magazine on the NSP. “All together in the National Solidarity Programme” 
[Translation by author] ©SDO website. 
This section examines the process of NSP formulation and design. The analysis shows 
that designing a programme intervention is not a linear process where a blue print is 
simply imposed by donors with no concessions or adaptation for the local context. 
Rather, this section reveals a complex process of bargaining, negotiations and 
competing interests involving different actors and institutions which resulted in the birth 
of a development programme with the largest budget and widest national coverage in 
Afghanistan’s history.  
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Actors in the process of NSP formulation 
Three different categories of actors were involved in the process of formulating the 
NSP; the first were development practitioners who had worked with communities in 
Afghanistan for decades, had a comprehensive knowledge of the ground realities and 
were familiar with donor-funded projects and programmes. The second, Afghan 
technocrats consisting of professional experts returning from the diaspora, many with 
extensive pre-war familiarity with the country and very strong relations and familiarity 
with the foreign donors and international development discourses. In the words of 
James Scott they were considered ‘the knowledge experts’ (Scott 1998:286) and 
included people with expertise on the World Bank’s community development models 
and overall development interventions, and those with familiarity with Afghanistan. 
Finally, the donors who were interested in funding the programme participated as well. 
In the following section, I elaborate on the various sets of interests and narratives 
surrounding the origin of the NSPs. The analysis is based upon field research 
conducted during 2011-2012.  
Origins and inspirations of the NSP 
The inspiration for the NSP came from a combination of the community development 
models of the World Bank, and the Afghan political discourse and power plays within 
the government at the time. Nixon (2008), for example, sees the origins of the NSP in 
both the World Bank’s global projects and Afghanistan’s traditional practices such as 
shuras (councils or collective way of decision making) and ashar (voluntary community 
labour) (Nixon 2008:17-18). Yet it is important to deconstruct the actual process of the 
NSP formulation to understand how national and international actors and institutions 
and their interests, world views and approaches resulted in the programme design 
(ibid.). 
Looking at the chronology of the World Bank’s engagements in Afghanistan after 2001 
(World Bank 2014a:295, 297-8, 319), it becomes evident that the Bank’s leadership 
was ready to invest in large scale programme interventions for several reasons: 
Western countries and their allies supported the signing of a new political settlement in 
Bonn. The military presence of the US and its allies in the country was accompanied by 
a broader vision of state-building and peace-building, providing the context for an 
ambitious reconstruction and development agenda. The major international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and a large number of donors were prepared to support the Bonn 
settlement and the broader development agenda through the provision of resources. In 
short, the political will of the international sponsors, combined with their financial 
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commitment, provided both the preconditions and the motivation for launching the NSP. 
In its initial stages, the process appeared to be a top-down initiative. One of the key 
actors at this early stage was Dr Ashraf Ghani.78 According to him, the NSP should be 
seen in the context of Karzai’s speech at the first Tokyo conference where the national 
development framework was outlined:79  
As chief advisor to then Chairman Karzai, my task was to take stock of what was 
there and of what was needed. I travelled to ten different regions of Afghanistan, 
my aim was to hear and see what was there. I was also preparing Chairman 
Karzai’s speech for the Tokyo conference which was due on January 1st 2002 (…) 
It is not like today when you give speeches and nothing happens, that speech was 
outlining the interim-administration’s plans for what came afterwards in all different 
fields, including security, economic growth, development etc. The initial idea of 
NSP was born as a result of this process, where I visited different parts of country 
and saw what potential was there that could be utilised.80 
One of the areas that Ghani travelled to was Panjshir, where the UN Habitat had its 
community forums. The programme was designed “to establish sustainable, multi-
functional neighbourhood centres that provide economic, educational and social 
benefits to men, boys, women and girls in the various communities.”(UN Habitat 2002: 
para 3) The UN-Habitat members provided an account of Ghani’s travel, which informs 
us on how two very different agendas and interests met:  
We were in search of potential donors and funding for our programmes. One of 
our leading colleagues was well-connected with the donor community and high 
profile people. She discovered that Ashraf Ghani is looking for a successful 
programme and is on a mission to visit provinces. Then we all [the Habitat team] 
                                            
78 Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai is an anthropologist by training. During the 1990s he worked for 
the World Bank, before joining the UN in 2001 as chief advisor on Security and Economic 
Development for the Afghan Interim-Administration. He was Minister of Finance from June 2002 
to December 2004 and Chancellor of Kabul University, 2004-08. He ran unsuccessfully for office 
in the 2008 elections. In 2011 he joined the Karzai administration as the head of Transition 
Administration. As of August, 2014 he was one of the two key front-runners in the presidential 
elections, leading his campaign with the slogan ‘Transformation and Continuity’. Source: 
http://en.ashrafghani.com/biography/ (accessed on 04.07.2014). 
79 President Karzai’s Tokyo speech points out: “[…] we intend to implement a local 
empowerment programme that would allow communities to manage their own resources. Such 
a programme would allow legitimate leaders to emerge and deal with issues facing their 
communities with forming a basis for consultative democracy in the future. Block-grants would 
be distributed to villages and districts, and allocated to projects through inclusive and 
participatory processes and on the basis of simple criteria.” Source: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/karzai0121.html (accessed on 
08.01.2013) 
80 Interview with Ashraf Ghani #123 dated 11.06.2012. 
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worked to seek ways to get in touch with him. We said to his staff: ‘We just need 
ten minutes of his time to explain our programme.’ Finally, with our networking 
contacts, we managed to get him for ten minutes. He got very interested in the 
programme and promised to go with us and visit our programme on the site. We 
told him in any of these provinces he can easily go and visit the programme: 
Bamyan, Kabul, Panjshir, Balkh. Then he visited Panjshir and we heard from our 
colleague [who used to lead the Panjshir and Parwan programmes] that they 
stayed up until 3am discussing the programme and all its aspects. Ghani got 
really interested in this programme and wanted to test if what we were explaining 
was real. In Panjshir, we also had a women’s shura besides the men’s shura, that 
was even an additional point. After this visit, Ghani returned to Panjshir with a 
delegation from the World Bank and we arranged their visit with around 150 
members of our different community forums who explained to them in detail about 
the work and how they are organised. The delegation spent three days and 
picked up on every single detail of the programme.81  
These two narratives demonstrate how the different interests and agendas converged: 
one seeking a successful model, the other in search of a long-term donor for their 
programme. Ghani, who for several years prior to 2001 had been a World Bank 
employee, was familiar with the community development programmes established by 
the Bank in Indonesia and also in East Timor after independence in 1999. The Bank 
views the NSP as based on its Community Driven Development (CDD) model similar to 
that in Indonesia and East Timor, but Ashraf Ghani maintains that it was not a ‘copy-
paste’ version of this model. He preferred to connect the programme’s roots with the 
existing forms of social mobilisations through the Sufi networks that have been 
dominant in Afghanistan historically (Haroon 2007:38; Edwards 1996):  
The inspiration for NSP comes from several sources. The first source is the Sufi 
networks. I studied this [the Sufi networks] from 1500-1900 onwards in 
Afghanistan. Its communities are organised around spatial units. Their ties are 
very strong locally, and weak externally. The mechanism that bound the country 
culturally most together [in Afghanistan] was the Sufi networks.82 
Ashraf Ghani’s emphasis of the NSP as a nationally-inspired model rather than a World 
Bank’s CDD inspiration is perhaps linked to where he stood in 2012 when these 
interviews took place, as a nationalist leader planning to run for president of the 
                                            
81 Interview with Development Practitioners #87 dated 18.04.2012 
82 Interview with Ashraf Ghani #123 dated 11.06.2012. 
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country. He spent less time discussing how the programme was a nationally modified 
version of the World Bank’s Community Driven Development (CDD) model, but rather 
linked the NSP with his own historical and anthropological understanding of 
Afghanistan. He did this in order to justify the legitimacy of the programme (of which he 
wishes to be known as the founder) to a national audience. 
Another important actor involved in the initial designing and implementation of the NSP 
was Minister Atmar. His background of working with NGOs, familiarity with 
development practices and his networks in the aid sector enabled him to create a 
technically professional working team to implement the NSP. With the benefit of 
hindsight it is clear that the NSP helped facilitate Atmar’s subsequent political career. It 
created a strong support base and platform that he was to draw upon when minister of 
education, then minister of the interior and thereafter as the leader of a political party 
that supported Ashraf Ghani’s candidacy in the 2014 presidential elections. Atmar was 
very conscious of the political role of the NSP from the beginning:  
NSP came into existence as result of a search for a legitimately and 
administratively competent local governance structure. Its aim was 1) 
empowering population through a decentralised means of governance; 2) 
providing socio-economic support across villages encouraging different 
communities, tribes and ethnics to work together, and (3) empowering women 
and enabling them to participate. In terms of service delivery, we were looking 
for an institution to cover the whole spectrum of law and order, service provision 
such as health, education etc. And the people’s support was key to this.83  
The NSP was linked to other sets of interests as well. The UN Habitat staff were 
interested in marketing ‘their’ programme in order to attract more and longer-term 
funding. Ghani, at the time on leave from the World Bank and acting as a UN advisor 
for the government, saw the model programme as a mechanism to help build a strong 
centralised state with outreach to the entire population. His response to a UN Habitat 
official who sought funding of around US $60,000 was:  
I cannot promise I can get you this amount, but I can promise you that I will work 
hard to convince everyone in government to make this a model for a national 
programme with nationwide coverage.84 
                                            
83 Interview with Minister Haneef Atmar #134 dated 05.11.2012 
84 Interview with development practitioners from UN-H in Kabul #87 dated 18.04.2012 
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It was decided by key actors involved in the process (such as Ghani and Minister 
Atmar) at an early stage to keep the programme entirely under leadership of the 
MRRD. This was a fairly easy decision given how the MRRD had positioned itself as a 
technically competent agency in relation to the donors and that no other ministries were 
likely candidates. All actors involved in the process agreed that due to government 
capacity constraints, NGOs would have a role as facilitators for the programme 
implementation (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). However, both Atmar and Ghani in their 
discussions pointed out that NGOs should be phased out once the local councils were 
established.85  
These general rules and agreements then, moved to the next stage where the actual 
programme design took place. The World Bank hired consultants who developed an 
operational manual which provided a set of goals to be achieved through following 
step-by-step phases of programme implementation. As such, it took the form of a 
prescriptive guideline to build institutions and change socio-political relations through 
introducing new sets of rules such as elections, participation of women and so forth.  
In this process, there were also key challenges and debates, given the diversity of the 
team and their competing interests. For instance, according to one informant, some of 
the NGO actors86 [national and international] argued against elections for the 
Community Development Councils (CDC), because of fears that they would be 
hijacked by local power holders. Another disagreement was over the conditionality for 
women’s participation. Opponents’ arguments were around the danger of strengthening 
the position of warlords and cultural sensitivity on women’s inclusion. Ghani recalled 
that he was able to convince the other national and international actors to accept both 
these on the basis of his own experiences and understanding of Afghanistan.87   
It is also interesting to see how a programme like the NSP was seen through the eyes 
of the broader government actors, in particular the president. Ehsan Zia, another 
technocrat who served as minister of Rural Rehabilitation of Development after Minister 
Atmar, and was one of the core team members during NSP formulation, stated:  
                                            
85 Interview with Ashraf Ghani #123 dated 11.06.2012; Interview with Haneef Atmar #134 dated 
05.11.2012. 
86 In terms of earlier categorisation, this was a mix of national and international actors who 
argued that the rural areas were not ‘ready’ for such dramatic changes and it would be 
insensitive to go around and push for women’s participation or for elections. Interview with 
development practitioners #87, #124 and #128. 
87 Interview with Ashraf Ghani #123 dated 11.06.2012 
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President Karzai was not highly in favour of a programme like this. He is more 
interested in the traditional and tribal forms of governance. Yet, he agreed that the 
aid and assistance must reach the rural areas and villages. Because he trusted 
Ghani well, he agreed easily on the programme. But the Mujahiddin leaders, 
people like the vice presidents at that time had no idea about what NSP was 
aiming for, they also were not interested about it [in the initial days] as they 
already had more than what they could digest on their plates.88 
President Karzai’s inclination towards traditional orders or customary structures and 
supporting them was reflected in his 1988 journal article and reiterated in his recent 
interview in The Atlantic (Karzai 1988; Mashal 2014). Although, according to Ghani, the 
president only gave his support and did not interfere in the NSP, the following section 
demonstrates how his bias towards customary structures was reflected in the 
emergence of the IDLG.  
For the World Bank, the NSP was inspired by its Community Driven Development 
(CDD) strategy.89 In the case of post-2001 Afghanistan, the Bank’s main interest was to 
follow a model that could strengthen the centralised role of the state. The choice of 
CDD model for this purpose was interesting as the same model was used in Indonesia 
for circumventing the state’s role or, as Barron et al. (2011) pointed out, the KDP 
(equivalent of NSP in Afghanistan) was a decentralisation project for strengthening the 
post-Suharto regime in the transition phase (Barron et al. 2011:x-xi).90 The most 
important difference between the Indonesian and Afghani contexts is that in Indonesian 
villages and sub-districts, prior to this intervention, the central regime had a strong 
presence unlike Afghanistan where the formal state presence has often been 
negotiated by mediators and did not go beyond the district headquarters, as noted in 
the previous chapter. The Bank liaised with different actors within Afghanistan and 
internationally, especially Indonesia, where the programme became very popular, for 
exchange programmes which brought relevant experts together in order to provide a 
learning space for making the programme more effective. The Bank’s interest was 
based on its political commitment to support state-building and institution-building in 
Afghanistan, promoting inclusiveness and women’s rights as its key interests.  
The NSP goals could be understood in two ways. The formal goal is outlined in the 
NSP documents: “to build, strengthen and maintain Community Development Councils 
                                            
88 Interview with Mohmmad Ehsan Zia #94 Dated 19.05.2012 
89 Refer to chapter two Section 2.3.3 for further elaboration of the CDD model and its usage in 
different contexts. 
90 See also the extensive work of Tania Murray Li (2005, 2007) on the Indonesian case. 
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(CDCs) as effective institutions for local governance and social-economic 
development.”91 Its declared purpose was to build governance institutions, provide 
social services and ensure women’s inclusion.92 However, since its inception, the NSP 
has also been associated with broader objectives that are not officially articulated. 
These included introducing a liberal democracy model on the local level by familiarising 
Afghans in rural areas with elections,93 voting and overall democratic processes. 
Breaking the existing influence and dominance of the warlord or strongmen’s control 
over the local population,94 and providing a mediating structure to build direct local 
(village level) relations between the central government and its sub-national institutions 
were other objectives. While in line with official objectives, these goals were both 
broader (e.g. democracy promotion) and more specific (e.g. breaking the power of local 
strongmen). In order to understand the dynamics of the design and implementation of 
the programme, it is important to keep in mind these other purposes of building 
institutions and changing socio-political relations.  
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) 
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) or Hambastagi Mili/Mili Paiwastoon 
(Dari/Pashtu) is one of the largest programmes led by MRRD and has been operating 
since September 2003. Although the programme is framed as being based on the 
Afghan traditions of ashar (community voluntary work) and jirga (council of respected 
members) and Islamic values of justice, unity and equity (MRRD 2014), as noted earlier 
it also draws inspiration from the World Bank’s Community Driven Development (CDD) 
modality (Nixon 2008). As Mulder pointed out, these programmes often have to be 
localised in order to be accepted by local people and the foreign elements need to 
connect to local roots and native stems so that they can be grafted (Mulder 1992:217, 
cited in Hasselskog 2009). 
The programme design in 2003 had five phases; (1) social mobilisation and Community 
Development Council (CDC) elections; (2) Community Development Plan preparation; 
(3) sub-project proposal preparations for block-grant;95 (4) implementation of projects; 
                                            
91 The Programme’s official website: http://www.nspafghanistan.org/index.aspx (accessed on 
11.01.2013) 
92 Interview with CEO of NSP #2 dated 09.08.2011 
93 Conversation with Afghan aid worker in Kabul #91 dated 13.05.2012 
94 Interview with Dr. Ashraf Ghani #123 dated 11.06.2012 
95 A block-grant is a specific amount of funding allocated for each CDC to spend on publicly 
beneficial projects that are identified by the members of the CDC. 
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and (5) closure of project, reporting and handover.96 Around 31 non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) were contracted as facilitating partners (FPs), responsible for 
facilitating the whole process until the handover phase.97 The FPs were also 
responsible for helping elected CDC members go through a series of training for 
‘capacity building.’98  
Nixon (2008), in his study of the NSP, provides extensive details on the Programme’s 
different procedures, varying standards of elections, different types of CDCs in terms of 
its gender aggregation and other aspects of the programme implementation. (Nixon 
2008:20-35)  
Since 2003 the programme has covered over 70% of rural communities and mobilised 
more than 34,383 communities who have elected their local CDCs99 (see Table 2).  
Table 2 NSP coverage in terms of communities, the block-grant funding they 
receive and demographic number of male and female members (NSP 2014) 
Key Indicators # 
# of communities with CDCs elected 34,383 
# of communities financed (at least partially) 31,430 
# of communities with full 1st block-grant 
utilization 
25,572 
# of sub-project proposals financed (at least 
partially) 
80,335 
# of sub-projects completed 57,728 
BG Committed (US$) Million 1,496 
BG Disbursed (US$) Million 1,411 
# of male CDC members 280,832 
# of female CDC members 150,561 
 
The block-grant is calculated at Afs10,000 (US $200) per household with an average of 
US $33,500 and maximum of US $60,000 per community (NSP 2014). It is disbursed 
directly to CDC accounts and communities are required to contribute 10 per cent of the 
total project costs in either labour, funds, or material. As of February 2014 the 
programme has covered 352 out of 364 provincial districts and is planned to expand to 
                                            
96 This means the FPs will hand over the CDC to the provincial MRRD office for NSP (NSP 
Operational Manual Version V 2009:11-14); Interview with NSP provincial managers in Bamyan 
and Nangarhar #6 dated 17.08.2011 and #70 dated 14.03.2012. 
97 The FPs include 1 UN Agency (UN-Habitat), 11 national NGOs, 19 international NGOs, 1 
national firm and 1 international firm (MRRD 2014). 
98 The training includes project management, accounting, procurement and monitoring skills and 
familiarity with the CDC bylaws and overall NSP processes (NSP Operational Manual 2009:17). 
99 See NSP webpage http://www.nspafghanistan.org/ (accessed on 04.02.2013). 
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a full coverage of 40,900 rural communities by September 2015 (MRRD 2014). Sub-
projects funded through block-grants include education, irrigation, livelihoods, power, 
transport, water supply and sanitation and others (see Table 3). 
Table 3 Projects funded by the NSP block-grants since its establishment (NSP 2014) 
Sector 
Completed Financed 
# of sub-
projects 
Disbursements 
US$ Beneficiaries 
# of 
sub-
projects 
Budget 
US$ Beneficiaries 
Education 5,836 37,934,851.14 1,914,656 6,538 61,225,599 2,104,582 
Irrigation 10,377 162,241,037.61 3,950,507 15,870 293,477,711 6,178,291 
Livelihood 2,481 8,964,619.61 599,404 2,549 9,599,744 613,338 
Power 6,838 153,402,919.23 3,188,839 7,866 183,882,628 3,589,281 
Transport 15,280 275,345,700.99 6,332,090 20,689 420,698,368 8,439,656 
Water Supply 
& Sanitation 13,164 188,752,163.93 5,130,090 18,584 291,909,993 7,110,006 
Miscellaneous 2,491 45,504,364.50 992,325 5,000 111,582,209 1,765,259 
Grand Total 56,467 872,145,657.00  77,096 1,372,376,253  
 
The NSP’s total budget from May 2003 to September 2015 (excluding community 
contribution) was set at US $2.7 billion and total expenditure as of April 2014 was US 
$1.865 billion (NSP 2003). NSP funding is entirely dependent on donors (NSP 2013).100 
While most donors channel funding through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(ARTF);101 a few also have bilateral agreements. The ARTF is the main machinery for 
operationalisation of the NSP based on the CDD modality, which is managed by the 
World Bank.   
NGOs were the primary service providers in most Afghan rural communities during the 
decades of war (Goodhand 2013:290). This gave them the potential to be important 
actors in the NSP implementation process that was led by a newly established 
government that had very low human as well as institutional capacity. However, this 
strength of NGOs as facilitating partners (FPs), including their familiarity and access to 
                                            
100 The key NSP donors are the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) at 
US $437 million (19.95%), The ARTF at US $1.569.48 billion (71.50%) and the Japanese Social 
Development Fund (JSDF) at US $41.81 million (1.90%). Bilateral donors mostly contribute 
through ARTF at US $145.31 million (6.65%) (NSP 2013). 
101 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was set up by the World Bank following 
other ‘post-conflict’ situations. The ARTF is a multilateral arrangement operated by the World 
Bank with a management committee including the Asian Development Bank, Islamic 
Development Bank, UNDP and the Afghan Ministry of Finance. 
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communities, also had a downside in the way the MRRD desired the NSP’s goal to be 
explained to people in the villages: NGOs often worked under strict rules of declaring 
themselves as ‘non-political’ and ‘non-governmental’ and as such they avoided 
explaining the political aspects of the programme to communities – the governance 
aspects of the programme were barely mentioned by FPs to local villagers.102 Instead 
the provision of services through block-grants was highlighted by the FPs’ Social 
Mobilisers when they introduced the NSP to villagers.103  
The purpose of the programme was defined as “to build, strengthen and maintain 
Community Development Councils as effective institutions for local governance and 
socio-economic development” (NSP 2014). Members of the CDC were elected through 
secret ballets and women’s inclusion was a non-negotiable condition. The programme’s 
focus on rural communities that had historically remained beyond the reach of national 
government marked a significant turning point. For the first time for some rural areas of 
the country, the government reached out to communities, not to extract resources, but 
to provide services and to facilitate participation in a supposedly democratic process. 
And, on paper at least, the programme dealt directly with ‘elected’ actors rather than 
selected intermediaries. Although historically, there had been attempts to reform the 
mediated nature of state-society relations, as the analysis of this programme will 
unpack, this could be seen as a systematic attempt to reconfigure local power 
structures and governance institutions.  
The programme very quickly utilised the human capacities of Afghan returnees and 
recruited hundreds of staff who had skills and experience with NGOs working on 
community development (PRDU 2012). These groups of Afghans became partners to 
the international actors in Afghanistan, particularly in the fields of economic 
development as the other allies of the Western countries, the warlords and militia 
leaders,104 lacked the necessary language skills and familiarity with programme 
management.105 For warlords (at the national level) the concepts of development and 
economic growth were quite unfamiliar and thus there was a greater opportunity for 
technocrats and western-educated Afghans to influence this part of the newly 
                                            
102 Interview with FPs and development practitioners #87 dated 18.06.2012 & #5 dated 
14.08.2011 & #94 19.05.2012 
103 The following empirical chapters have detailed elaborations on how SMs introduced the NSP 
to villagers. See section 4.2 in chapters six and seven. 
104 In the Afghan context, warlord mainly refers to leaders of Mujahiddin factions who were 
involved in the anti-Soviet war and later in the civil wars of early 1990s. 
105 The funding flow to Mujahiddin leaders in the form of ‘blank cheques’ is commonly discussed 
among Afghans referring to the 1980s. The lack of accountability on how this was spent 
encouraged NGOs to make a distinction between this and their work. NGOs began to work 
under a level of accountability which only later became more standard. 
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established government.106 The technocrats, therefore, had an important role in framing 
the direction of the country’s major development and economic programmes from early 
2002. 
This whole notion of development programming was associated with a particular set of 
technical concepts and language widely used by the MRRD staff and donors, but 
obscure to the uninitiated (Cowen and Shenton 1995; Ferguson 1994; Ludden 1992; 
Scott 1998; Skaria 1999 – all cited in Long 2001; Mosse 2005:4). For instance, the 
hierarchy of planning is explained as follows: the Community Development Council 
once formed, will produce a Village Development Plan (VDP), then these plans should 
be incorporated via the District Development Assembly (DDA) into the District 
Development Plan (DDP). The district plans are meant to provide the basic material for 
Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) authored by the Provincial Development 
Committee (PDC) that consists of various line ministries and provincial level executive 
authorities and is chaired by the provincial governor (TAF 2007:32). In theory, the 
village plans were incorporated into the district plans and the district plans into the 
provincial plans; thus a bottom-up planning was supposed to be responsive to the local 
population’s needs. However, in reality many different sets of (top-down) interests 
permeated into the process, as explored in the following chapters, which affected key 
decisions about what was selected, what to fund, how long for, and on what scale, etc. 
5.2.2. MRRD’s district assemblies  
According to Article 33 of the Afghan constitution that regulates electoral matters, 
district councils were supposed to be established through free, secret and directly 
balloted elections (Nijat 2014:19). Legitimate elections, according to the law, are only 
conducted under the Independent Election Commission’s direct supervision: at the time 
of writing (2014), there were no district councils that could be formally recognised. This 
‘gap’, according to the MRRD, was ‘filled’ through the ministry’s programmes to create 
District Development Assemblies (DDAs) through the MRRD’s National Area Based 
Development Programme (NABDP). According to the MRRD, this programme has two 
main purposes: building and strengthening district level institutions to ‘independently 
address priority local needs’ and provision of social services. Multiple donors funded a 
total budget of over US $351,675,696 between 2004 and 2012.107 The programme’s 
                                            
106 According to one of the ex-MRRD ministers, the two vice presidents, both of whom represent 
Mujahiddin warlords, had no interest in the MRRD and its work; they were more engaged with 
MoD and MoI affairs and other ministries. Interview with ex-minister Ehsan Zia #94 dated 
19.05.2012 
107 Donors contributed US $351,675,696. They included: Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
European Union, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and UNHCR (UNDP 2012). 
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brief is broader than the discussion here where I briefly look at its history to highlight its 
facilitating role in creating the district level assemblies.  
The NABDP has been implemented in three phases so far. The first phase between 
April, 2002 and December, 2005 did not include institution-building as a key 
component. The broader framework of the NABDP, according to the MRRD, was 
referred to in President Karzai’s speech at the first International Conference on 
Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, held in Tokyo in January 2002.108 The 
programme was led by UNDP in the first phase; later it transferred the leadership to the 
MRRD and continued in a supporting role (MRRD 2004:4; UNDP 2012). The second 
phase of the programme (February 2006 - 2008) coincided with the period when the 
NSP had already created the Community Development Councils (CDCs) in the villages. 
The idea of District Development Assemblies emerged as a result of seeking ways to 
connect the CDCs to district governance institutions (MRRD 2004). In the second 
phase, institution building became a priority and 137 DDAs were established across the 
country. By 2014, the programme had registered 388 DDAs across all 34 provinces.109 
Most of the established DDAs managed to develop the district-level Development Plans 
(MRRD 2006:6). The MRRD built a partnership between two of its programmes (NSP 
and NABDP) by linking the NSP’s facilitating partners (NGOs) with the DDAs as 
partners (MRRD 2014). The NGOs played a similar role in facilitating the DDAs in the 
same districts where they were involved in building the village level councils.110 
  
DDA members are elected through the CDC clusters. Similar to CDC members at the 
village level, they are not paid any salary. This created tensions, especially when 
parallel councils were established whose members were salaried by institutions such 
as the IDLG. According to NSP facilitators, initially the plan was that CDCs and DDAs 
should be non-governmental civil society institutions, but the MRRD insisted on an 
emphasis on their governing role.111  
In the third phase of the programme (2009-2015), ‘local institutional development’ 
became a priority, and the idea of building governance institutions for the purposes of 
                                            
108 This speech was also referred to by Ashraf Ghani as the framework for the NSP’s 
establishment. More on this in the following section (MRRD 2004:4). 
109 The number of DDAs exceeded the actual number of districts on record according to the 
IDLG who claimed that formally there are 364 districts with 9 others still in the process of being 
formally recognised. In some cases there is still a lack of verified boundaries (Mielke 2007; 
Nixon 2008). Interview with Deputy IDLG Barna Karimi #1 03.08.2011; Interview with ISAF 
embedded at IDLG #83 dated 10.04.2012; (MRRD 2014). 
110 Interview with DACAAR staff #124 dated 11.06.2012. 
111 Interview with development practitioner from UN-H #87 dated 18.04.2012. 
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‘stabilisation and governance’ became more visible in this programme intervention 
(MRRD 2014). This may have been due to an increasing interest the MRRD had (by 
2009) in playing a leading role in the ‘ownership’ of local governance’s at the national 
level and the conflict that emerged as the IDLG started its own initiative establishing 
new district level councils formed by the Afghan Social Outreach Programme through 
patronage networks at the districts.112  
There is a strong emphasis on gender in the DDA institution building model which has 
led to women’s participation in the DDAs. However, the degree of this varies according 
to socio-cultural characteristics and the context and security of districts; while in some 
cases women have benefited from their participation, (explored further in chapters six 
and seven), in other cases their participation was purely symbolic. Often, although 
many women’s names appear on the list of ‘elected female DDA members’, only a few 
actually participate in the DDA meetings. This was evident in the two districts studied in 
Nangarhar and Bamyan. Saltmarshe and Medhi (2011) summarise the different status 
of the DDAs in various parts of the country:  
(…) In Laghman they [DDAs] had a coordinating role in the NSP process; in 
Daykundi they were moribund; in Helmand their role had been eclipsed by 
ASOP’s District Community Councils; and in Wardak the unstable security 
situation led DDA members to conceal their identity or flee to Kabul. However, in 
Samangan DDAs were present in all districts and were used and supported by 
NGOs who encouraged female participation, though problems of distance and a 
lack of offices inhibited their operation. They were also active in Sar-i-Pul, but 
mostly in WFP-related activities. (…) In Jawzjan they were most active and a 
number of NABDP funds were being disbursed… (Saltmarshe and Medhi 
2011:36) 
What is seen in the operationalisation of the DDAs around the country is the fact that its 
role in service delivery and access to economic resource distribution has become more 
visible than its role as a governance institution; and that its governing role has been 
contested by internal (within government) and external (anti-government) forces. In the 
following two chapters, I present an in-depth analysis of the formation and operation of 
DDAs in the districts of Behsud (Nangarhar) and Yakawlang (Bamyan). As the 
following chapters will reveal further, the DDAs have been received by the district and 
village elites and de facto governance institutions and actors as an important source of 
                                            
112 More on the IDLG’s programme in the following section of this chapter. 
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resource distribution; hence the leadership and its activities were practically taken over 
by key district level elites or those loyal to them.  
5.2.3. Debates on the effectiveness and impacts of NSP 
The NSP has generated a significant body of literature, which studies various 
dimensions of its effectiveness and impacts. This literature varies from naively positive 
and celebratory writings to some very critical work and more nuanced and context-
specific accounts (Boesen 2004; Kakar 2005; Barakat et al. 2006; Noelle-Karimi 2006; 
Brick 2008; Nixon 2008; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Kamal 2010; Azarbaijani-
Mughaddam 2010; Beath et al. 2013; Monsutti 2012). For instance, the programme 
was widely covered in the media as a justification for international interventions in 
Afghanistan, particularly when donors were frustrated by President Karzai and the 
widespread corruption and inefficiency of the government. Kamal (2010) for instance, 
termed the NSP’s councils as ‘wise council’ from ‘quiet corners’ of the country and an 
example of flourishing democracy (Kamal 2010). Boesen (2004) highlighted the NSP’s 
role in redrafting customary power relations, although she admits that, in parts, the 
CDCs have “reproduced customary structures of local governance”. Nevertheless, she 
says, although it is a democracy introduced ‘from above’, it fosters democratic 
processes at the local levels (Boesen 2004:2; 39-40). Noelle-Karimi pointed out the 
importance of the programme in terms of shortening the ‘perceptional distance’ 
between Kabul and regions or rural communities (Noelle-Karimi 2006:2). Brick’s view is 
that by introducing customary village structures and actors the CDCs, instead of 
contributing to conflict resolution, generated more conflict in villages and she argues for 
a productive role for ‘customary’ organisations in state-building while looking at CDCs 
as externally imposed organisations (Brick 2008). Nixon (2008) looks into the NSP in 
the broader context of local governance, examining the programme’s origins and 
design and addressing its challenges in terms of sustainability, coherence and 
effectiveness in the longer term. He, like Boesen, highlights local power relations as a 
challenge for the NSP intervention and advocates for a ‘coherent strategy’ that 
incorporates ‘shared vision’ on sub-national governance arrangements (Nixon 2008). 
Kakar and Azarbaijani-Moghaddam looked specifically at the gender aspects of the 
programme, highlighting how it affected (or not) local level gender relations through its 
gender conditionality and providing women-focused projects (Kakar 2005; Azarbaijani-
Mughaddam 2010). Following an anthropological approach, Monsutti looks at the NSP 
as an element of a much broader conceptual and bureaucratic apparatus that aims to 
promote new forms of “transnational governmentality” that, he says, coexists with 
“territorialised expressions of state power and sovereignty” (Monsutti 2012:278).  
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Another set of questions concerns whether the structures and institutions created by 
the NSP will last beyond their donor funded project cycles. This partly depends on 
international funding commitments, but it also upon the way local elites influence these 
institutions through their patronage networks (Suhrke 2006; Rubin 2006). In the 
national political arena, institution building and resources provision have become 
important instruments for newly emerged national political elites looking to extend their 
influence. Both MRRD programmes depend on donor funding for their continuation 
(Suhrke 2006:1). The NABDP is planned to continue until 2015, ‘coordinating and 
facilitating’ the ‘capacity development’ of the DDA members. Given the broader peace-
building interests exhibited by donors through their support of other programmes, the 
NABDP has added conflict resolution to DDAs’ mandates.  
At the national level, in an attempt to address problems of coordination and competition 
between the IDLG and MRRD’s conflict, an inter-ministerial agreement was signed in 
December 2013. According to this, the DDAs and the IDLG’s councils are to merge into 
a new structure (still unrecognised in law) known as District Coordination Councils 
(NABDP 2014). Although this appears to have ‘resolved’ the conflict at the national 
level, the operationalisation in each district will be uneven and almost certainly 
problematic in some cases.113 The NSP, too, is planning to complete full coverage of all 
Afghan villages by 2015. In its third phase, the programme aims to “continue to develop 
the capacities of CDCs to operate as the people’s representatives at the village-level 
and to enable them to assume the mandate of the Village Councils foreseen in the 
Constitution” (NSP 2013). The NSP remains the most publicised programme among 
donors, with the highest budget and flag-ship status. Nevertheless, both the village 
level CDCs and the district level DDAs continue to, unsurprisingly, be shaped by local 
political networks.114 However, the continuation of CDCs and DDAs beyond the current 
programme funding and provision of block-grants as a local governance structure, 
seems unlikely at the time of writing.  
5.3. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance: from top down to bottom 
up governance?  
By 2007, international intervention in Afghanistan had reached its fifth year. Various 
different factors had shaped the emergence of sub-national governance as an 
international and Afghan government priority. They included: changes in US military 
policy; the growth of insurgency/re-emergence of the Taliban; failure of top-down state-
                                            
113 See chapter six section 6.4.2. 
114 See chapters six and seven for further evidence on this point. 
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building and problems associated with reform-resistant ministries; intra and inter-
ministerial tensions related to resource distribution and funding between government 
ministries and, to some extent, the interest of political leadership in the slow pace of 
reform due to political dealings and compromises; and the failure of bureaucratic 
institutions to deliver services efficiently. All these factors contributed to the creation of 
the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG).  
This section assesses the different factors that led to the establishment of the IDLG 
and the operationalisation of its work in two different forms: its relations with donors 
and the justification of its programmes through decentralisation discourses, whilst in 
practice strengthening national elite patronage networks. The section highlights the 
roles of individual actors in negotiating local governance ‘ownership’ matters with 
actors within the government and beyond.  
5.3.1. Factors behind the emergence of the IDLG  
The IDLG was established in August 2007,115 by which time the Bonn Agreement 
international commitments had been declared ‘over’. On paper, Afghanistan was 
considered to have a legitimate state, a written constitution, an elected president and 
parliament, and the process of donor funded institution-building was ongoing. 
International donors were in search of ‘best practices’ to find out how better their 
internationally committed funding could be used to reach people beyond Kabul and 
other major city boundaries. The international military had a mandate to move from an 
‘enemy-centred’ to a ‘population centric’ approach and sought to ‘expand the legitimacy 
of the central government to the regions and enhance security’ (Lister 2007:8; van 
Bijlert 2009). As such, it was looking for a government institution to partner with that 
could take over the governance role once they had ‘cleared’ the area of ‘enemies’. 
The history of the IDLG’s formation and its work on local governance is presented here 
as a contrasting case to the MRRD. It shows how transnational agendas such as ‘good 
governance’, decentralisation and foreign military’s COIN interests in the form of 
‘population centric’ warfare combined with the newly emerged central government’s 
interest in strengthening a patrimonial system of rule in order to build stronger relations 
between the local population and central government whilst avoiding or bypassing the 
influence of regional strongmen. On the surface, all three (international donors, foreign 
military’s COIN and central government’s agendas) appear similar and yet, at times, 
were in conflict with each other. The IDLG as a sub-national governance institution 
                                            
115 The presidential decree for the establishment of the IDLG was signed by President Karzai on 
August 30th 2007 (Nixon 2008:2). 
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became a platform to meet the competing interests of all parties involved. It took the 
lead in building institutions and strengthening loyalties between district and village 
actors and the central government. On the one hand it was seen as an instrument to 
decentralize power and bring government ‘closer to the people’, and yet on the other it 
was viewed by government protagonists as a means to concentrate power. In this 
section, I start by elaborating the different sets of interests and actors involved 
including the presidential palace, donor institutions such as the World Bank, the UNDP 
and the international military’s COIN strategy. The IDLG became a point of 
convergence for these different actors as explored below. This is followed by looking at 
the IDLG’s role in district and village governance in terms of its policies and practical 
interventions.  
Justifications for the IDLG varied from enhanced decentralisation to the need to 
strengthen patronage networks. For instance, in 2007-2008 there were at least three 
reports or assessments carried out by organisations such as the World Bank (2007), 
The Asia Foundation (2007) and the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit116 (a 
donor-funded research organisation). All highlighted the lack of a clear government 
strategy on sub-national governance, the lack of a sub-national governance policy, the 
existence of duality in the way government worked (i.e. through formal and/or informal 
patronage networks), the lack of clarity in the process of appointment of provincial and 
district governors, and the need in the overall administration for reform at the sub-
national level. All three papers emphasised building institutional capacity in terms of 
fiscal and financial, political, and public administration and overall governance relations.  
The central government, on the other hand, was dealing with its own challenges with 
regard to sub-national governance. As the central government started to gain strength, 
the central authorities were not in favour of leaving sub-national governance to 
provincial or regional strongmen. In some cases, President Karzai managed to move 
individuals to positions in Kabul (for example, Ismail Khan who used to be governor of 
Herat) while in other cases he failed (for example, Governor Atta in Balkh). There was 
no clear mechanism for the appointment of provincial and district governors and chiefs 
of police other than it was all handled through the Ministry of the Interior (Lister 2007; 
van Bijlert 2009). This meant that depending on whether or not the Ministry of the 
Interior was an ally of the president, the president had – or did not have – any direct 
authority over sub-national authority appointments. This became more important as the 
                                            
116 See, for example, Lister (2005), Lister & Nixon (2006) and Nixon (2008). 
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president began to think of running for a second term (Giustozzi and Orsini 2009:1).117 
Hence, it could be argued that the president and his team’s motivation to support the 
IDLG’s establishment was to strengthen patronage based networks across the country 
and bring them under his direct influence. Technically, the staff of the IDLG were a 
combination of government bureaucrats, including the Deputy Minister of Administrative 
Affairs of the MoI and the Deputy Director of the Provincial Council of the Office of 
Administrative Affairs (OAA) who formed the Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance (IDLG) organisational structure (IDLG 2008). Ghulam Jelani Popal was 
appointed as its director.118 The appointment (by the president) of a person with a 
political background (unrelated to Mujahiddin groups), who also had very extensive and 
current linkages in the provinces through his NGO experience and good relations with 
donors (Suhrke 2011:126) and international community, was undoubtedly not 
accidental.119 It was said in some circles that Popal convinced the president that if he 
was given the leadership of the IDLG, he would form ‘an army of forty thousand men’ in 
his support.120 The informant added that Popal’s aim was not literally to form such an 
‘army’, but he wanted to ensure that the president realised that an institution such as 
the IDLG had the potential to strengthen his own patronage network across the 
country, bypassing the warlords, strongmen and other influential figures. As Lister 
(2007) pointed out, the MRRD was practically taking over district and village 
governance through its national programmes of building institutions and channelling 
service provision. While this was seen by some (especially donors) as reasonable 
given the ministry’s ability to carry out these programmes, others saw it as ‘power-
grabbing’ (Lister 2007:10). This ‘power grabbing’ factor, as discussed in the earlier 
section, was also related to Minister Atmar’s desire to build his own patronage 
networks.121 Another important factor on the government, and particularly, the 
                                            
117 Humayoon (2010) provides an extensive account of how President Karzai managed to win 
the second round elections through national rather than international support and in this, 
political actors and indeed sub-national governance structures were crucial. 
118 Popal is a technocrat belonging to one faction of the Afghanistan Social Democrat Party 
(more commonly known as Afghan Milat), a Pashtun nationalist party with decades of presence 
in the Afghan political arena. Popal worked for over two decades with international aid agencies 
through the Afghanistan Development Agency (ADA) a non-political NGO that he founded in the 
1990s. He joined the post-2001 government with different senior posts at the Ministry of Finance 
and later with the president’s office. 
119 In the earlier years of the Karzai administration, most of the people connected to the regime 
were either linked to Mujahiddin leaders or technocrats arriving from the west; a third group who 
found their familiarity with context and most updated information and networks throughout 
Afghanistan were people like Atmar, Popal, Stanikzai, etc. The president kept them close to him 
because he saw them as close allies he could trust and use in certain times. They have 
certainly been helpful in attracting international resources for development in Afghanistan. 
120 Based on conversations with a civil society member who was close to Mr. Popal. #65 dated 
30.02.2011. 
121 See sub-section 5.2.2. in this chapter. 
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president’s side was the fact that formal institutions were seen to be too bureaucratic, 
less amenable to direct control and slower to deliver results than informal, personalized 
networks: 
President Karzai was not highly in favour of a programme like this [the NSP]. He 
is more interested in the traditional and tribal forms of governance.122  
As his June, 2014 interview with The Atlantic highlighted, he often relied on informal 
patronage networks rather than his own government’s staff (Mashal 2014). These 
factors led to the president’s agreement to Popal’s proposal to form the IDLG as an 
independent directorate operating directly under the president’s leadership. President 
Karzai relied on Popal, who was joined by Barna Karimi, then the deputy chief of staff 
of the president’s office and a seasoned Afghan-American technocrat, who according 
to some spoke the language of US business schools, to operationalise the work of the 
IDLG and seek funding for it. The combination of Popal and Karimi was a perfect 
choice as one brought local and contextual expertise of how things worked on the 
ground, while the other was able to turn those ideas into the language of donors and 
institutions in order to gain financial and political support for the institution.  
Various international organisations supported sub-national governance, including the 
World Bank, the UN and the Asia Foundation, and some of them were happy to support 
the IDLG. Others, like the World Bank, were already engaged with the MRRD’s work 
and so they were less interested, but UNDP, for instance, financed the Afghanistan 
Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) through one of its country office 
departments and the MRRD’s National Area Based Development Programme (ANBDP) 
through another. The ASGP funded the overall process of the IDLG’s establishment 
and the Sub-national Governance Policy formulation process.123 By 2006, the 
international military forces found themselves under increasing pressure from the 
insurgency. The United States, as the largest donor involved in Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction, increased its funding from $40 million (2004) to $1 billion in 2010, 60% 
of its funding being channelled through the Department of Defence. The US military’s 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy required the military forces to seek shortcuts in 
order to ensure stability in areas under their control and one such was often their 
reliance on existing patronage-based networks in the country, especially at district and 
village levels (van Bijlert 2009). Hence, for the US military focusing on stabilisation and 
                                            
122 Interview with ex-minister of MRRD Ehsan Zia #94 dated 12.05.2012; (Mashal 2014). 
123 In 2008, I worked as a UNDP Programme Officer; ASGP was one of the programmes in my 
portfolio. This analysis is based on my experience. 
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outreach to the sub-national level, particularly in areas with no or weak government 
presence, an institution like the IDLG was a more suitable choice than going through 
the MRRD’s ‘legal rational bureaucratic’ institutions that took much longer to create.124 
The military’s ‘population centric’ approach to counterinsurgency involved the increased 
mobilisation of development programmes to support stabilisation objectives In part, this 
policy shift was about focusing on “accountable, capable, and visible” district level 
administration as part of expanding the central government’s legitimacy (Brown 
2012:4). This increasing attention to district governance was translated by the military 
into provision of large scale support to districts and, in search of national partners, they 
decided that the IDLG would be the best option as both had a shared interest in 
patronage networks, although perhaps for different purposes. 
Similar to the MRRD, the IDLG also operated through different donor-funded 
programmes. These programmes included the Afghanistan Local Government Facility 
Development Programme, Performance Based Governor’s Fund, Strengthening 
Provincial Administration and Service Delivery, Regional Afghan Municipality 
Programme for Urban Population, Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme 
and the Social-Outreach Programme (SOP) for forming district councils (IDLGa 2014; 
IDLGb 2014). It should be noted that some of these programmes (such as SOP) were 
only pilot initiatives and no longer operational in 2012. The overall budget for the IDLG 
between 2013-2014 was reported to be $35,536,163 (Ministry of Finance 2014:53). 
In sum, it was the convergence of all these different motivations and competing 
interests that led to the establishment of the IDLG as an independent directorate, 
whose leadership was able to bypass parliamentary approval and whose head was 
directly under the president’s command. Since its establishment, the IDLG has 
managed to carry out both the formal track of Sub-national Governance Policy 
formulation, implementation of different donor-funded programmes and distribution of 
resources in districts and provinces, as well as expanding President Karzai’s patronage 
network through district and provincial governor appointments and governors’ direct 
reporting channelled through IDLG to the president. In this way, an informal 
centralisation process is officially funded through decentralisation and good 
governance programme interventions. 
                                            
124 See chapters six and seven on how PRTs and in general the DoD have supported the 
Afghan Social Outreach Programme to create a district council through the ‘notable’ figures 
picked by district governors. 
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5.3.2 IDLG’s formal track: district and village governance 
One of the first steps taken by IDLG was to formulate Afghanistan’s Sub-national 
Governance Policy. In part this policy was a reaction by the IDLG leadership towards 
the MRRD’s attempts under Minister Atmar’s leadership to formalise its own ministry’s 
local governance interventions at village and district levels (Lister 2007:10; Nixon 
2008:53). But before going into further detail about the parts of the policy that 
discussed district and village governance, it is important to appreciate the wider events 
at the time (Li 2007; Kelly 2009): 2009 marked an important year for policy shifts, 
particularly with regard to local and sub-national governance in Afghanistan 
(Saltmarshe and Medhi 2011). The USA, the largest donor in the country, had just 
elected a new administration under Barak Obama who had promised Americans in his 
election campaign a military surge that would first escalate US engagements in 
Afghanistan, followed by withdrawal of the troops. This was interpreted by some as a 
shift in US policy (Brown 2012). In Afghanistan, too, the second presidential election 
was to be held in September with President Karzai planning to run for re-election. Thus, 
there were strong local and international imperatives to formulate the Sub-National 
Governance Policy. The international needs were mainly to do with military goals of 
focusing on stability, while for the Afghan government, in particular for the president, it 
was to have a closer and more direct eye on district and provincial governors. 
Although, according to the IDLG official leading the process of policy formulation, the 
policy came about as a result of “extensive consultation with people across the country 
as well as with government officials”,125 a quick overview of it indicates a significant 
level of confusion and lack of clarity that demonstrates just how divorced it is from local 
practices and needs in the field.  
The Asia Foundation carried out a ‘consultation’ survey on the draft of the IDLG’s policy 
and produced a superficial and hasty report based on a quantitative survey in eight 
regions. This supposedly revealed 93% support for the, as yet, untested Sub-national 
Governance Policy and congratulated the IDLG on the ‘accuracy’ of the nascent 
document.126 The survey did not address the existing conflict and issues (at that time) 
regarding ‘ownership’ of local governance affairs between the ministry of economy, the 
MRRD and the IDLG. In a nutshell, surveys like can be seen as an attempt to gain 
further ‘legitimacy’ for IDLG policies in order to ensure donors’ funding and satisfaction. 
The SNG Policy is a lengthy 415 page document. A review of the village governance 
                                            
125 Interview with Jelani Popal ex-director of IDLG #85 dated 12.04.2012. 
126 The Asia Foundation report concluded after 25 pages that “Conclusively, we would like to 
congratulate IDLG on completing draft policy with such accuracy to achieve 93% agreement by 
the sub-national stakeholder’s consultations” (TAF 2008:25). 
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section reveals the policy’s lack of clarity as it presents goals and ‘benchmarks’ that are 
neither realistic nor achievable in their defined time-frames. van Bijlert (2009) rightly 
points out that the IDLG followed two aspects of sub-national governance agenda in its 
work: the technical or administrative, and the political (van Bijlirt 2009). On the political 
side, it mainly focused on ‘outreach programmes’. Interestingly, despite the fact that the 
outreach programmes were creating new sub-national governance structures, there is 
no mention of them in the policy document (ibid.:15) Instead, the policy described how 
the MRRD’s established councils at district and villages would transition to ‘civil society’ 
once the constitutionally defined District and Village Councils were established by 
2011: “When the Constitutionally-mandated Village Councils are elected, CDCs may 
cease to exist” (IRA 2010:165). In other words, the district and village governance parts 
of the SNG policy were a kind of formal reaction of the IDLG leadership towards the 
MRRD’s so-called ‘power grabbing’ (Lister 2007). Saltmarshe and Medhi (2011) 
highlight the inconsistencies of the document, caught between trying to decentralise 
responsibilities and the fear of losing control over the local governance relations that is 
in place at sub-national level (Saltmarshe and Medhi 2011:10). The policy does not 
even have a clear definition of the ‘village’.127 The policy also presents a mixed and 
confused image of ‘village institutions’ and ‘village actors’: it failed to highlight the ‘new’ 
actor created by the IDLG’s order through district offices, the qaryadar or village 
administrator; the list of responsibilities delegated to village councils was identical to 
those of district and provincial governors; and it completely overlooked the collective 
nature of village leadership in its attempt to formalise village governance institutions. 
Gender and women’s inclusion in male-dominated sub-national governance relations 
has been a tricky question for the IDLG. The policy reserves 25% of the provincial and 
municipal council memberships for women, but goes on to state that if women are ‘not 
available’ to contest them, these seats will go to men (IDLG 2010:18). Nor does it 
provide a quota for women in the mayoral seats or on village councils (ibid.). The policy 
does keep the debate open for reconsideration at a later stage, but according to some, 
this half-hearted attempt is typical of the government’s deliberate manoeuvring to rely 
on traditional and patronage networks to which women have no or very limited 
access.128 In contrast, as earlier pointed out, the MRRD, at least on paper and to some 
extent in practice, has been more precise and serious about women’s inclusion in their 
programme interventions.  
                                            
127 For further elaboration on this point, see chapter four, section 3. 
128 Interview with a gender and development expert who was part of the discussions #131 dated 
27.06.2012. 
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The IDLG policy’s ambiguity and its unrealistic and inconsistent quality is also a good 
example of the way ‘technical’ experts operate in ‘post-war’ contexts where 
assumptions are made based on unrealistic or old data rather than ground realities, 
existing power dynamics, etc. As already noted, the policy’s twin purposes were to 
encourage donors to fund the IDLG’s work through notions of ‘good governance’, 
democratisation and decentralisation and to simultaneously strengthen the president’s 
office’s control over sub-national governance through a centralised system of 
patrimonial rule (van Bijlert 2009).  
5.3.3 The IDLG’s informal track or unwritten rules on district and village 
governance 
As already noted, the international military’s COIN strategy found a common interest 
with the IDLG in building up the patrimonial system of rule. The presence of American 
Special Forces and NATO/ISAF in provincial capitals, districts and villages led to their 
increased interest in sub-national governance relations for two reasons: intelligence 
gathering from civilians and influential figures (Baker 2007), and using development 
assistance and reconstruction funds as a means for ‘winning hearts and minds’ and in 
military terms for the purpose of what they called ‘force protection’ (Baker 2007).129 
Based on the ‘population centric’ approach by international security forces a significant 
part of development funding was allocated to the international military forces. The 
military was to seek partnership with civilian parts of the government that could help 
them support the expansion of the Afghan state’s legitimacy. For this purpose, the ISAF 
forces, with their nationwide presence, stationed their representatives as ‘embeds’ 
within the key ministries in Kabul, liaising between the forces and the central 
government.130 For instance, an ex-PRT commander who twice served in Nangarhar 
was an ISAF embed at the IDLG during the period of this research. According to her, 
the international military forces had a wider presence across the country than the 
government. This meant that ISAF was in a much stronger position and had much 
better contact with both de facto and de jure governing actors at the sub-national level 
than the government, and that ISAF worked to ensure alliances with those recognised 
by the central government:  
Sometimes it also happens that we suggest to the central government to 
change a governor or district governor, although we know this is the job of 
GIROA and the president to do that. But because we have a wide-spread 
                                            
129 Interview with an ISAF civilian advisor #82 05.04.2012. 
130 Interview with a civilian advisor at NATO HQ in Kabul #81 dated 31.03.2012. 
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presence, we feel it necessary to send our feedback on the practices of local 
government representatives.131  
Although ISAF and the PRTs did have working relationships with the MRRD, given that 
the MRRD’s approaches were more development-oriented and seen to be slow and 
bureaucratic, something that military logic could not afford, they relied more on the 
IDLG’s role in local governance. One example of IDLG and international military 
cooperation was the formation of the Social Outreach Programme (SOP) councils. The 
councils were not directly created by the international military, but at the district level 
the PRTs relied mostly on the district governor and members of these councils and in 
some instances the councils were used by international military forces to help form 
local militia. Suhrke et al. (2009) pointed out that the IDLG’s interest in forming the 
district level councils through this programme was around building relations between 
the ‘traditional’ leaders and central government while the international military and 
ministry of interior (by this time led by Minister Atmar) were looking for mechanisms to 
allow them to form arbaki or local militias (Miakhel 2012:53; Hakimi 2014:396). 
According to the IDLG, members of Social Outreach councils were working with district 
and provincial governors on ‘development, security and governance improvement’ 
(Suhrke et al. 2009:19). They note that the programme gave the maliks (traditional 
community leaders) the legal status to serve as ‘community representatives’ liaising 
with the government (ibid.). 
The Social Outreach Programme is US funded and is closely linked to the COIN 
strategy where its focus has been on the districts considered unstable. Within the SOP, 
there is a multi-donor funded initiative known as the District Delivery Programme 
(DDP).132 This initiative is funded by the British and Danish, both at national level (the 
IDLG Office) for oversight and in Helmand PRTs where they delivered support to 
districts that were ‘cleared’ after military operations.133 Saltmarshe and Medhi identify 
the purpose of DDP (similar to SOP) as providing support to local populations via 
government services as a broader part of COIN strategy (Saltmarshe and Mehdi 2011). 
SOP councils were created under district governors’ guidance and members were 
selected through varying criteria depending on each governor’s position and linkages 
within villages under his jurisdiction. In some areas the international military had a 
direct presence during the SOP councils’ elections in sessions, while in others only 
                                            
131 Interview with ISAF embed at IDLG #83 dated 10.04.2012 
132 Interview with DFID lead on supporting Stabilisation and Governance #125 dated 18.06.2012 
133 The UK provided £4 million, supplemented by £1.8 million from the Danish government from 
2010-2012. (DFID 2012) 
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IDLG representatives and the district governor were involved.134 A civilian advisor at 
ISAF/NATO headquarters explained their overall interest in issues of rural development 
and local governance as a threat avoidance strategy, hoping that by providing 
development assistance to people they would ‘win’ over them(Ibid). 
The international justification for building various forms of ‘local’ councils, ‘shuras’ or 
‘jirgas’ (depending on context) on the basis on ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ mechanisms is that 
the Afghan state is perceived to be ‘external’ or ‘illegitimate’ and conversely any form of 
‘local’ structure, is seen to be automatically more embedded and legitimate (Dorronsoro 
2014). Hence, the military, as well as other international institutions, allocated millions 
in funds for creating ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ structures.135 Saltmarshe and Medhi indicate 
that the Social Outreach councils are the “sole formal organisations to fulfil the role of 
district representation”, however, only a paragraph prior to this, they write about the 
District Development Assemblies (DDAs) and how they intend “to take on a growing 
role in district governance” (Saltmarshe and Medhi 2011). Their observation of 
identifying both as district governance representatives is correct, as in most districts 
both exist in parallel. However, what is missing from their analysis is how one is a more 
‘formal’ representative than the other. Both the MRRD and IDLG sponsored 
interventions are donor funded, one by followers of the development oriented approach 
and the other by builders of patrimonial system logic. And if one follows the 
constitutional argument, none of the structures they have built at district and village 
levels could be considered in any way or form ‘formal’.  
As discussed in an earlier section, the IDLG has followed different strategies in order to 
expand its institutional footprint in terms of ‘ownership’ of local governance. In a way, 
the establishment of the Social Outreach councils could be seen as an example of the 
IDLG’s attempts to regain the district council authority from the MRRD’s DDAs and 
trying to limit the DDAs’ work to purely development. Also, the IDLG continued its 
active debates and lobbying at the national level through the inter-ministerial local 
governance working group chaired by Senior Minister Amin Arsala. At the same time, 
at village level, as the elected village councils were yet to be established, IDLG took 
certain actions – less spoken about in Kabul – such as formalising the qaryadar 
positions. During 2010 most district governors’ offices were asked to add a village 
                                            
134 For instance, in Helmand, the DFID sponsored SOP councils were formed on a ‘different’ 
model to those in the east. (DFID wanted to introduce their model across the country but the 
pilot project ended in 2012.) Interview with DFID lead on supporting stabilisation and 
governance #125 dated 18.06.2012 
135 In Dorronsoro’s view, this also includes the community shura buildings since the 1980s 
through the NGOs that was further intensified in the post-2001 context by the military. 
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affairs sub-directorate (moderyat-e-qaryajat) to their tashkeel or 
organisational/administration structure. This sub-directorate was tasked with 
‘registering’ village administrators or qaryadars through a formal and legal procedure.136 
A qaryadar in this context is assumed to be the individual representing the village. He 
was asked to bring a petition signed by a number of village elders to confirm his 
position as a qaryadar. The lengthy job description for this position includes the same 
formal duties previously carried out by maliks. The petition was then sent to the district 
court for verification and once attested, the person formally registered in the sub-
directorate as the village administrator or qaryadar. This move by the IDLG was first of 
all, an important policy shift from what the formal track of its practices indicated in the 
Sub-national Governance Policy, where it identified the village council as its village 
administration.137 By formalising an individual’s role as village administrator, it clearly 
undermined the collective nature of the village council to take up the administrative 
responsibilities for the village. The selection mechanism for the village administrator is 
also vague, unclear and confusing, at least currently at the field level.138  
The IDLG officials in Kabul were in a state of denial (during the field research period 
2011/2012) about this attempt undermine village councils and the existing CDCs:  
We are not aware of any such actions; they may be carried out locally by the 
governors or local administrations. For us, the head of this council [Village 
Council] administratively is registered with the village affairs officers at district 
level. This is useful, for example if there is a case of an arrest warrant for 
someone hidden in the village, the district does not need to send a military 
operation unit, they get in touch with the head of the VC and he’ll be in charge of 
handing over the person.139  
The role that Mr Karimi explained is precisely what historically (and indeed presently) is 
carried out by maliks. However, historically, maliks were selected by the khans who 
were often the sole elites in the village; in the present context, there are multiple actors 
with contested interests at the village level and it is not difficult for a person to present a 
                                            
136 See the following chapters six (6.3.2.) and seven (7.3.2.) for further details on how this 
office operates in the contexts of Nangarhar and Bamyan districts. 
137 The policy at one point, clearly considers the malik’s role unofficial: “Yet any authority maliks 
may be given is not considered official” (IDLG 2010:12;71). 
138 Interview with district official in Nangarhar #80 dated 17.03.2012; Interview with sub-director 
of village affairs in Bamyan #18 dated 24.08.2011 
139 Interview with IDLG leadership member Barna Karimi #01 dated 03.08.2011. 
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paper with a few signatures to claim his malik or qaryadar position. This has already 
begun to create more confusion and conflict.140 
5.3.4. Patrimonial assemblages and local governance and its future 
One important factor affecting issues around local governance interventions by central 
government that this chapter has demonstrated is the role of individuals in processes of 
local governance policy formulation and implementation on the ground. These diverse 
groups and individuals have used their ‘assets’, whether language and technical skills, 
contacts and networking skills or access to patronage networks and power-brokers 
across the country, to maintain an increasing level of control or central government 
influence over local governance relations. These actors, who developed close relations 
with international organisations as well as the president’s inner circle, played a 
significant role in shaping the government’s sub-national governance interventions. In 
the case of the IDLG, there were different phases in which such individual roles 
became more visible in the actions that the institution have taken. For instance, though 
the IDLG’s leadership met donors’ concerns by hiring international consultants and 
allowing an ISAF/NATO embed to the IDLG, at the same time they used IDGL 
networks across the country to work on the re-election of the president (Humayoon 
2010); allegedly by instructing district governors (appointed by them) to finance and 
facilitate the stuffing of ballot boxes in favour of one candidate.141  
The IDLG leadership changed during the course of this period. Jelani Popal left the 
institution in 2010, although Barna Karimi remained as acting director. Later in 2011 
Karimi, too, left for an international diplomatic post as the ambassador to Canada, later 
leaving the government for private sector. The new director of the IDLG, Abdul Khaliq 
Farahi (since 2011), was another very close ally of President Karzai who served as 
ambassador to Pakistan, and had been taken hostage by the Taliban at one point (BBC 
News 2010). This senior post was a reward for him and he was seen as a trustworthy 
figure with the departure of two key figures (Popal and Karimi). One of the two deputy 
director posts was given to Matin Bek, the 26 year old (in 2012) son of Abdul Mutalib 
                                            
140 See following chapters six and seven for further elaboration on this point. 
141 Full narrative of the story shared by one of the IDLG staff. He compared what he heard from 
a group of young boys arriving from their native district to Kabul on holiday and spending lots of 
money. This attracted his attention and he asked the youngsters where they got the money? 
They said: “We worked for the Woleswal during elections stuffing the boxes.” In another 
instance the same officer found out that the IDLG office purchased expensive watches (cost 
approx. USS1000) and Samsung mobile phones which were given as ‘gifts’ to district officials in 
appreciation of their work for the elections. Connecting both stories, he is confident that district 
officials played an important role in the 2009 elections, but has no hard evidence as it was all 
done through the informal networks. Based on conversations with IDLG officer #136 dated 
03.12.2012. 
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Bek, an influential Uzbek power-broker from northern Takhar province. It is said that 
Bek senior, who was assassinated in a suicide attack, was a strong opponent of 
General Dostum (Pajhwok News 2014) hence, giving Bek’s son a senior position was a 
form of balancing the power on the president’s side given the seasonal fragility in 
Dostum’s relationship with the president.  
By the end of 2015, eight years after its initiation, most of the IDLG’s major external 
donor funded programmes are due to finish and there is an increasing pressure on the 
government to allocate part of the national budget to some of the non-programmatic 
operations of the institution (IDLG 2014a) This seems to indicate that the IDLG as an 
institution has a higher chance of survival despite a decrease in international funding, 
but the most important point of interest is how it will manage its formal and informal 
sub-national governance tracks with a new government under new leadership. 
The way forward for the IDLG’s status 
In 2012 the status of IDLG was contested by parliament and some of the country’s 
power-brokers. According to Article 64, Clause 20 of the Constitution, the president has 
the authority to establish commissions and institutions for the ease and smooth running 
of governance-related activities. However, on 19 December, 2012, members of 
parliament voiced their concern about the IDLG becoming “out of control and corrupt”142 
and as a result of their debate in the plenary session, the majority voted for the IDLG to 
become a ministry so that its minister could be approved by parliament and be brought 
into parliament for questions. This is seen an interesting move at the time. The current 
president has, in constitutional terms, an enormous level of authority over ‘independent’ 
institutions. This debate over the future of the IDLG was important for two reasons: 1) 
as the election was getting closer, representatives or partners of potential candidates 
jostled for influence the institution and 2) MPs used this as a way of pressuring the 
president regarding their own group and party interests on matters of sub-national 
governance. Although President Karzai did not take this decision by parliament 
seriously, it remains to be seen how his successor will use the institution for local 
governance in the future.  
5.4. A ‘policy’ solution: Response to the question of ‘ownership’ 
As outlined in this chapter, the two government institutions emerged as key players in 
the central state’s efforts to create district and village level governance structures. Both 
institutions attempted to increase their sphere of influence and resources in order to be 
                                            
142 See the original Dari text on the official page of the Afghan Parliament for these claims: 
http://wj.parliament.af/ accessed 19.12.2012 
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seen as the ‘owners’ of district and village councils. However, given that a large part of 
this competition (particularly at its ‘peak time’ i.e. in 2008-2010) was individually rather 
than institutionally driven, with the change of political leadership in both the MRRD and 
IDLG, the pace of debates and intensity of competition and conflict evolved over time. 
The most recent iteration of this debate, at the time of writing was an inter-ministerial 
working group where representatives of both institutions, the Independent Elections 
Commission, the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livelihoods and the Ministry of 
Finance chaired by senior minister on governance relations Senior Minister Amin 
Arsala, agreed on the ‘National Policy for Governance and Development at District and 
Village Level’ where both institutions agreed to ‘merge’ the ‘existing’ councils at district 
level where both institutions will jointly lead what will be called District Coordination 
Councils.143 This policy was approved by the cabinet and as shown in the following 
chapter, the operationalisation of this merger is not going to be a smooth and easy 
process; as DDAs are more established and systematic, there is a better chance that 
the MRRD will lead these councils rather than sharing with the IDLG.  
On matters of village governance, while the policy recognises the CDCs “To act as 
formal institution[s] for the government and other actors to ensure community 
representation and community-based governance(…) including service delivery” (IDLG 
and MRRD 2014:11), , the formalisation of the qaryadar post through district 
headquarters goes unmentioned. in the policy which, undoubtedly, will create issues in 
contexts where the position is filled by someone other than the CDC chief. In practice, 
however, as the following chapters reveal, this is far more complex and will continue to 
have consequences for the way district and village governance relations are handled. 
As long as the central government gives such legitimacy to different types of actors, 
this will create more competition and potential conflicts among different patrons who 
will gain strength from such recognition.  
5.5. Conclusion  
This chapter charted the emergence and evolution of two different central government 
institutions (the MRRD and IDLG) responsible for district and village governance. It 
examined how local governance programmes have been negotiated, formulated, 
designed and operated. The analysis highlights the tension between efforts to build 
formal, democratic institutions and processes for ostensible long term developmental 
goals, alongside efforts to extend and consolidate patronage networks to pursue more 
                                            
143 The policy was approved by President Karzai and cabinet ministers on December 30th, 2013 
(NABDP 2013). 
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short term sets of interests.  
The chapter discussed how the formulation and design processes of these 
programmes were negotiated between different national and international actors and 
institutions, each following their own interests. The chapter also demonstrated the 
effect of the interplay of the personal politics by those in leadership positions at the two 
institutions and other government actors.  
The chapter demonstrated how both institutions’ programmatic interventions in local 
governance are donor dependent. At the same time, it was discussed that because of 
the IDLG’s importance to the central government, particularly the president, as a hub 
for expanding its patronage networks across the country, in the absence or shortage of 
international funding, it has a much better chance of survival than the MRRD.  
The chapter then demonstrated how international donors also influenced the two 
institutions’ decisions to follow different directions. For instance, the MRRD’s 
interventions have been more in line with the World Bank’s Community Driven 
Development initiative for building modern institutions, while in the IDLG’s case, the 
focus has been on the international military’s counterinsurgency strategy that was 
‘population centric’ with the purpose of ‘expanding government’s legitimacy’. In terms of 
village and district level footprints, the latter have become less visible and in certain 
instances, have no more tangible presence than the former.  
The chapter highlighted that women’s participation in the village and district councils 
being non-negotiable resulted in the presence of women in both structures (at village 
and district levels) through MRRD’s interventions. However, as demonstrated in this 
thesis, neither the IDLG’s donors nor the institution itself saw women’s inclusion in 
district councils as a priority, because both focused on short-term reliance on 
patronage networks for whom inclusion of women was not a priority. 
The chapter pointed out that the MRRD’s efforts in general were directed towards 
building bureaucratic institutions while the IDLG, in terms of its district interventions for 
institution building, was influenced by the COIN objective of intelligence gathering and 
using development funds for wining hearts and minds.  
Finally, looking at the historical processes of these two institutions’ engagements in 
local governance interventions shows a complex process of interactions, negotiations, 
contestations and compromises between international and national actors and 
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institutions, each following their own interests and agendas in order to fund, influence, 
operationalise and implement the various programme interventions. 
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Chapter Six 
Nangarhar: Local Governance Interventions and Local Responses 
 
Map sources: ©BBC (left) and ©Kohistani.com (right). 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter will introduce Nangarhar Province and the village of Qala-e-Janan Khan in 
the district of Behsud as a site of intervention, in order to study local governance 
relations that emerge as a result of programme interventions by two central 
government institutions: the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) 
and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). The purpose of this 
chapter is to critically examine the process and different dynamics of local power 
relations historically, and to identify how they have changed during the MRRD and 
IDLG’s interventions that were built one upon the other.  
Nangarhar’s capital city, Jalalabad, has historically been one of the key strategic towns 
for any ruler of the Afghan state and its international sponsors. Its geopolitical, as well 
as its economic importance, in terms of revenue resources has put the provincial elites 
in a strong position to negotiate their interests with the central government. This 
chapter will first introduce the historical context of Nangarhar’s governance relations in 
the pre and post 2001 context, and will then expand on the particular governance 
characteristics of the selected village and district as site(s) of interventions and by 
deconstructing the process of the MRRD’s National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and 
the IDLG’s programme and policy interventions at the village and district level.  
The key argument of this chapter is that local governance programme and policy 
interventions result in changing local power dynamics as these interventions are a 
source of power in terms of provision of resources and establishing a legitimate form of 
authority. However, these interventions have not resulted in creating a sustained form 
of local governance institution that continues beyond the programme’s life. The chapter 
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examines the hybrid forms of governance relations that emerge as a result of these 
interventions in the particular context of Qala-e-Janan Khan and Behsud.  
The chapter is organised into five sections, the introduction being section one.  
Section two presents Nangarhar’s particular characteristics and socio-economic 
context, followed by a history of governance interventions and the province’s pre-2001 
position. In light of that historical context, I will introduce governance relations and the 
interplay of power dynamics at the post-2001 provincial level.  
Section three provides an extensive study of the MRRD’s interventions in the village of 
Qala-e-Janan Khan. I will initially introduce the village, outlining how the programme 
was introduced and implemented, and how conditionality on women’s inclusion by the 
NSP was negotiated among village elites. To conclude this section, the intended goals 
and unintended consequences of the NSP intervention will be assessed.  
Because these interventions are built upon each other, in section four I explore both the 
IDLG and MRRD’s district level governance interventions. I will first introduce the 
district of Behsud, then analyse the MRRD’s programmatic intervention in forming a 
District Development Assembly (DDA) and the subsequent intervention of the IDLG in 
forming a council through its Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP). I look at 
how these two parallel attempts to ‘own’ district councils by the MRRD and IDLG were 
realised in Behsud.  
Section five will conclude the chapter, returning to the two key research questions: how 
the MRRD and IDLG interventions were received by the local elites and the way local 
elites bargained and negotiated to shape the programme to their own advantage. 
6.2. History of governance relations in Nangarhar 
6.2.1. Provincial socio-economic characteristics 
Nangarhar is located in the eastern part of Afghanistan. It is mainly an ethnically 
Pashtun dominated province and contains one of the key commercial routes that 
connects Afghanistan to the south Asian sub-continent through Pakistan. Jalalabad,144 
the provincial capital of Nangarhar, not only serves as the centre for the political and 
administrative affairs of the province, but as a capital for the eastern region which 
includes three other provinces: Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan.145 Jalalabad has always 
been important to Afghan and imperial rulers as the central hub for the eastern region 
                                            
144 See Balfour (1885) for the ancient history of Nangarhar and Jalalabad. 
145 The term ‘Mashreqi’ refers to the eastern zone that includes Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman 
and Nuristan. 
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and its geo-strategic position connecting Afghanistan to British India (today’s Pakistan). 
Nangarhar has twenty-two formally approved districts.146 The population of Nangarhar 
was some 1.436 million in 2012.147 The majority of the population (1.2 million) live in 
rural areas and only 211,000 live in urban areas, mainly Jalalabad (CSO 2012a). The 
ethnic composition of the province includes 90% Pashtuns of different tribes,148 1.6% 
Tajiks, 2.6% Afghan Arabs,149 3.6% Pashayee and 2.1% others (CSO 2012c).  
Jalalabad is also an educational hub for the larger region. There are two major public 
higher education institutions and several private education institutions. Apart from some 
of the more remote areas, most districts are covered by health and education services. 
Alongside the universities, there are two large religious education centres known as 
darulhefaz in the vicinity. Nangarhar’s majority population are Sunni Muslims, with a 
small minority of Sikh Hindus who mainly reside in Jalalabad. The religious institutions 
include madrasas and mosques. There are around 5000 mosques registered with the 
Ministry of Pilgrimage and Religious Affairs, including grand and smaller mosques. 
According to different sources, these institutions are not affiliated with the government 
and are mainly privately funded.150 It is difficult to track the actual sources of funding, 
especially for large madrasas and mosques, as no one had clear indication of sources 
of funding for them. 
Nangarhar’s sub-tropical weather and mild winters keep the province mostly fertile for 
agriculture during the whole year (Goodhand and Mansfield 2010:12). Agricultural 
activity is one of the major sources of revenues for the majority of people in the 
districts.  
The province is considered as an economic hub and transit route for goods to and from 
Pakistan. Import/export taxes raised $66 million in 2008/09 which was the second 
highest after Herat. One fifth of central government’s total revenue is generated from 
sources in this province (CSO 2009:228 cited in Goodhand and Mansfield 2010:12). 
                                            
146 There is also a 23rd district, Spinghar, that is currently considered a district in transition and 
recognised as a temporary district only by a presidential decree (TLO 2010:7): Interview with 
IDLG official in Kabul #39 dated 17.08.2011; Interview with ex-PRT head of Nangarhar #83 
dated 10.04.2012. 
147 After Kabul and Herat, Nangarhar is the most highly populated Afghan province (CSO 
2012a). 
148 Major tribes in Nangahar include Mohmand, Shenwar, Khogyani, Sapi, Jabarkheyl, Nasir, 
Ibrahimkhail, Hoodkhail, Kharoti, Niazi, Pashayee, and Tajiks. (NABDP 2012). 
149 Afghan Arabs speak Dari and are descendants of the Arabian armies that conquered 
Afghanistan in the 8th century (Barfield 2010:29-30). 
150 The government only provides salary to clergy for 174 mosques, among them 51 grand 
mosques and 47 smaller ones. Interview with provincial directorate of Religious Affairs #117 
dated 04.05.2012. 
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The local elites in the province have a long history of control over the border and the 
taxes it generates. The Haji Qadir and Haji Din Mohmmad’s (former governors) families 
are said to have control over a considerable part of the revenues from the province 
(Goodhand and Mansfield 2010). Taxes on the movement of goods through the 
province are another source of revenue which, according to different sources, have 
been personally used by Gul Agha Shirzai during his governorship to fund 
reconstruction projects in Jalalabad (Rosenberg 2009; Mukhopadhyay 2009; 
Goodhand and Mansfield 2010). 
Another characteristic of Nangarhar is the mobility of its people. Historically, Nangarhar 
was known as the winter residence for Kabul’s elites, including the royal families, and 
also for kochis (nomads). Years of war and conflict have resulted in massive 
migrations, with many of Nangarhar’s residents moving to refugee camps in 
neighbouring Pakistan.  
6.2.2. Historical context of local governance relations 
As discussed in chapter four, interventions in Afghanistan by major regional and 
global powers go back centuries. Nangarhar Province and, more specifically, Jalalabad 
has always been a core strategic location for those who sought control and rule over 
the region and Kabul.  
Jalalabad was administratively part of Kabul Province during the late 19th century. A 
governor and chief of army who were appointed by the king in Kabul led the province 
and these leaders maintained order within their territory by relying on local traditional 
leaders such as khans and maliks who operated as patrons of different regions within 
the province (Kakar 1979:48). The eastern region (Mashreqi) was administered through 
Jalalabad until 1966 when Zahir Shah’s administrative reforms divided the eastern 
provinces.151  
The Nangarhar elites – those with political and economic influence in the province – 
have historically been considered as key actors in the national political arena because 
of the importance of the province to the Afghan state and indeed their power and 
influence for having the potential to be a close ally or a contested opponent of the 
Afghan state. Their economic power base results from Nangarhar’s position linking 
Kabul with the Indian sub-continent (contemporary Pakistan), especially through 
commerce. The political power of Nangarhar’s elite has been linked to strong tribal and 
                                            
151 Laghman and Kunar were separated from Nangarhar in 1966 and Nuristan in 1986 during 
Dr. Najibullah’s time. (TLO 2011:1). 
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other forms of solidarity and socio-political relations that enabled them to mobilise the 
population for or against the government (Dorronsoro 2005). This power of elites often 
put them in a relatively strong position to negotiate their interests with Kabul. And for 
Kabul or the central government too, the economic and geo-strategic importance of the 
province made Nangarhar one of the key provinces whose governor had to be a close 
and trustworthy ally of the ruler.   
In all invasions or internal struggles for power, control of Jalalabad was always crucial. 
For instance, the city was occupied in the 19th century by British forces during the first 
and second Afghan-Anglo wars (1839-42 and 1879-80). During the Soviet invasion in 
1979, a military command was established near Jalalabad and it controlled the town 
throughout the 1980s (ibid.). Under the Mujahiddin and then the Taliban regimes, 
Pakistanis and Arabs maintained a strong presence in the area via military bases.152 
Since 2001 the province has had a highly visible US military presence and is part of 
one of the largest Regional Command (RC) bases in eastern Afghanistan. According to 
local informants in Nangarhar, there are five military bases. The most important base is 
located at Jalalabad Airfield, from where drone operations and other activities are 
directed.  
The direct and indirect military and political presence of international forces and 
especially the provision of resources through them – similar to the central state 
intervention – have become an instrument used by competing provincial elites to 
maintain their patronage based system of rule. Thus sources of power and legitimacy, 
whether locally generated through elite patronage networks or nationally and 
internationally sponsored or negotiated, have historically shaped the way governance 
relations operate in the province.  
In chapter four I elaborated upon the relations, interactions and negotiations between 
the khans (traditional leaders who operate in the absence of formal government), the 
formal government appointees, and the clergy and religious actors and institutions. I 
suggested that it is these relations that illuminate the state and how it operates in 
Afghanistan. However, Nangarhar’s post-1978 history has created a far more complex 
governance environment which is the result of military, political, and economic 
interventions during years of war. For instance, as Goodhand and Mansfield (2010) 
point out, control of the Pakistan border and taxes generated from goods imported via 
                                            
152 There were two major military bases in Nangarhar, one located in the Darwanta area near 
Jalalabad, established by Hekmatyar with the help of Arabs and closed down by the Taliban in 
1996 and a second one in Torabora where Osama Bin Laden was based (Dorronsoro 2005:302; 
Johnson 2007:96). 
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this border, alongside the movement of goods through the province, have been 
important sources of revenue for provincial elites (Goodhand and Mansfield 2010:12) 
Besides this, the drug economy, linked to the overall war economy that also includes 
external military and financial support of warring factions during 1980-2000s, has 
become another primary source of revenue controlled by local elites (Dorronsoro 
2005:136). Politically, the emergence of new military leadership known locally as 
qomandansalari (warlordism), topaksalari (the rule of guns) or pataksalari (the rule of 
checkpoints for tax collections) have added further actors to the governance relations 
formulae that are operating locally and at district and provincial levels (Giustozzi 
2009:75).153  
From 1978 to 2001, the key actors in the province were from different tribal lineages 
that allied themselves with the pro-government or pro-Mujahiddin groups in the anti-
Soviet period. Both camps were sponsored by international rivals (i.e. the Soviets and 
the USA). The pro-government actors resided mainly in Jalalabad and were given 
privileges, positions, and opportunities to work in Jalalabad or in Kabul.154 Those loyal 
to Mujahiddin groups included different tanzims or parties who had bases in refugee 
camps in Pakistan and operated military commands in different districts and villages. 
The key Mujahiddin parties active in Nangarhar included Hizb-e-Islami Khalis155 (HIK), 
Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar156 (HIG), Jamiyate-e-Islami (Rabbani)157 and Etehad-e-
Islammi (Sayyaf),158 Mahaz-e-Milli159 (led by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani). Jabhah-e-Nijat-
                                            
153 Also see the following sections, particularly the analysis of the village actors in Qala-e-
Janana Khan, where members of the same tribe represent different actors and structures. 
154 Interview with a female university lecturer in Jalalabad #62 dated 02.01.2012; interview with 
a Russian graduate male resident of Jalalabad dated 26.11.2011. 
155 Khalis originally from Nangarhar, was initially a clergyman and a religious scholar (Shaikhul-
Hadith); later he became one of the leading figures in the anti-Soviet occupation war. His party 
members include a large number of senior commanders from the Arsala family, such as Abdul 
Haq, who was assassinated by Taliban in 2001, Haji Qadir who served as Nangarhar governor 
and later as minister and was assassinated in Kabul, Haji Din Mohammad who also served as 
Nangarhar and later Kabul governor and many others. One of Khalis’ sons, however, is known 
to be operating on the Taliban anti-government front too. 
156 Hekmatyar’s key figure in Nangarhar and larger eastern zone was Mawlawi Fazil Haq 
Mujahid who was assassinated in 1997. Several HIG commanders are active in the province, for 
instance, Mawlawi Attullah Ludin who was previously an MP and replaced Gulagha Shirzai in 
2013 as provincial governor for Nangarhar and another is currently an MP, Engineer Abdul 
Ghafar from Behsud. 
157 Jamiyat is mainly represented by Pashayee commander Hazrat Ali. 
158 Etihad was represented by several commanders, among whom the most prominent post-
2001 figure is Fazil Hadi Muslimyar. 
159 The Mahaz and Nijat fronts mainly ruled through old Sufi networks and had their own 
patronage system that secured loyalty and support. Often national level candidates of these two 
parties got automatic votes from their followers in the province. 
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e-Milli (led by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi) and Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami160 (led by 
Mawlawi Nabi). Each of these parties was represented by commanders, some of whom 
became important actors in the post-2001 governance of the province.  
Jalalabad remained under the People’s Democratic Party (PDPA) regime until Kabul 
fell in 1992. In 1992, Haji Qadir (a senior commander of the Khalis faction) became 
governor and led the province through a joint shura that also had members from the 
other parties. Qadir maintained some relations with Jamiyat and HIG in Kabul, but this 
is the only period when Nangarhar’s relations with Kabul were minimal (Dorronsoro 
2005:241).161  
Under Taliban rule, the governor of Nangarhar was Mawlawi Kabir, and later Mullah 
Abdul Salam Rocketi, both of whom also acted as commander-in-chief for the eastern 
zone, inclusive of all four provinces.162 The Taliban ruled Nangarhar – and to some 
extent its districts – through alliances with junior military commanders who were not 
involved in mujahiddin rule (1992-1996). All the key provincial elites, including most 
mujahiddin commanders and other actors, retreated from the province when the 
Taliban captured Jalalabad.163 Although the Taliban gained some support from religious 
scholars and influential mullahs, their alliance was not powerful enough to allow them 
expand their control beyond district headquarters more than any other centralised ruler. 
The most senior posts – such as provincial and district governor positions – were held 
by Taliban military commanders, most of whom also had a ‘mullah/mawlawi’ title with 
their name and were external to the province.164 For instance, two of the most senior 
Taliban who served as Nangarhar governor or commander-in-chief for the eastern zone 
were Mawlawi Kabir from Paktia’s Zadran tribe and Mullah Rocketi from Zabul (Strick 
van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012:468; Dimanno 2009). From the perspective of the 
central authority, this was the most successful approach to ruling. Appointing an 
outsider maintained much stronger relations between Kabul and Nangarhar, while an 
insider (such as Qadir and allies, for instance) kept most of the local licit as well as illicit 
resources to themselves, with almost no loyalty or payment to the central government. 
                                            
160 During the anti-Soviet war, there were only junior commanders leading small district or 
village level fronts for the Harakat party. Later, during the Taliban rule, most of these 
commanders joined the Taliban regime. 
161 According to Giustozzi (2009:79) the Nangarhar Shura did not officially recognise Rabbani as 
a legitimate president. 
162 Eastern zone provinces include Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar and Nuristan. 
163 There was only one exception, Mawlawi Khalis, who was said to be giving support to the 
Taliban when they captured Nangarhar in 1996. (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012:471). 
164 Based on different informants’ accounts, district commanders (governors) were appointed by 
the central Taliban leadership and were not native to the province. Based on anecdotes shared 
by local informants in Nangarhar. 
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At the district level, councils were formed by local mullahs and traditional khans and ex-
mujahiddin commanders who were not loyal to the Taliban were often denied 
participation.165 
Three mujahiddin commanders who were strong US allies played an important role in 
toppling the Taliban regime in Nangarhar: Commander Abdul Haq who was 
assassinated in the initial stages; Haji Zaman Ghamsharik who later become deputy 
chief of police for Nangarhar;166 and Hazrat Ali, a Pashayee commander who was 
previously with Hizb-e-Islami Khalis, and later joined Jamiyat as a chief commander for 
the eastern zone. As will be elaborated further, most of the iconic strongmen affiliated 
with different political and politico-military groups during war time have, in fact, become 
key post-2001 provincial political elites in the province.  
6.2.3. Post-2001 Governance Characteristics  
In terms of population and revenues generated, Nangarhar in the post-2001 socio-
economic context has become one of the fastest growing provinces.167 Rising land 
prices have impacted the local population’s living standards, as agricultural landowners 
have sold parts of their land to build concrete villas. Jackson (2014) points out that the 
taxes collected at the Torkham border between 2012 and 2013 were approximately US 
$174 million (Jackson 2014:22). Although there is no cumulative figure for overall donor 
funding to Nangarhar since 2002, according to one source the US government –
including USAID and the military – spent $1.1 billion across Afghanistan in 2008 and for 
Nangarhar, it had a combined budget of US $150 million for the year 2009 
(Mukhopadhyay 2014:221). The military’s shift from counter-terrorism to 
counterinsurgency (COIN) in 2009 resulted in more funding and resources, especially 
in strategic and geopolitically important Nangarhar.  
The political leadership in the last decade has evolved into coalitions linked to old 
regimes of the pro-Soviet PDPA, the Mujahiddin who ruled in the 1990s, and some of 
the Taliban or their allied groups (Roggio 2009). The Taliban are relatively active in 
attacking international bases and government institutions and staff, while most of the 
                                            
165 Based on anecdotes shared by several local informants who were living in Nangarhar during 
the Taliban, including residents of the village of Qala-e-Janan Khan  
166 Ghamsharik was assassinated in a suicide bombing in 2010 (Memmot 2010). 
167 Mukhopadhyay (2014) states that since 2006-7 there has been an increase in customs duty 
in Nangarhar from 17 to 23%. In the year 2012, there was a general increase of 8% in 
Afghanistan’s customs duty and Nangarhar’s Torkham revenue with second largest income 
(Aariananews dated 30.03.2013 (accessed online on 24.04.2013) and Customs Mirror, a 
publication of the Ministry of Finance’s customs directorate: 
http://customs.mof.gov.af/en/page/5658 (accessed on 24.04.2013); also see Goodhand and 
Mansfield (2010:12). 
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actors among the first two groups (PDPA and the Mujahiddin) with the addition of 
smaller groups and influential actors are involved in the province’s leadership, in some 
cases in alliance while in other cases as competing forces. Although in the immediate 
aftermath of 2001, as a result of the Bonn Agreement, Haji Qadir returned to his 
position as governor of Nangarhar, he was soon followed by Haji Din Mohammed who 
was subsequently replaced by Gul Agha Shirzai in 2004 (originally an ex-Mujahiddin 
commander and then governor of Kandahar) who was initially seen as a Karzai loyalist 
who would quell competing rivalries in the province.  
Mukhopadhyay (2014), in her extensive study of the strongman model of governance, 
explores the personality and characteristics of Shirzai as a ‘neo-khan’. She argues that 
he was able to maintain power and political order in the province through a combination 
of the financial and political support of the US and central government, alongside his 
ability to deal with local conflict and to use tribal leaders and inter-tribal disputes to 
prevent opposition from emerging, thereby maintaining a political equilibrium in the 
districts (Mukhopadhyay 2014).168  
The security and stability in Nangarhar province is directly related to the underlying 
political settlements and alliances that local elites have made in terms of authority and 
resource distribution with or against the government.169 For instance, Mansfield’s 
(2013) study of the drugs economy in Nangarhar, with a particular focus on the 
southern districts, demonstrates how Jalalabad and northern parts of the province are 
considered as ‘state spaces’ where the local political elites are part of the overall 
political settlement, and are therefore different from the southern districts in terms of 
the challenges that provincial authorities faced during the Shirzai-led counter-narcotic 
campaign. The politico-military elites from the northern districts such as Dara-e-Nur, 
Koz-Kunar and Behsud, including Hazrat Ali and his commanders, are strong allies of 
the US forces and the Afghan government; the Arsala family from Surkhroad and the 
khans of Behsud and many other loyal mid and lower level commanders from the two 
                                            
168 See also Foschini and Ali (2013) for the most recent analysis of anti-Shirzai protests and 
shifting alliances of local power brokers in Nangarhar http://www.aan-
afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=3365 (accessed on 25.04.2013) 
169 This division is also reflected in the Nangarhar Regional Development Association (NRDA)’s 
‘Marshal Plan’ for the province. Most of the investment and development plans are focusing on 
districts in the northern parts of the province. See “Nangarhar Regional Development Plan: 
Bridging a rich past with a bright future” (date not mentioned but assumed 2007) aka 
“Nangarhar Inc.” http://wemeantwell.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NANGARHAR-INC-
BUSINESS-PLAN-MAR-08.pdf (accessed on 23.03.2013) 
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Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis and Hikmatyar factions) are mostly working as government allies, 
some in key positions.170 
Stronger informal or de facto alliances, networks and patronage structures underpinned 
the formal or governmental institutions and nominally democratic processes in the 
province. The formal governmental posts were mostly filled by provincial elites or 
officials who had strong affiliations with the provincial elites, with the exception of the 
provincial governor’s post held by Gulagha Shirzai (a strong US ally) who was 
appointed by the president and served as governor from 2004-2013.171 For instance, 
most of the provincial seats for both parliament houses (upper and lower) and the 
provincial council were accordingly filled by men, as well as women, who either directly 
represented a political (or politico-military) group or faction, or were sponsored by them. 
The economic basis for mobilising capital and supporters for voting and loyalties is 
often a combination of illicit economy (such as drugs, illegal taxing, etc.), funding 
through US contracts (mostly given to commanders in exchange for loyalty), aid 
funding and licit businesses.172 It is important to point out here that the two presidential 
and parliamentary elections held in 2004 and 2009, resulted in changed attitudes of the 
local population towards elections and democratisation, particularly in areas where the 
National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was implemented. These national level elections 
further promulgated the patronage based politics where votes were bought directly by 
cash or other privileges.173 
Another factor in the democratization interventions is women’s suffrage, which, so far, 
has been received with mixed responses. For example, despite the quota system that 
reserved 25% of the parliamentary and provincial council seats for women, in 
Nangarhar, none of the female politicians were able to succeed without being 
sponsored by the major provincial political elites. This has given female candidates only 
symbolic access to political representation, a symbolism betrayed by the fact that they 
operated entirely as figureheads for these major patrons.174  
                                            
170 It has to be noted that the Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar faction is divided into several other 
parts, some of his loyal commanders are still operating in anti-government operations while 
most spliced parts operate under the “Hezb-e-Islami Party” that is registered with the Afghan 
government. 
171 Shirzai’s appointment as governor of Nangarhar involved different factors, including keeping 
him away from Kandahari (his native province) and the fact that the president wanted an 
‘outsider’ to rule Nangarhar, not someone from its local elites. Interview with a local resident in 
Jalalabad #73 dated 15.03.2012. 
172 Interview with Sheila Baburi (02.01.2012) 
173 This point will be explored further in the following sections. 
174 Interview with Sheila Baburi (02.01.2012) 
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Although the district governors are appointed through the IDLG at a central level, in 
order to show his power, the governor moved the district governors from district to 
district on a regular basis.175 The governor used the allocation of formal positions as a 
reward to be given to different district and provincial elites in exchange for their 
continued loyalty and support of the governor’s political and economic interests.176 
This overall competition over power and resources is also partly reflected in the 
patterns of security incidents in the province (Foschini and Ali 2013). For instance, the 
security incidents in the province are divided into five categories:177 i) bombings, suicide 
attacks and direct offensives by the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami factions; ii) organised 
crime, such as assassinations, murders, kidnapping, sometimes carried out for 
economic reasons, including ransom-taking or to apply pressure to judiciary personnel 
in order to influence or change court decisions, hiring or firing staff, land-grabbing, etc; 
iii) personal or internal hostilities and disputes, largely at different levels ranging from 
disputes within families over property or honour, public resources such as water, etc., 
competitions over power positions and loyalties to political elites; iv) violent 
demonstrations, where people were mobilised through Nangarhar University that was 
reportedly influenced by the Hekmatyar faction’s hardliners and other conservative 
groups; v) house raids, arrests and in certain cases aerial bombardments by the US 
and Coalition forces over residential areas. The nature of these acts is violent, resulting 
in numerous casualties. They also, especially if they involve massive civilian casualties, 
can cause even more unrest, demonstrations and protests.  
These different forms of violent incidents directly affect the way governance relations 
operate in the province. Although most security incidents are labelled and linked to the 
Taliban, an in-depth look into every incident reveals a more complex story, where 
violence (of different forms) has been used by different actors (including pro and anti-
government groups) in order to compete against their rivals and control the population 
and local leaders.  
Nangarhar has been one of the major recipients of USA funding since 2001. The 
development funding was mainly spent on infrastructure, agriculture, livelihoods and 
other social services (Goodhand and Mansfield 2010:13). The US Provincial 
                                            
175 One example of this is shared by Behsud’s governor in the following section. Interview with 
district governor of Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012 
176 See, for example, US Embassy, Kabul communication to the Secretary of State (US 
Embassy Kabul  2009).  
177 This analysis is based on personal observations and resources such as TLO (2010), CPAU 
(2010), Mansfield (2012); and media reports, particularly Pajhowk news updates between 2011-
2012 and beyond. 
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Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) implemented over 300 projects in the province from 
2002-2013 (ibid.). These include local governance and community development 
support in areas where the government still did not have access and CERP funding, 
the European Union’s rural development funds, as well as various road reconstruction 
projects that were financed by Pakistan, China and many other countries.178 As 
Jackson (2014) points out, undoubtedly while these massive (re)construction projects 
have changed the province’s appearance and built its institutions, it also created 
winners and losers. The winners were often those who managed to use these 
resources in order to further strengthen their patronage networks and buy more 
loyalties, while the losers were those who did not benefit economically or politically 
from these resources. Hence, the imbalance in distribution and channelling of 
resources also creates instability and insecurity.   
In sum, Nangarhar’s governance relations in the post-2001 context are characterised 
by a form of neo-patrimonial system of governance. Under this system, de facto 
provincial and local elites as well as the intervening forces (including the central 
government and international military) institutions and actors played an important role 
in the way governance relations operated in the province. While, in some instances 
different provincial elites used violence as a means to control power and resources, in 
others, they worked under a complex hybrid form of system where the interests of all 
different factions and groups met.  
                                            
178 Most of major national development programmes also active in Nangarhar. 
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6.3. Village Governance Interventions 
6.3.1. Qala-e-Janan Khan village: micro site of governance intervention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Map identifying Qala-e-Janan Khan and six different divisions of the village ©Google 
Maps 
 
Qala-e-Janan Khan (QJK)179 is located in the north-eastern part of Behsud district.180 
The village road entrance is through the Jalalabad-Kunar highway and the distance 
between the village and Jalalabad city centre is only 4-5 kilometres. The village is 
divided into six parts181 (Figure 2 shows the exact location of each). The Behsud district 
headquarters is approximately 16 kilometres from the village. Behsud River is located 
in the southern part of the village. The village has good access to water, as it is located 
close to the river bed. During summer 2011 (the field research period)182 it was 
observed that a small part of the village space was still used for agricultural purposes, 
while the selling of land183 and building of new concrete villas was on the rise in the 
area. Almost all of the village roads are gravelled, although most are still quite bumpy, 
                                            
179 I will use QJK as a short name for Qalal-e-Janan Khan in this section. 
180 It borders Qasimabad and Daman in the north, Kolanga in the west, Abdian and Behsud in 
the east and Dubila in the south. 
181 See Figure 3 in the following section on village divisions. 
182 In this section I will be referring to observations made during a field trip, and will therefore be 
using the past tense in reference to those observations, even in situations in which the 
phenomena described is still the case. 
183 The land price in Nangarhar, including in the Behsud area rose to $100,000 for 2000 square 
meters. Interviews with local residents in QJK #69; #71 (2012) and #139 dated 15.02.2013. 
  127 
especially if one travels by rickshaw or zarang.184 There are several stops for the 
zarang service which passes through all parts of the village from south to north, with a 
main stop in the central QJK market.185 In the northern part of the village a new market 
has been built with a two story building that, at the time of my visit, did not appear to be 
functioning as a market centre. The small private clinic in the QJK centre received 
patients on a daily basis but did not have a full-time service. There are five mosques in 
the village, two of them at the centre, including the grand mosque186 which is led by the 
imam who is also the headmaster of the boys’ school. There are two madrasas, one 
run by a villager who is a returnee from Pakistan (he and his wife teach religious 
studies to girls and boys separately)187 and the second led by a man seen as ‘very 
conservative’ by local residents, as at one point he discouraged teenage girls from 
going to school (although after the matter was raised with village elders he stopped). 
The village has a new building for the high school that was constructed with the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team’s financial support. The building serves a dual function, 
operating as Queen Suraya Lycée for girls in the mornings and Qalal-e-Janan Khan 
Lycée for boys in the afternoons. The school land was contributed by local elites188 and 
the building was constructed with funding from the US PRTs with a 10% village 
contribution.189 The choice of name – especially for the girls’ high school – should be 
noted here.190 The fact that members of the village chose this name demonstrates two 
key points: 1) the village elites in this locality are open-minded and moderate enough to 
allow women to choose Queen Suraya as their role model; 2) given that in the larger 
Nangarhar context Ishaqzais consider themselves descendants of the southern elites 
or the khans (originating from Kandahar) their choice of a royal personality could also 
be related to this fact. 
                                            
184 Zarangs are three-wheeled motorbikes with a small cabin (similar to a tuk-tuk or auto-
rickshaw) which are mainly used for public transportation in the area, especially by women. 
185 The market is owned by one of the key central QJK elders from the Ishaqzai tribe who 
apparently is not an active member of CDC, but whose economic status gives him a strong 
voice in the village overall governance. 
186 The Grand Mosque is where Friday Prayers and Eid Prayers are convened. 
187 It is common for children to attend a madrasa as well as the school according to village 
residents. 
188 According to local informants the total size of the school land is 22 jeribs, and was 
collectively owned by the fathers of Commander Mustafa, Haji Ghulam Farooq and Mawlawi 
Sami. In short, three of the main village elites contributed to the school. 
189 According to the US Department of Defence website the school costs were estimated at US 
$116,000. (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52689 accessed on 18.06.2014) 
The female deputy chief of CDC had a leading role in organising the construction of the school, 
particularly the collection of 10% community contribution. Interview with Female deputy chief 
#43 dated 28.11.2011. 
190 Queen Suraya was the wife of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) who was a reformist and 
his wife is known among Afghans as a pioneer for women’s rights and a dedicated supporter of 
the King in his social reform projects. 
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There were 304 households in the village in 2004, but as a result of new arrivals over 
recent years, it has grown to approximately 487 households.191 The majority of the 
residents are Pashtuns from the Ishaqzai and Alizai tribes who left southern Kandahar 
and settled here; they mostly speak Dari. 
Village governance relations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The tomb of Janan Khan in the village’s graveyard. 
The gravestone has a brief biography of Janan Khan ©photo by author 
 
According to its residents, the history of this village goes back to the 18th century. 
Janan Khan was the grandson of Sepah-Salaar (Generalissmo) known as Medad 
Khan, a warrior general of Timor Shah’s army who received the title of Sardar-e-
Sardaran (Commander in Chief) from him.192 Since then, the family had lived in this 
village and all the Ishaqzai tribe in QJK consider themselves descendants of Janan 
Khan. Ishaqzais and Alizais reportedly make up around 80% of the village population; 
the other 20% includes Solizais, Afghan Arabs, Jabarkheyls and Taghars.193 The 
village’s close proximity to the city also attracts new settlers. However these new 
settlers are not entirely integrated and are yet to become part of the village community.  
                                            
191 Email communication with NSP Office at MRRD, Kabul dated 28.12.2013; interview with the 
QJK malik/CDC qaryadar #41 dated 27.11.2011; interview with CDC Secretary #49 dated 
31.11.2011; interview with QJK resident #50 dated 20.12.2011. 
192 Timor Shah (1748-1793), second son of Ahmad Shah Abdali, both rulers of Afghanistan. See 
(Ferrier 1858) on Timor Shah’s rule. Village history based on interview with village residents 
#41; #45; #52; #54 between 20-27.11.2011. 
193 Interview with village residents #45; #52; #54 dated 20-23.11.2011. 
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QJK has always had a malik (village representative) who took care of the village affairs 
and played a bridging role between the village and district headquarters.194 The village 
malik is selected by the most influential men of high economic (ownership of land and 
property) and political (linkages with the major power brokers and/or ruling government 
at provincial and in Kabul) status. Tribal or kinship identity also plays a role in the status 
of influential men, but is secondary to economic and political status. For instance, the 
maliks in QJK have always been from the Ishaqzai tribe because they constitute the 
majority of the village population. According to elders, the QJK malik in earlier days 
used to represent neighbouring villages as well, but as the population increased and 
villages separated, the malik now represents only the QJK area.195  
The central QJK residents are more ‘educated’, i.e. they are literate. Women from 
central QJK are also mostly educated.196 Most educated women work as civil servants, 
often as teachers or at child-care centres in Jalalabad. The first round of the girls’ high 
school graduates attended Nangarhar University and the Teacher Training Institute in 
2009. Men are involved in different private and public services. Women in other parts of 
QJK are mainly at home; some stated they did a few years of education, but the 
majority are illiterate or studied briefly and stopped working after school or, especially, 
after getting married.  
Village elites in the case of QJK include different members of the Ishaqzai tribe. Among 
them are: Dr Alam Ishaqzai, who served in different capacities with government and is 
currently head of the provincial directorate of the Ministry of Finances (with previous 
PDPA loyalties); Haji Ghulam Farooq, a landlord who also owns the village central 
market; Malik T., who served as malik or village representative for most of the past two 
decades; Mawlawi Sami, a religious scholar with political affiliations with Hezb-e-Islami 
Khalis; Commander M., son of an old malik and a war time commander with Hezb-e-
Islami Khalis; and Mrs. J. Jabarkeyl, who is also a member of the Ishaqzai tribe married 
to an ‘outsider’, but lives in QJK and plays an important role in village governance 
affairs.197  
                                            
194 According to the malik who was in charge during the time of my field research, he is not paid 
and his position is only voluntary, but he confirms that many maliks are paid, either in cash or 
crops by the villagers. Interview with QJK malik #41 27.11.2011. 
195 According to villagers, the malik system has never gone out of use and it functioned in one or 
another form throughout the decades of war. Interview with nephew of the commander #138 
dated 05.02.2013; Interview with QJK elder #52 dated 22.11.2012; Interview with QJK elder #74 
dated 16.03.2012 
196 Based on interviews in the field and observation notes from August 2011-April 2012. 
197 In the following sections, I will elaborate further on this point about a woman being 
considered as a village elite and her limitations. 
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In addition to the customary village elders’ shura, there are also other shuras in QJK.198 
Although, according to the village malik, the village mullah does not have formal 
membership of the village shura, he plays an ad hoc role rather than a formal one.199 
The imam of the QJK grand mosque explained the village shura mechanism as follows:  
As khateeb (prayer leader] I do not have membership of any of the village shuras. 
But after Friday prayers, I always make an announcement if there is something 
happening in the village or if there is any issue, and then, the issue is raised and 
villagers discuss it in the presence of village elders and myself. Sometime the 
shura/council gatherings happen after Friday prayers. At other times, smaller 
meetings happen in a member’s hujra [a separate guest compound/house]. Major 
events such as elections, jirgahs [large gatherings] and so forth always happen in 
the mosque. Decisions about village matters happen in these meetings. And I am 
often asked for advice.200 
In the passage by the QJK imam, it is understood that the notion of shura does not 
necessarily mean a formal structure or institution, and in practice there are overlapping 
institutions, linked together by the same network of village elites. Where customary, 
formal (if we assume the CDCs as formal), and religious boundaries overlap with one 
another, a collective of village elites gathers to discuss their issues and make 
decisions. This blurriness among different village structures informs us that the 
distinction between different structures201 becomes fuzzy in two respects: first, there 
are differences between the three in their nature, a shura is a gathering that can 
happen in a given space (be it a mosque, guesthouse or in the field.)202 Secondly, once 
appointed by the village elites, mullahs and maliks are considered part of the village 
elites, operating as gatekeepers in different ways, and they too have a voice in the 
village decisions. The mullah’s role is mainly ideological and involves approaching 
different village matters on the basis of religious teachings. Villagers approach different 
village elites for different kinds of problems. For instance, in the QJK case, it was 
observed that there was no clear line of distinction between the mullah, malik or khan. 
                                            
198 Different government and NGOs operating in the village have formed their own councils 
dealing with thematic matters such as school council, health council, etc. 
199 According to the village malik, the mullah is not formally a member of any shura, although 
occasionally he invites him to CDC meetings: “In CDC meetings I sometime bring the mullah 
and we listen to what he says. Although formally he is not a member.” Interview with QJK malik 
#41 dated 27.11.2011. 
200 Interview with Mullah of the Grand Mosque of QJK #42 dated 27.11.2011. 
201 See, for example, Brick (2008) who discusses the idea that village customary institutions are 
separate entities. 
202 Some of the CDC meetings in this village, for instance, happened in the older female CDC 
member’s house. 
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Mullahs for instance, declared the celebration of the New Year (Nawroz) un-Islamic and 
‘convinced’ all the men present at the Friday prayers that no public celebrations in the 
village should be held. One of the village elites, upon returning from the mosque, asked 
his family not to have any public celebrations and, although the women in his family did 
not agree, they were obliged to follow the mullah’s orders agreed by the village elders 
and men in the mosque.203 This example shows the collective power of village elites 
that in instances involves the mullah, malik and various other key village elites.  
In sum, the Qala-e-Janan Khan village case demonstrates the different aspects of 
power dynamics in the village and different historical events that shaped how village 
governance relations are linked to the broader political and economic structures at the 
district and provincial levels.  
6.3.2. Introducing the NSP and its implementation process 
In this section, I will look at how the NSP was introduced in the village. My main 
argument is that from the beginning, the facilitating partners (FPs) staff simply relied on 
existing power structures to explain the programme. Mansuri and Rao (2004:24) review 
different reasons why facilitating partners in such programmes find it easier to rely on 
existing power structures (Mansuri and Rao 2004:24). These include the need to show 
results (Jackson 1997 cited in Mansuri and Rao 2004:24); when their (FP staff’s) own 
interests are in conflict with those of village actors (Vasan 2002 cited in Mansuri and 
Rao:24) or as younger or less experienced practitioners, they are faced with older and 
more experienced village gatekeepers who manipulate them for own their interests 
(Botchway 2001; Michener 1998 cited in Mansuri and Rao 2004:24) Here, different 
accounts from village elites and residents confirm this reliance on existing power 
structures.  
QJK was one of the very first sites for CDD intervention in Nangarhar.204 The facilitating 
partner piloted the NSP in villages that were in close proximity to city centres, or places 
with which the FP was familiar. UN-Habitat used to have community councils in QJK 
prior to the launch of the NSP,205 hence, the QJK CDC was granted a total of US 
                                            
203 Based on observation notes from QJK #65 dated 13-19.03.2012. 
204 Behsud was one of the first districts where the NSP was piloted after its launch in 2003. 
Interview with ex-head of NSP OC in Jalalabad #70 dated 14.03.2012. 
205 The NSP’s FP role was transferred from UN-Habitat to BRAC during the early stages. 
Interview with ex-head of NSP OC in Jalalabad #70 dated 14.03.2012; Email communication 
with NSP office at MRRD, Kabul dated 28.12.2013; Interview with QJK malik/qardyadar and 
CDC chief part II #46 dated 01.12.2011. 
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$122,000 which was dispersed in two rounds of block-grants in the two NSP phases.206 
Funded projects included supplying solar power (2007-9), vocational training for 
women (2007-8), a shallow well (2009), and a tertiary road (2013-14) in the village.207  
The field staff or Social Mobilisers (SMs) from the FP208 presented the NSP programme 
to some village elders during the very first phase. The accounts below by the village 
malik and female deputy chief of CDC illustrate some important points about how it was 
introduced to villagers:  
The NSP surveyors came to our village and asked me if they could list all village 
names/families and I said yes. After that, based on the list of people they had, the 
election for CDC was conducted. Then the CDC was established and started its 
work. We were informed that the CDC role was to identify the village needs at first 
stage and then to prioritise them. As we had a mixed shura, women and men 
were both part of all processes. So we listed electricity, roads and a school as our 
first priorities.209  
And:  
Our village became part of the NSP programme as one of the first villages in the 
country. They were piloting a mixed CDC where men and women could sit in the 
same meeting, so they came to our village. I did not know about it at all. I was at 
the school when Malik Sahib sent someone to me saying they want me to come 
and attend the election. I came and all of the people said they were ready to elect 
me. I was forced to be elected! [She said this with a smile] In the second round, I 
wasn’t ready at all, then all insisted and so I agreed to be a candidate again. I did 
not want to, because I wanted other women from our village to come forward. […] I 
don’t want to become ‘the key person’ of the village. But if elders say something, I 
can’t refuse it. They told me to put myself for election and I obeyed.210  
The above narratives by the village malik and the female deputy chief confirm that the 
FP staff mainly relied on the village elites, particularly the malik, as their key entry point. 
The quote from the female CDC member shows that FPs did not contact women 
                                            
206 The total amount in Afs. is two rounds of 3,000,000. I converted this to USD using an 
estimated exchange rate of the time of US $1:49 Afs. 
207 Email communication with NSP office at MRRD, Kabul dated 28.12.2013 
208 It is not verifiable if it was UN-Habitat or BRAC. But presumably it was UN-Habitat who 
introduced the NSP to the villagers, given that they had prior presence in the province and were 
the first FPs who implemented the NSP in Nangarhar. 
209 Interview with QJK malik/qardyadar & CDC chief part II #46 dated 01.12.2011 
210 Interview with deputy chief of QJK (female) #43 dated 28.11.2011. 
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directly at the initial stage: rather, the village women were introduced through the malik. 
The malik, in the introductory phase, also informed the village elders about the 
programme and hence some time prior to elections it was decided that J. had to stand 
for the deputy chief of QJK CDC. Another informant from the village stated that Mustufi, 
the ex-deputy governor (a key village elite) had informed people about the NSP:  
Mustufi is from our village. He told people that the MRRD is helping people. 
Then, people in the village formed the shura [CDC] so we get the help.211 
The quotes above also show that there was a consensus among village elites on the 
work of the NSP. Hence, the malik’s decision to allow the FPs to operate in the village 
was supported by village elites. He also played a gatekeeping role in ‘facilitating’ the 
work of FP staff at the village level.  
It should be noted that prior to the NSP operating in this village, UN-Habitat used to 
have similar shuras where, for instance, women would informally gather and identify 
their problems and needs, but according to female CDC members these were more 
informal and casual than the CDC that was established later.212 The difference between 
earlier projects and the NSP is that the NSP was the first programme that had the 
village itself as a focus for establishing a more formal governing institution or council 
(ibid.).  
Another point to be elaborated here is the reason that the FP staff did not reach out to 
women directly. The lack of consultation/introduction of the NSP to women, and also 
people in other parts of QJK, was not due to conservative perceptions within the 
community, but rather a form of control of access and information by the malik who 
acted as the gatekeeper.213 He selected the would-be council members from each part 
of the village and their constituencies were mobilised within the village to vote for them 
as CDC members. Hence, to sum up, the way the NSP was introduced in the village 
relied entirely on the existing power structures and actors. This is why, as I will 
elaborate in the following sections, it is not surprising that the chief CDC position is 
occupied by the same person who also is the malik and, indeed, the qaryadar. 
                                            
211 Interview with a village resident from Qala-e-Mandes #53 dated 22.12.2011 
212 Interview with second female member of CDC #47 dated 03.11.2011. 
213 There is a limitation in this regard that I would like to address. Unfortunately, I was unable to 
interview the male and female SMs who worked in QJK and this makes it challenging to either 
comment or make claims about their working capacity and also the logic of why they decided to 
visit the malik rather than gathering an inclusive group from the community, including men and 
women as the NSP guidelines suggest. 
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6.3.3. Local governance through CDCs 
Following the introduction of the NSP to villagers, according to the NSP mandate, 
Community Development Councils were to be established in the village. The Social 
Mobilisers (SMs) were mainly in charge of facilitating the overall process of formation 
by following pre-defined steps set out in the NSP manual.214 These steps included 
counting the number of households in the village, gathering villagers and informing 
them about election proceedings and ensuring that women also took part in the 
elections and become members of the CDC. In QJK, according to many informants, 
people in general were not aware of the NSP and the reason for the survey.215 The only 
time that people were informed in a general way about the formation of CDC was on 
election day when every man was asked to come to the grand mosque and women to 
the malik’s home to vote:216 “We were not aware when the MRRD people came and 
introduced the NSP. We only knew when all was prepared. So people from our 
community only were informed on the election day.”217 
This demonstrates the role of the malik as a strong gatekeeper who (presumably 
backed by village elites), decided to stand for election himself and carefully chose both 
who he informed of the election in advance and his running mates.218 So, crucial 
information was controlled by the malik in a way that some influential persons who 
might potentially receive more votes than him, were not even aware that an election 
was to be held. The only people informed prior to the election were those chosen by 
the malik from the sub-divisions of QJK. Also the role of the SMs and their reliance on 
the malik is important to note: we can see here that the notion of development actors 
going to communities and remaining ‘independent’ or impartial is a myth, as by relying 
on the existing village leadership, in practice they align themselves under an operative 
framework which directs them towards a certain perspective or interest (Mosse et al. 
1998).  
                                            
214 For more details on the programme phases and steps, please refer to chapter five, section 
2. 
215 Interview with second female member of CDC #47 dated 03.11.2011; interview with 
Shoraghonday (one of the six village sub-divisions) CDC member #54 dated 23.12.2011; 
interview with two male elders #55 & #57 dated 23.12.2011. 
216 Interview with second female member of CDC #47 dated 03.11.2011; Interview with 
Shoraghonday CDC member #54 dated 23.12.2011; Interview with two male elders #55 & #57 
dated 23.12.2011. 
217 Interview with Shoraghondy resident #54 dated 23.12.2011. 
218 Interview with CDC member #50 dated 23.12.2011. 
  135 
Village politics interplay on CDC elections 
It proved difficult to reconstruct the two CDC election processes based on local 
informants’ accounts, but I try here to follow how things changed between the first and 
second elections. 
The results of the first election (2004-5) indicate the representation in the QJK CDC. As 
Table 4 below illustrates, there was a good level of representation from different parts 
and different kinships in the village.  
Table 4 Qala-e-Janan Khan village divisions and representation in the CDC 
QJK village divisions CDC Representation 
Central Qala-e-Janan Khan 
(central) 
Malik (chief); J.(F) (deputy chief); H.(F) (member 
resigned); A. (Secretary). They all are Ishaqzai with 
exception of A. who is related to Ishaqzai on the 
maternal side. 
Bara Banda (West) M.D. (Treasurer) from the Solizai tribe. Other 
members included a farmer from the village who 
worked the malik’s land and Z.J. another villager. 
Koza Banda (South West) M.B., a respected teacher from the Alizai tribe is a 
member of the CDC, but he is not in the leadership or 
in any other leadership structure in the village.. 
Abdul Wahab Banda (North) A. is a CDC member from this part, near the Daman 
area. He is not Ishaqzai. 
Qala-e-Mandes (South) Col. N. is Ishaqzai and he represented this part of 
village. It is the smallest sub-division with only four 
households.  
Shuraghonday (East) A. is Ishaqzai and is CDC member for this area that 
has 25-28 houses. This is the community where the 
Commander (grandson of Old Malik) lives. 
 
As the table illustrates, the key positions were all taken by residents of Central QJK 
who worked together to elect the CDC leadership from amongst themselves. This 
confirms the earlier point that central village elites managed to control the process and 
turn it to their own advantage, therefore, it was not surprising to see the malik elected 
as CDC chief. In most cases, the CDC members stated that the malik had told them to 
stand for election, so it was obvious they would vote for the malik as chief. 219 However, 
it has to be noted that the consensus was not the result of a joint gathering of all 
villagers, neither was it a consent by representatives of each household/tribe or 
geographical boundaries; primarily it was the malik’s choice of who should represent 
each locality within the village. One tactic the malik used was to choose a less powerful 
representative for each cluster, for instance, to have CDC member A. as a young man 
(then) in his 20s (the nephew of Commander M.) from Shoraghonday, he was a 
                                            
219 Interview(s) with QJK Village CDC members #43; #44; #47; #50; #53 and #60 dated between 
November-December, 2011. 
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strategic choice preferable to the commander (grandson of the old malik) who might 
potentially successfully compete for the CDC leadership. Consequently, the election of 
the malik as the head of CDC was smooth and uncontested in the first election.  
In the second election held in 2009, the situation changed.220 Conflict emerged when a 
resident of Shoraghondy, Qomandan M. an ex-Mujahiddin commander and the 
grandson of the old malik Sarwar Khan – decided to stand for election as CDC chief as 
a rival to Malik T.:221  
In the second election, people were not happy with the malik as the chief of CDC 
and the current CDC members. We wanted to have some new members, but this 
caused some conflicts in our village. (…) We wanted new people, because most 
of the current CDC members were weak and unable to help their constituencies 
and the leadership were a few smart people who only worked for their own 
benefit. People from the rest of the village were not happy with them. Commander 
M. is highly respected by people, he serves people well, so we wanted to add him 
in the shura. The problem emerged when Commander M. wanted to become a 
member of our cluster [Shoraghonday] and then run for the CDC chief position. 
But supporters of the malik [central QJK] refused this and we had arguments that 
could lead to a fight.222 
The person who gave this account was a member of the CDC, and he and the 
commander were also members of the Ishaqzai tribe. This account informs us how the 
CDC leadership, as a source of public authority with the power to distribute resources, 
becomes a battlefield for other elites or patrons. This attempt by the commander to 
push his way into the CDC was resisted by other village elites. As a result, the QJK 
residents and the village elites (mainly the central QJK members) decided to recognise 
the previous CDC members and leadership as legitimate and the FPs followed their 
agreement.223 Another important aspect of this effort by the commander is to look at it 
more generally (beyond the village) as a trend where war time commanders tried to 
take control of power and authority.224  
                                            
220 Over completion of one full NSP phase, there needs to be elections to refresh the CDC 
legitimacy. See chapter five, section 5.2.2 for more details on the NSP phases. 
221 Interview with Shoraghondy resident #54 dated 23.12.2011; Interview with Abdulwahab 
Banda resident #60 dated 23.12.2011. 
222 Interview with Shoraghondy resident #54 dated 23.12.2011. 
223 In 2014, I was informed that the QJK village elders replaced the village malik with a new 
person (not the Commander). 
224 Interview with male aid worker in Jalalabad #120 dated 03.06.2012. 
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Negotiating distribution of resources 
Events both inside and outside the village led to a very different dynamic in the second 
CDC election in QJK in 2009.225 One of the central issues that resulted in tensions was 
the prioritisation and implementation of projects at the village level. According to the 
chief of the CDC, the malik, there were three main priorities: 1) electricity (solar power); 
2) gravelling the roads; and 3) building a school.226 All fifteen members of the CDC 
agreed on these priorities and they developed plans to turn them into projects.  
One of these projects was the distribution of solar power panels. The CDC decided that 
they would collect Afs.3000 (approx. US$65) for every three households as a 
community contribution to the price of each solar panel.227 The solar panel distribution 
turned out to be a complicated and conflictual experience. There were accusations of 
corruption against the CDC leadership and its chief from all parts of the village, those 
who received panels and those who did not: “There were issues with the solar panel 
size, some were big and some were small, people said there was corruption 
involved.”228 An elderly villager added: “Hambastagi Milli [the NSP] has provided people 
with solar panels, but only those who have a close friendship with the malik.”229 
The second female member of the CDC, the malik’s sister and a resident of central 
QJK, added to the complaints: “I was very upset being a member of CDC and yet 
because I was busy at home with maternity leave, they dropped me completely off the 
list and I did not receive a solar panel”.230   
Although it is difficult to verify whether there was any corruption involved in the process 
of solar panel distribution, what is obvious is that some of the confusion created among 
people contributed to the idea that something unlawful was going on. It is common that 
with resources comes corruption, as well as allegations of corruption, suspicion and 
lack of trust among the population. This is especially true if there is not enough clarity in 
the system and transparency at the different levels that the programme operates on. 
For example, one of the staff members of the provincial office of the MRRD said:  
                                            
225 The specific dates of both elections were not available; based on local informants’ account 
and NSP data I approximate that the first election happened during 2004-5 and the second 
during 2008-9. 
226 The school building was not directly part of the NSP block-grants according to the NSP 
record. The funding for this was paid by the Nangarhar PRT. Interview with malik/CDC 
chief/qaryadar part II #46 dated 01.12.2011. 
227 Interviews with residents from different parts of QJK #47; #52; #53 and #66 dated between 
20-24.11.2011. 
228 Interview with resident of AbdulWahab Banda #66 dated 24.11.2011. 
229 Interview with QJK elder man #57 dated 22.11.2011. 
230 #47 dated 03.12.2011. 
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I give you an example. There is a project on which, for instance, Afs20,000 is 
spent. The CDC leadership would report to the RRD staff [provincial MRRD] that 
we will write a receipt for Afs60,000 and if you help us, we will share a percentage 
of this extra with you and so they agree and approve the overpriced receipt and 
the extra Afs40,000 will be divided among them.231 
It is important to point out here that the conflict over distribution of resources was not 
between different tribes or different parts of the village, but more between those in the 
CDC’s key positions and those villagers who did not benefit from it. In one case the 
issue has become an instrument used by a rival of Malik T. to re-consider their status 
as a separate village: 
In this village [he refers to his own community, Shoraghonday] no one gave us 
solar panels. We are 30 families, not even one family received one. Because the 
current malik does not help us we are planning to register our community as a 
separate village. In the past we were fewer families, now there are more families in 
this community.232 
In the case of Shoraghondy, however, it should be mentioned that while some 
residents complained about not receiving any solar panels, another claimed that their 
own cluster representative had asked for them to be provided with a water reservoir 
instead of solar panels. As the water reservoir did not materialize due to errors in 
estimation and costs, the villagers from Shoraghondy found themselves losers on both 
accounts.233 This idea of separating their community from QJK emerged due to these 
problems and in particular after the conflict over the second CDC election.  
Despite the challenges it faced, the CDC and its leadership continued to operate as an 
active hub, attracting NGOs and, at least in one case, the PRT (Provincial 
Reconstruction Team) from Nangarhar to provide assistance to the village. The CDC 
members took part in resolving some disputes and issues during their biweekly 
meetings.234 But the main interest for the CDC and its leadership remained the projects 
funded through the NSP and other sources for the village. 
In sum, the overall process of the CDC formation and the way it has operated, informs 
us how programmatic interventions result in a complex form of governance relations in 
                                            
231 Conversation with Nangarhar RRD staff who requested anonymity #68 dated 15.03.2012 
232 Interview with resident of Shoraghonday, QJK #54 dated 20.11.2011. 
233 Interviews with different residents of Shoraghondy area of QJK #51; #54; #56 and #57 dated 
20-23.11.2011. 
234 Interview with different CDC members from QJK #43; #44; #50; #60 dated 11.2011 to 
12.2011. 
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a given context. The co-option of CDCs by the local elites did not come as a surprise, 
as it represents the power of the existing structures and how they influence and control 
processes. The conditions that made this possible were several: the local elites 
operated under a strong patronage system of rule where each cluster was represented 
by one patron who depended on the malik who, in turn, was backed by the village elites 
who play a leading role in the way governance relations are led in the village.  
6.3.4. Women’s role in local governance and donor conditionality 
Women’s inclusion has been a firm conditionality for the NSP intervention in 
Afghanistan. When the NSP facilitators visited QJK, they informed the village malik 
(Malik T.) that if women were not included in the CDCs, the programme would not be 
implemented. However, on the QJK side, given its reputation as a non-conservative 
village, this was not a big concern for the villagers or for the facilitators. The majority of 
male and female respondents in this study expressed their sympathy and support for 
the inclusion of women in the CDC to varying degrees.235 In this part, I will expand on 
how women took part in the CDC and overall village governance by first looking at how 
different village actors responded to this question, and then briefly explore the 
background of the two women (J. and H.) who were represented in the CDCs. I will 
conclude by looking at the broader picture of how this conditionality opened space for 
local women leaders to emerge as village elites or gatekeepers, although with some 
limitations.  
Women in QJK, especially from the Ishaqzai kinship have a reputation for being 
educated and involved in public work. They used to work outside the house, but often 
‘outside’ meant in Jalalabad and not within the village itself. This meant that they were 
not active in the village meetings or jirgahs.236  
Different village informants, varying from youth to elderly, from elite to people with 
lower economic or social status such as farmers or newly settled residents, and also 
the religious actors expressed their full support for women being part of the CDC 
leadership. Yet, it is worth mentioning here that these responses came as an ‘opening’ 
question or discussion about women’s public role. With the majority of informants, as 
soon as the discussion moved on to further details at an in-depth level, things evolved 
                                            
235 It is important to note here that around 20% of interviews in QJK were conducted in my 
absence by a male research assistant but there were no differences in informants’ responses in 
answering this question whether asked by me, as a woman and the two male researchers I sent 
to the village. 
236 Interview with QJK resident also CDC member #50 dated 20.12.2011. 
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in a different manner. For instance, a farmer, head of one of the six clusters expressed 
his view: 
J. [Deputy Chief of CDC] is a respected woman, she attends our CDC meetings. 
It is good to have her there; she is well-educated and knows the needs of women. 
For us, she is like a family member (…) In our cluster there is no woman. Our 
women are not involved in the CDC and were not involved in the election either. I 
know there is a women’s group in the village, but we [the farmer’s cluster] do not 
have any working relationship thus far with women.237 
The cluster that the farmer represents is made up mainly of working/farming families 
with the lowest economic status in the village. The idea of having a female 
representative from among these families was out of the question according to the 
farmer. Hence, one important factor that could be observed in this example is that the 
economic and social status of women affected their ability to participate in the CDC, 
even to vote, let alone their inclusion as CDC members or leaders. And for this reason, 
it was not surprising to see these two particular women (J. and H.) were elected as 
CDC members because of their socio-political status, not because of being women, per 
se. (see below for more details) However, such inclusion should not be seen as full 
participation by women in all aspects of village governance. Women’s role in the CDC 
remains restricted to matters related to development projects in the village and bringing 
resources into the village. For instance, J. the deputy chief of CDC, and member of the 
District Development Assembly (DDA), managed to bring in donors and resources 
through the different networks she connected with.238 However, neither J. nor H. (the 
second female CDC member) were or have been part of the larger informal village 
mechanism for governance that included dispute and conflict resolution or other 
broader issues that were discussed outside the CDC meetings. Those matters still 
remain ‘men’s affairs’, discussed most often in the grand mosque after Friday prayers, 
a place to which the women have no access. 
Here, I will further elaborate on what qualified these two women as candidates for a 
first time formal role in the village’s public affairs.  
J. is in her mid-50s, a mother of three, and married to a man from Kabul. QJK is her 
native village and she lives in a house inherited from her family. J. is trained and has 
worked as a teacher for over two decades. After her marriage she lived in Kabul, but in 
the early 1990s she moved back to QJK because of the civil war. Under the Taliban 
                                            
237 Interview with village farmer #44 dated 29/11/2011 
238 See the following section 6.4.2 for further details. 
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regime, she was involved in vaccination programmes in Jalalabad and also led home-
based schools for girls in QJK. J. was approached by Malik T. to stand as a CDC 
member and she won the majority vote in the election, becoming the deputy chief of the 
CDC, the position reserved for women.   
H. was in her 30s when she was elected as the second woman in the CDC leadership. 
Like J., H. is married to a man from outside her village and kin. She studied in 
Jalalabad and works at the QJK high school. H. joined J. in most of her village activities 
prior to the CDC formation. She taught girls in home-based schools during the Taliban. 
Together with J. she took part in different projects NGOs brought to the village prior to 
the CDC. H. is Malik T.’s sister and she lives in the large compound owned by their 
father, along with their other siblings and their families. Her selection as the second 
female CDC member was because of being the malik’s sister and also because of her 
active role in the village. When she was elected, she did not have children. After she 
had children, she was not able to attend CDC meetings regularly and finally she 
resigned, supposedly having lost trust in the CDC’s work and also because she was 
upset at not receiving a solar panel.239  
The family background and socio-economic status of the two women in the QJK CDC, 
inform us about the village elite’s strategies that led to the selection of women 
acceptable within the existing ideological system of patriarchy and socio-political 
norms. This mind-set is what determines the majority of men’s and women’s views on 
women’s public role in Afghan society. Hence, the QJK residents, although relatively 
open-minded compared to others who would not agree to even a symbolic presence of 
women in the public eye, still chose only women within the elite networks who were not 
their wives, but rather their sisters who had married outside the village circle. I raised 
this question to Malik T.’s wife and her account confirmed the notion of the patriarchal 
mind-set in Afghanistan; the best way to describe a woman with a public role is 
compare her with men:  
It [membership of CDC] is a man’s job, so my husband is there. [smiling] J. [the 
female deputy chief of CDC] has characteristics like a man; she is very brave and 
she does not feel embarrassed to sit and speak with strangers. Also she is married 
to a Kabuli man and that’s why it was okay with her husband that she sits with men 
                                            
239 Interviews #43 28.11.2011; #47 dated 03.12.2011; and #78 dated 16.03.2012 
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at CDC meetings. I do not have the same courage as her. Also, men here would 
feel very embarrassed if their wives sat with other men in the same room.240 
These two women did not have other competitors within the village in terms of 
mobilising voters or bringing resources into the village. J. in particular was an important 
figure in terms of bringing in different projects (i.e. resources) beneficial to different 
parts of the village.  
From my observations in this context, despite the nominal agreement of the majority of 
male and female villagers, in reality they did not envision women’s public role beyond 
the provision of services through women-only focused projects. Men in the village, such 
as the farmer and others, had a particular understanding of what type of women could 
participate in the village leadership. The reason given by the majority who agreed on 
women’s role was solely seen as “It is good to have women in the group who know the 
problems of other women and can help them”.241 The dominance of this kind of 
mentality and the limitations experienced by an average woman in a male-dominant 
society have resulted in the maintenance of a form of status quo in regard to gender 
relations in the village. In other words, although the broader consensus among villagers 
about the role of female CDCs has given these two women a platform to enter into the 
sphere of village governance relations, practically, the dominant customary practices 
have limited their role in changing gender relations.  
It was observed that age was an important factor in the case of J. who remained an 
active member of the CDC and village representation at the district level. As many 
scholars have already pointed out, it seems evident that younger women – especially if 
they are married with children – face more obstacles to take part in these processes 
(Kakar 1979:172-173; Kabeer et al. 2011; Mielke 2013:19) In addition to this, the role of 
FPs and their staff, particularly their female SMs cannot be ignored – the following 
chapter elaborates further on this. However, in QJK, because J. was an active and 
experienced woman herself, she succeeded in securing a women-focused project 
through the NSP. Additionally, she brought in many more resources through different 
NGOs and aid organisations to her village women and girls.  
In sum, the most remarkable contribution of the NSP intervention and its conditionality 
on women’s inclusion in the CDC leadership was to provide a level of legitimacy and 
formal recognition of women’s role in village governance. The section highlighted that 
these particular women were chosen for the CDC by Malik T. and other elites because 
                                            
240 Conversation with wife of the QJK malik part II #46 dated 01.12.2011 
241 Interview with male QJK villager from Qala-e-Mandes #56 dated 23.12.2011. 
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of their kinship relations (especially their out-marriage) and active role in the community 
prior to the NSP intervention. However, women’s role remained basically limited to the 
developmental aspects of governance practices, more precisely in terms of bringing in 
financial and economic resources to the village. The customary practices of conflict 
resolution and land or other dispute resolutions that were often discussed after Friday 
prayers in the mosque were not as open to women, hence the spatial aspect of where 
discussions around governance occurred also affected women’s governance practices 
in the village. The notion of seniority, above all, informs us that although some women 
in the QJK context have had access to resources and a level of agency, they still 
continue to operate within the patriarchal framework and it is still far from practical to 
begin challenging the gendered roles of women within these local settings. The women 
were seen as ‘family members’ rather than as active leaders. And finally, neither the 
NSP as a programme, nor the FPs had any form of strategy that would allow them to 
challenge the existing patriarchal forms of mind-set. 
6.3.5. Intended goals and unintended outcomes 
In previous chapters, I discussed the idea that programmatic interventions cannot be 
entirely judged as failures or successes because once they are implemented in a 
context, no matter how successful (or not) they are, they leave their mark on the 
existing power relations. In the MRRD interventions too, the actual goal that the 
programme was designed to attain may not have been achieved, but it certainly left its 
mark on the way governance relations operated in the subject context.  
QJK, like many other parts of Nangarhar, had been part of various NGOs’ service 
provision coverage for most of the 1990s and 2000s. Initially the NSP programme was 
equated with the NGO activity, but later people were able to distinguish between the 
NGO projects and the NSP as governmental assistance for people.242 Their 
understanding of this intervention was mainly limited to its provision of services through 
the block-grant and projects.243 For instance, “reduce the gap between people and 
government” and “improving economic conditions by creating jobs and services” were 
reflections of villagers who were (and were not) involved in the CDCs directly.244 What 
is observed in these reflections is the fact that none of them discussed the CDC as a 
village governance institution.   
                                            
242 Interviews with local CDC member and non-member residents of QJK #47 #50 #60 #72 
dated between November 2011-July 2012. 
243 Interviews with local CDC member and non-member residents of QJK #47 #50 #60 #72 
dated between November 2011-July 2012. 
244 Interviews in QJK #50 #43 #57 dated between (2011-12) 
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Although the majority of people in the village felt that the CDC was a positive thing in 
terms of bringing in resources and providing some services for villagers, they also 
shared concerns about the spread of corruption associated with the distribution of 
these resources. When comparing the CDC with the malik system, some said: “A shura 
solves the problems, a shura is better than just one man being a leader [referring to 
Malik T.] but corruption created lots of problems.”245 
Another informant reiterated this:  
In my opinion, through CDC shuras we can solve lots of problems. We can avoid 
corruption because if one is involved, others can keep him accountable. In the old 
malik system, no one ever questioned the malik, because he was one man. For 
example if he wanted to, he could put all the Afs10,000 that someone donated to his 
village in his pocket. But in the shura this is impossible, because if he does, others 
will know; if he shares among others, it becomes a big embarrassment for him 
among his own villagers. I cannot say there is no corruption at all in [CDC] shuras, 
but I can say it’s better than the malik system.”246 
These elaborations confirm that lack of accountability from the village elites to the rest 
of population existed historically and did not change with the introduction of the CDC. 
The QJK experiences with the CDC informs us that locals, whether members of the 
CDC or not, realised that corruption was widespread and that CDC members were no 
different from other people who had access to power and resources within or beyond 
their communities. 
The preference for collective over individual leadership was also highlighted in some of 
the discussions with QJK residents. The QJK villagers preferred a shura over an 
individual’s leadership. This preference could be interpreted in two ways: 1) as the 
above quote reflected, the more people involved in the resource distribution (one of the 
key roles for the CDC) the less chance there was for corruption; and 2) because of the 
broader political context where, for instance during national elections, political elites 
mostly relied on buying votes and loyalties via the maliks, their (the maliks) reputation 
as corrupt individuals has become more widespread.  
For instance, this anecdote from H. (a CDC member who resigned) about how the 
situation changed between the first and second elections demonstrates how broader 
                                            
245 Interview with QJK shopkeeper #60 dated 23.12.2011. 
246 Interview with CDC Treasurer in QJK #50 dated 11.12.2011. 
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political processes such as national level elections affected the way villagers were 
voting and choosing their representatives:  
I say democracy was good, but the national elections have ruined it for us. Before 
[referring to pre-2004 years] it was not difficult for us to gather a group of people 
in one house and discuss our problems and issues, but now if you aim to do so, 
everyone expects you to pay something. We were regularly meeting with no 
expectation for return, but that culture no longer exists. To me, that culture of 
people in general and especially women discussing their problems, deciding what 
to do in a shura was a real democracy, but these elections ruined our democracy! 
I mean, when these larger presidential and parliamentary elections happened, the 
candidates started to bribe people and buy votes through paying for food, clothes, 
turbans and even cash to voters, so now every time you speak of shura, elections, 
or gathering people, they think they must be paid.247 
This account is crucial in helping us understand how notions of liberal institution 
building operated under a strictly patrimonial system of governance, whether at the 
village level or beyond. The anecdote about democracy being ‘good’ but ‘ruined by 
elections’ is perhaps, the best way of summing up the implications of liberal institution 
building under a patrimonial system of rule.  
                                            
247 Interview with second female CDC member #47 dated 03.12.2011. 
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6.4. District Governance Interventions 
6.4.1. Behsud district: A site for contested interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Behsud district map ©AIMS 
. 
Behsud248 is one of Nangarhar’s 22 districts. It is located in the northern part of the 
province and surrounds the city of Jalalabad, Nangarhar’s provincial capital, to the 
north, east and south.249 The new district headquarters, built by the USA PRTs at a 
cost of US $450,000,250 is located in a relatively remote area in the south-west known 
as Qala-e-Regi, approximately 13-14 kilometres from Jalalabad and 15 kilometres from 
Qala-e-Janan Khan (the village selected for this research). Administratively, the district 
has a sub-directorate for most of the line ministries.251 It is the third most populated 
district after Jalalabad and Surkhroad (CSO 2012a), with approximately 108,700 
inhabitants.252 According to MRRD documents, Behsud has 100 villages, all of them 
                                            
248 Behsud became a district in its own right in 1992 during the Mujaddedi leadership period. 
Prior to that, it was considered an alaqadari or sub-district of Surkhroad which is located in the 
south-western part of today’s Behsud. Interview with DG #79 dated 17.03.2012; Interview with 
QJK malik #41 dated 20.12.2011. 
249 Behsud borders the Kuz Kunar (or Khewa) and Kama districts in the north, Rodat and 
Chaparhar in the south, Surkhroad in the west and Batikot in the east. It covers a total of 312 
square kilometres. 
250 According to a news report, the building was inaugurated on November 15th, 2011 
http://www.pajhwok.com/dr/photo/161802 (accessed on 08.04.2013) 
251 The district sub-directorates include representation of various line ministries and the 
judiciary. Interview with DG Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
252 The most recent numbers according to the Central Statistics Office (in 2012) estimates 
108,700, while documents from the MRRD and IDLG have hugely different numbers for the 
population. 165,000 (MRRD, NABDP, 2010) and 250,000 (IDLG, Behsud district assessment). 
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covered by the NSP; the district governor, however, claims there are 128 villages.253 
The ethnic composition of the district is diverse, including Pashtuns (55%), Afghan 
Arabs (40%) and Tajik (5%) (UNHCR 2002).  
  
Figure 5: The new Behsud district building  
©Pajwak Photo 
According to the district governor of Behsud, the district boundary and jurisdictions of 
Jalalabad and Behsud are administratively complicated by the fact that Nangahar’s 
customs office (gumruk) lies within Behsud’s district boundary, as does Jalalabad 
Airport and a large international military base attached to it, in addition to the Gambiri 
Desert in which a large US military base is planned.254 The main Jalalabad-Torkham 
road also runs through Behsud. However, the remoteness of the district office tends to 
be confined to more local and less politically contentious issues. The international 
military forces, for instance, only contact the Behsud district administration if something 
is specifically related to a given case in villages under the district’s jurisdiction. For 
major issues, they are in direct contact with the provincial authorities in Jalalabad.255 
Nevertheless, it remains an important district because of its proximity to the provincial 
centre and the heavy military presence, which brings in resources to the area and also 
                                            
253 According to the district governor, there are around 128 small and large villages but only 98 
are officially registered with the district.  
Interview with district governor of Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
254 Interview with district governor of Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
255 Interview with district governor of Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
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attracts anti-government activities, issues of security and illicit activities such as 
smuggling, organised crime, etc (TLO 2010; CPAU 2010; Mansfield 2013).  
Although influenced by the processes of urbanisation, Behsud is still a largely rural 
district. Most villages have some shops and marketplaces, but they are only regulated 
by the local owners and villagers as there is no formal revenue or taxation mechanism 
affecting local businesses.256 In general there are tax collection checkpoints, such as 
the one located on Behsud Bridge257 (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Tax collection check point on Behsud Bridge, Nangarhar 
©Photo by author 
The district government houses the district governor, security apparatus, sub-
directorates from different line ministries and the district court. Although constitutionally 
required, formal district councils have yet to be established (2014). Instead, there are 
District Development Assemblies, created by the MRRD’s National Area Based 
Development Programme (NABDP) and from 2010 onwards, a council created as part 
of the Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) run by the PRT (through the IDLG). 
                                            
256 Interview with district governor, Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012; Interview with QJK 
community elder #69 dated 13.03.2012. 
257 It is unclear whether these checkpoints are formal or informal. The tax collection spot on 
Behsud Bridge is attached to the security checkpoint which may be an indicator that it is a 
formal method tax collection, but there is no evidence either way if the collected tax money is 
channelled into national, provincial or district budgets. (My observation); See also CPAU 
(2010:9). 
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Both councils used to work through the district headquarters.258 However, by the time 
this research was conducted, the ASOP council had been dissolved.259 NGOs 
operating in Behsud include BRAC which is the Facilitating Partner for the NSP.260 
Most NGOs work on agriculture, education, health, income-generation, livelihoods, etc. 
Given the close proximity to the centre and relative security that the district has, it 
attracts different intervening institutions and actors to operate in the area. These, in 
addition to NGOs, include political groups, politico-military factions and religious 
networks (mostly conservative groups). At the time of the fieldwork, several new grand 
mosques and madrasas were being built in different parts of the district. Respondents 
explained they were sponsored by Pakistan or, in some cases, by local businessmen 
and influential persons.  
Despite its relative security, Behsud experiences intermittent security threats due to the 
strong government and international military presence in its vicinity. During my visit to 
the district headquarters, I was strictly advised to go there in the morning and leave by 
mid-day, because after mid-day the area was no longer under government control 
according to local informants.261 Behsud is illustrative of a wider pattern, in which 
increased international military presence (particularly due to the military surge 2009-
2012) has also meant more anti-government and anti-foreign troop activities and more 
security issues in the area.   
The politico-military networks of Jalalabad and Behsud overlap. Similar to Nangarhar 
as a whole, power structures within Behsud are complex and devisive, including HIG 
(Hikmatyar faction), HIK (Khalis faction) and ex-PDPA members, many of whom were 
now active within the current government.262 The presence of political elites from 
                                            
258 The following sub-section elaborates on the nature of these councils and how they have 
been operating. 
259 Interview with District Governor Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
260 According to the district governor, there are around 11 international and 8 national NGOs 
operating in Behsud. Interview with District Governor Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
261 District HQ is often used by the district residents to gain ID cards, or carry out other 
administrative related work. It seemed there was an agreement between the district governor 
and the local Taliban that allowed these operations to be carried out in the morning, while in the 
afternoon the area was considered unsafe for any official. 
262 For example, Eng. Abdul Ghafar, a Behsud native, was a senior commander of the Hezb-e-
Islami - Hikmatyar faction in the eastern region. During the Mujahiddin regime he was head of 
customs; he is now the MP for Nangarhar. Dr. Mohammad Alam Ishaqzai received his PhD from 
the University of Petersburg in Russia, served as deputy governor for Gulagha Shirazay and 
then became governor of Baghlan; he is currently head of the Ministry of Finance provincial 
directorate, one of the key governing positions in Nangarhar. He is from Behsud’s Qala-e-Janan 
Khan. A number of village level commanders or influential figures that I met during field 
research (2011-2012) are also from villages in Behsud, indicating that they were part of Hezb-e-
Islami of Mawlawi Khalis. This implies that the majority of the district is populated by actors who 
are directly working with the current government. (TLO 2010:36). 
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northern Nangarhar (including from Behsud) in the current government may be 
interpreted as an indicator of relative stability for the area and, more broadly, the 
northern part of Nangarhar.263 Nevertheless, Behsud’s security issues mainly come in 
two forms: 1) direct Taliban attacks against the international military forces and 
government forces and threatening of government officials; and 2) criminal activities 
such as kidnapping, targeted murders and robberies of houses that are mainly related 
to issues such as land-grabbing, drug smuggling, and personal disputes.264 
The MRRD presence in the district is in the form of its district sub-directorate. 
According to NSP data, 121 CDCs have been established in Behsud. Out of these, 100 
villages were included in the first two phases and 21 in the third. In total 96 CDCs have 
received their first and second round block-grants.265  
The IDLG carry out their work through the office of the district governor. The US PRTs 
operated through the IDLG whose representatives were based at the district’s office to 
implement its district support projects. One of the IDLG’s key roles is to appoint the 
district governors from Kabul (Nijat 2014). The district governor for Behsud, who initially 
applied for the Batikot district, was appointed as district governor in Batikot through the 
IDLG’s civil service reform programme. However, the governor of Nangarhar (Gul Agha 
Sherzai) moved him to Behsud after eight months.266 This highlights the level of power 
and authority that the provincial governor exercises over provincial and district matters 
under his rule. As Jackson (2014) pointed out, the appointment of district governors, 
depending on the significance of the district, is seen as a reward or punishment for 
those who ally with or oppose the provincial governor (Jackson 2014:27). The district 
governor at the time of the research was a young man in his mid-30s, a native of the 
district of Pacheerwagam and an economics graduate of Nangarhar University. More 
importantly, he did not have close links with the existing political elites, particularly the 
governor’s rivals, so his appointment to an important district could be seen as an 
attempt by the governor to strengthen his own patronage network.   
                                            
263 See section 6.2.3 in this chapter for more on this point. 
264 These are sometimes more common than direct Taliban attacks. Although there are overlaps 
between these different types of insecurity it is still important to note the differences, particularly 
given that the district is hugely prone to land disputes and land-grabbing. Interview with Village 
Affairs Sub-Director #80 dated 17.03.2012. See also TLO (2010), CPAU (2010) and Mansfield 
(2013). 
265 Email communication with NSP Office at MRRD, Kabul dated 28.12.2013 
266 Interview with District Governor Behsud #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
  151 
6.4.2. Competing forms of central government interventions  
The IDLG’s operations at the district level came after the MRRD’s programmes were 
initiated and implemented. It was obvious that this gave the MRRD the upper hand on 
the ground. However, IDLG’s interest in district and village governance was not solely 
about competition between two ministries.267 The dynamic was also shaped by the 
differing approaches of the donors (military or developmental) to governance. The 
IDLG was the major partner of the international military forces, who relied on the newly 
established institution implementing its district governance projects for purposes of 
‘stabilisation.’268 As discussed in chapter five, this move is related to the broader shift 
in intervention policies where initial bottom-up approaches were seen as ‘time-
consuming’ and the intervening forces, especially the military, were more attracted to 
immediate results.269  
The MRRD attempted to create district level institutions known as District Development 
Assemblies (DDAs) in 2007. The DDAs were formed out of CDCs (village level 
councils), specifically the CDC chief clusters.270 However, after the establishment of the 
IDLG and particularly after the military’s shift from counter-terrorism to 
counterinsurgency (COIN), there was more emphasis on district governance through 
stabilisation programmes.271 This international military focus, and indeed the IDLG’s 
interest in maintaining more influence and control over district governance affairs, led to 
an attempt by the IDLG to form another district council despite the existence of the 
District Development Assemblies that operated similarly to district councils. Behsud 
provides an example of how one intervention was built over the other in the district.   
The MRRD intervention 
The DDA “enhances cooperation between the communities and government and 
ensures community participation in district development planning and management 
processes”(MRRD 2010). Although the DDA mandate does not explain its role as a 
‘governing’ institution or describe it as operating as the District Council, the manner in 
which it was formed (through elections by village CDC representatives) and its role in 
                                            
267 See chapter five for more systematic analysis of motivations for the MRRD and IDLG and 
their donors’ interests in district governance. 
268 DOD (2010), in its annual report, refers to the IDLG as the lead and key partner in carrying 
out different DoD projects such as the District Delivery Programme, Social Outreach 
Programme and various others. 
269 See chapter five section 3.1 for more on this point. 
270 Chapter five, section 5.2.2 provides further details on the overall process of DDA formation 
and its broader programme. 
271 According to the Nangarhar PRT, the DDP support includes “greater pay for district officials, 
funding for operation and maintenance of current facilities and approval of new facilities.” 
(http://prtnangarhar.blogspot.no/ (accessed on 24.04.2013)). 
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the allocation and distribution of resources gave DDA members an important governing 
role at the district level.272 The representatives from the Behsud CDCs who were 
organised in 16 clusters, elected 30 persons, including 10 women, to form the District 
Development Assembly.273 DDA membership is on a voluntary basis and members are 
not paid. They gather relatively regularly, their key role according to the DDA’s chief to 
channel development assistance in an equitable way to all Behsud villages; help with 
dispute and conflict resolution and also take care of security matters that concern the 
district. The DDA chief is a man with a HIG background who had also been a malik and 
CDC chief in his village in Behsud:  
I have been malik of my village for a long time. When the election for the CDC was 
conducted in my village, I was away for Haj [pilgrimage to Mecca]. People elected 
me in my absence. Then, when the DDA was formed, I stood for the DDA chief 
position. In the first round, I had only three votes against me. My rival was not 
respected by people and elections happened in the presence of World Bank and 
government representatives. And in the second round I had 29 votes, meaning the 
absolute majority of the DDA members [30 of them] voted for me and I remain in 
my position.”274 
The words of the DDA chief from Behsud demonstrate the influence and role of the 
existing patronage system at the village and district levels. The fact that one candidate 
won 29 out of 30 votes indicates a pre-election consensus on who should lead the 
DDA. Jackson (2014) provides similar examples of at least three other districts in 
Nangarhar where ex-commanders became part of the CDC and DDA leadership 
(Jackson 2014:33). While DDAs have their own challenges in terms of their legitimacy 
and position, and interference from different provincial and district authorities (ibid.), 
they were not the only district level structure that operated in Behsud, particularly 
during the military surge by the US army (2009-2011). 
The female deputy CDC from Qala-e-Janan Khan was also a member of the DDA and 
secured several projects for her village. These included a road connecting the northern 
part of the village with the main road and a spinning project that involved women.275 
This confirms the point made in the earlier section on how the MRRD’s interventions 
expanded women’s public role in the village and district governance. Although she 
                                            
272 Interview with the DDA chief in Behsud NGR #116 dated 04.05.2012; Interview with QJK 
CDC and Behsud DDA female member #47 dated 03.11.2011. 
273 Interview with head of Behsud DDA #116 dated 04.05.2012. 
274 Interview with the DDA chief in Behsud NGR #116 dated 04.05.2012 
275 Interview with QJK malik and CDC chief #41 dated 27.11.2011; interview with female deputy 
chief CDC #43 dated 28.11.2011. 
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operated mainly to attract resources for her own village, the fact of a woman leading 
resource distribution at district level is significant in a context where women’s public 
role is under on-going threats. 
The IDLG intervention 
Behsud is one of nine districts in Nangarhar where the PRT provided support through 
the District Delivery Programme. The COIN strategy by the US government and its 
allies followed a combined security, governance and reconstruction or development 
approach – known as “Clear, Hold, Build” – in order to support provincial districts (DoD 
2009:15). Behsud was incorporated as one of the ‘Comprehensive Focused District 
Development’ priority areas identified by the US leadership in Afghanistan (ibid.:78). 
This strategy was operationalised to provide support to the IDLG’s efforts at the district 
level. Chapter five discussed how such links functioned at the wider national level, but 
in Behsud it was found that the previous district governor was asked to introduce a 
number of influential actors from different parts of the district to come together and form 
a council mainly to ensure its security.276 The Afghan Social Outreach Programme 
(ASOP) was implemented by the IDLG and funded by the US Department of Defence. 
Its purpose was to bring together the “(…) special councils of notables to better link 
local authorities to the population, with improved security as the principal goal” (DoD 
2009:53). These ‘notables’ were also paid a salary, unlike the DDA members who were 
volunteers. The newly appointed Behsud district governor elaborated on the 
problematic outcome of the ASOP and how the pilot phase failed:  
ASOP was a failed experiment, so we managed to close it down, because they 
were directly interfering in our work. No one knew what their role was and what 
they should do. One day they would come and sit in my office or in another office 
saying we ‘monitor’ your work! (...) I think finally this confusion resulted in their full 
closure of the programme. The DDA however, is better – at least they are 
development oriented, every time an NGO comes here and asks me if they can do 
something for the district, I refer them to the DDA for development projects.277 
This assessment by the district governor was followed by one of the district officers 
who had served for many years in the office and remembered the initial formation of the 
ASOP council:  
                                            
276 This account is based on an interview with a district official in Behsud #80 dated 17.03.2012. 
277 Interview with Behsud District Governor #79 dated 17.03.2012. 
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The selected members of the ASOP council came on the recommendations of the 
old district governor; they were paid a salary and they were here more for their own 
purposes of using district resources rather than being helpful to the government’s 
work in their areas. So the Americans closed the project. Now, there is only the 
DDA.278 
Both accounts demonstrate how ASOP councils were ineffective because they focused 
on strengthening the position of the previous district governor who was no longer in his 
position. In Behsud, the members of the ASOP council were mainly loyal to the old 
district governor and when a new one was appointed, the council became 
dysfunctional.  
In Qala-e-Janan Khan, for instance, Mawlawi Sami, one of the village elites, became an 
ASOP council member after the village malik was approached by the previous district 
governor to recommend someone for a council position that paid a monthly salary of 
$120:  
I sent Mawlawi Sami, he is a respected man and also because of his poor 
economic conditions. I selected him because he might have been upset by not 
being elected as CDC chief, so I sent him there and he was happy.279 
As we can see, the reasoning and logic the malik used in responding to this request 
from the district governor was different from that intended by the initiators of this 
intervention. Mawlawi Sami was ‘happy’ with his work, because of its salary and he 
also (with the help of J.) succeeded in mobilising funding through the PRTs for the 
village high school. He was present when the school was officially inaugurated in 2009 
(see Figure 7).  
                                            
278 Interview with a Behsud district official #80 dated 17.03.2012. 
279 Interview with QJK malik and CDC chief #41 dated 27.11.2011. 
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Figure 7: Opening of QJK school building 
Persons in picture: Mawlawi Sami CDC and ASOP member and religious scholar (second right), 
Mohammad Ibrahim Miakheyl deputy director of provincial directorate of ministry of education 
(fourth right), Mullah of Grand Mosque QJK (sixth right), Haji Ghulam Farooq a central QJK 
elder (seventh right), Munshi Abdul Rahman the CDC Secretary (third left) and daughter of J. 
joined by Army Capt. Elisabeth Leon, Provincial Reconstruction Team lead engineer, 
inaugurating the construction of Qala-e-Janan Khan High school for girls and boys. ©Picture280 
dated Jan.11, 2009 taken by Capt. Dustin Hart (US Air Force). 
As demonstrated in the above examples from interventions by both the MRRD and 
IDLG, there are various differences in the nature of the space each one has filled in 
governance relations and in their mechanism of establishment. In Behsud the DDA was 
a permanent structure from 2007, with continuous funding and facilitation through the 
MRRD and UNDP, while ASOP was only ever piloted and has since been closed.281  
In sum, these councils have/had an important gatekeeping role (Saltmarshe and Medhi 
2011:17) which the district governor sought to shape and monopolise. Yet, their 
effectiveness in terms of representation of the rest of population and the sustainability 
of the councils in the absence of funding appeared to be limited. Both institutions were 
less about representation and the voices of local population than about creating 
mechanisms to funnel resources downwards and information and intelligence upwards.  
                                            
280 Picture details are taken from the webpage of the Department of Defence 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52689 (accessed 18.06.2014). 
281 In the period this study was conducted, the DCCs were not officially in place. So, it is not 
clear if the ASOP council will be revived, or if the DDA will take over as a whole in Behsud, 
calling itself a DCC. The IDLG notes that the ASOP closure was mainly due to the US congress 
not approving its budget. Although in its earlier years’ report the IDLG stated that it 
recommended districts to keep these councils, according to Behsud officials it had been 
dissolved. See IDLG (2014:44) 
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Reviving the formalisation of the qayradar system by the IDLG 
In Behsud, in around 2010, the new office of Muderyat-e-Qaryajat was added to the 
administrative structure.282 This sub-directorate is responsible for village affairs and 
registering the ‘village representative’ or qaryadar, the official version of the malik. 
Villages were asked to register a representative who was then formally recognised by 
the district authorities as the ‘village head’ or qaryadar. The district sub-director for 
village affairs in Behsud elaborated on the procedure:  
Qaryadar is not an elected post. Anyone can put himself forward – write a 
petition, get the signatures of a few community elders, then bring it to district 
court. Once it is approved, we call it a wasiqa [a legal certificate] that confirms 
the person is an approved qaryadar. (…) The problem with this is that every day 
we have many people coming and claiming they are qaryadar. We face a 
challenge as the rules are not very clear on the mechanism of how the qaryadar 
should be selected or elected. This can cause conflict and disputes among 
communities.283 
Given that there is no universally accepted definition of ‘village’ by the Afghan state, the 
district officials’ registration of qaryadars became more problematic:  
The communities have a very clear definition of what a village consists of; among 
themselves everyone knows what divides one village from another in their close 
neighbourhood. But we don’t have a clear definition of ‘village’ to work with. The 
issue is the population has increased and war has created lots of disputes that 
divide communities rather than unifying them.284 
This was also evident from discussions with the district governor about registered and 
non-registered villages, where, for instance, the CDC chiefs were not considered 
qaryadars by default. If the qaryadar’s position is seen as the village ‘executive leader’, 
then it becomes even more problematic, some villages having only one representative 
who is CDC chief, malik and qaryadar rolled into one.285 As Saltmarshe and Medhi 
(2011) noted, the qaryadars also operate as key informants, providing information and 
intelligence to the security forces, including the National Department of Security and 
                                            
282 Interview with a Behsud district official #80 dated 17.03.2012. 
283 According to (Saltmarshe and Medhi 2011:23) in some areas the qaryadars are also allowed 
to arm villages for their own protection. This was not mentioned in Behsud, but it is possible that 
in some insecure areas this does happen; Interview with the head of Village Affairs sub-
directorate #80 dated 17.03.2012. 
284 Interview with the head of Village Affairs sub-directorate #80 dated 17.03.2012. 
285 See the following section for more on this example in the case of Qala-e-Janan Khan Village. 
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the PRTs.286 Consequently, the formalisation of the qaryadar system contributes further 
to strengthening a centralised system of governance, whilst also undermining the 
efforts towards institution building and particularly the MRRD’s attempts to formalise 
the CDCs as local governance structures.  
To conclude, this section reflected on the MRRD and IDLG interventions building upon 
each other as the district became a site of contested interventions by central 
government’s ministries and their international donors. The district and village elites, as 
demonstrated in Qala-e-Janan Khan, used these opportunities to ensure that they 
benefited from interventions by receiving different types of resources and were hence 
able to ‘deliver’ to their clients. 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the local governance relations that evolved as a result of local 
governance interventions by MRRD and IDLG (as central government institutions) in 
the post-2001 context of Nangarhar’s Behsud district and Qala-e-Janan Khan villages 
as micro sites of intervention.  
The chapter introduced a historical overview of socio-political and economic 
characteristics of the province and what shaped overall governance relations within the 
province and its relations with the central government and international donors who 
provided financial support to governance programmes in the province.  
I have pointed out that Nangarhar’s political elites, historically known as the khans and 
tribal leaders, in the post 1978 context have evolved and emerged into, or in instances 
been replaced by, strongmen or commanders who have gained power not only through 
local means of legitimacy (such as socio-economic status) but also through external 
sources of funding and controlling the provinces’ revenue resources.  
The chapter discussed two forms of provincial and district governance arrangements in 
the province: the de jure form of governance which includes actors and structures that 
are formal and part of the central government’s expanded authority at the provincial 
level, and the de facto form of governance, which involves members or actors loyal to 
different political and politico-military groups who continue to have a monopoly over 
violence and economic resources in the province (Wilder and Lister 2007: 87). There is 
no clear line of distinction that separates the two, but the latter group has stronger 
influence in the political and economic aspects of provincial and district level 
                                            
286 “Formerly we used to work for the KGB. Now we work under the CIA” (Saltmarshe and Medhi 
2011:23). 
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governance which respectively impacted the village governance.  
Introducing the particular context of Qala-e-Janan Khan village, it was discussed that 
village elites included a mix of pre-war and war-time, including actors who emerged as 
powerful players in the post-2001 context. The chapter highlighted how the village 
representative or malik monopolised the operationalisation of the MRRD and IDLG 
interventions in his village where he was also backed by part of the village elites. 
However, it was also seen how, in the process, the power dynamics in the village 
changed and other village elites tried to compete with the malik.  
The chapter considered that conditionality on women’s inclusion has been effective to 
the point of bringing women representatives into both the village and district institutions. 
The Qala-e-Janan Khan village example demonstrated different factors involved in 
selection/election of two women who initially became members of CDC, one of whom 
later operated effectively in the district level DDAs. However, women still faced 
challenges in instances where spatial factors and the broader patriarchal mindset have 
limited their meaningful participation in everyday practices of governance.  
In sum, this overall discussion around a specific context of Nangarhar, Behsud and 
Qala-e-Janan Khan village informs us about the complex hybrid form of governance 
relations that emerges as a result of many different forms of interventions, designed for 
different purposes, focusing on the same local setting. 
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Chapter Seven 
Local Responses to Governance Intervention in Bamyan 
 
Map sources: ©BBC (left) and ©NPS (right) 
7.1. Introduction  
Bamyan is the second province studied here as a site of intervention. Compared to 
Nangarhar, Bamyan Province represents a very different socio-political and historical 
context. The key difference between the two provinces is that Nangarhar has always 
been of geopolitical importance to the Afghan state in terms of revenues and being a 
border province whereas Bamyan, as a central highland with limited resources for 
revenue, did not attract much attention. In addition, the population of Bamyan has been 
systematically subordinated on an ethnic and religious basis. It is at the heart of 
Hazarajat, the homeland of Afghanistan’s Hazara people. As Shiias, and with features 
quite distinct from the country’s other groups, the Hazaras have been subject to 
discrimination ever since their homeland experienced an aggressive form of 
intervention by the Afghan state in the late 19th century. Unlike Nangarhar, Bamyan has 
historically been marginal to the Durrani-dominated state. Yet, as will be shown in this 
chapter, the Hazara elites advanced their political influence and position at the national 
level during the years of war after 1978 and have managed to hold on to those gains in 
the post-2001 context.  
This chapter provides a case study of two major local governance interventions 
implemented by the central government Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development (MRRD) and Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) in the 
villages of Katakhana and Akhundan in the district of Yakawlang, Bamyan. The chapter 
takes a historical political economy approach by analysing the historical aspects of the 
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local governance interventions in the context of the Hazarajat region where Bamyan 
lies at the centre. By looking at how patrimonial relations dominate in the mentioned 
settings, I will critically examine the processes of MRRD’s National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP) implementation in the two villages. I then examine both MRRD’s 
and IDLG’s role in governance affairs at the district level.  
The key purpose of this chapter is to examine how local governance relations evolved 
as a result of a complex process of interactions, negotiations and, at times, 
contestations between local actors and the MRRD’s and IDLG’s sponsored local 
governance programme interventions. It is argued that both the MRRD and IDLG 
interventions have changed local power dynamics by allowing new actors to emerge, 
opening a relatively symbolic space for women’s public role in the village and also 
creating confusion about the roles and obligations of village leadership and village 
representation by formalising the village administrator or qaryadar positions as prior to 
this, the CDC chief were known to be representing each village.  
This chapter is organised in five sections, including the introduction. The second 
section will provide an introduction to governance relations in Bamyan by first 
presenting the province’s socio-economic characteristics, followed by a brief history of 
the central government’s interventions in the Hazarajat region. This will be followed by 
a discussion of the evolution of Hazarajat politics from 1978 to 2001 and how the 
wartime transformations have influenced and shaped the political economy of 
governance relations in the post-2001 context. Section three will critically examine the 
overall introduction and implementation of the NSP and the strategies local elites used 
to adapt to the programme in order to benefit from its resources in the two villages. The 
section also explores the unexpected effects of the programmes on governance and 
gender relations. Finally in this section, I examine how the recipients of/subjects to this 
intervention understood the goals and outcomes of the programme. Section four will 
look at the district level institution building efforts by IDLG through its operations to 
formalise the qaryadar (village administrator) system and the MRRD in forming the 
district level institution, the District Development Assembly (DDA). The chapter 
concludes by considering the overall effect that MRRD and IDLG’s local governance 
interventions had on village and district governance in this particular case. The 
conclusion will highlight that while these interventions resulted in changes in local 
power dynamics, they did not succeed in transforming or replacing existing structures 
or creating a sustained form of local governance institution able to lead everyday 
practices of local governance relations. 
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7.2. History of governance relations in Bamyan  
7.2.1. Provincial socio-economic characteristics 
Bamyan is located in the central highlands of Afghanistan, also known as Hazarajat.287 
It is a mountainous region with harsh winters and has fallen into deep poverty in recent 
times. The province has a population of 406,700 (CSO 2012b). The majority are 
Hazaras (67.4%), with Sadaat288 (16%), Tajik (15.7%), Tatar (0.5%), Qizilbash (0.2%) 
and Pashtuns (0.1%) making up the remainder. At the national level, Hazaras are the 
third largest ethnic group after Pashtuns and Tajiks (Canfield 1972:2-3; Dupree 1973; 
Poladi 1989:47-53; Harpviken 1995; TAF 2006). Health and education levels are 
generally below the average of Afghanistan. The main source of revenue for 86% of 
Bamyan people is agriculture, and around 92% of rural households own land or small 
garden plots (NABDP 2012). Handicrafts and carpet weaving is another source of 
income where mostly women are involved. Approximately half of rural households 
(47%) earn income through non-farm related labour (ibid.). For one-third (36%) of them, 
livestock is an important source of income and only 4% of the population in Bamyan 
rely on remittances (ibid.).  
There are different theories about the origins of the Hazara people. The dominant one 
holds that Hazaras are the first inhabitants of the region known as Hazarajat.289 
Available sources, however, cannot confirm any of these theories. In any case, given 
Bamyan’s historical position on the route of passing armies and business caravans, it is 
not surprising that the local population has adapted customs and concepts from 
different groups passing through their area. Ethnic identity is never static given people’s 
mobility, changes of rulers and, in the course of history, it can change or be influenced 
by different elements. The Hazara population in Bamyan are mainly Twelve Imam 
follower Shiia Muslims.  
7.2.2. Historical context: Local autonomy and violent state interventions 
Historically, Hazarajat was an area known for struggling to maintain its autonomy from 
the central government. Events in recent decades, however, have caused an important 
                                            
287 Hazarajat or Land of Hazara contains the central highland region of Afghanistan. The 
boundaries of Hazarajat have never been officially demarcated. Some view Hazarajat more as 
an ethnic and religious zone rather than a geographical one. It is marked by Bamyan in the 
north, Helmand River in the south, Firozkoh to the west and Salang Pass to the east (Canfield 
1972:2-3; Poladi 1989:47-53; Harpviken 1995; Khazeni 2003). 
288 Sadaat, Sayyed or Sayed (written in different ways) refers to an honorific title for a 
descendant of Islam’s prophet Muhammad through his grandsons (Hassan and Hussain ibn Ali) 
from his daughter Fatima and his son-in-law Ali (Ali ibn Abi Talib). 
289 See for example, (Ferrier 1856:222-23). For further elaboration on other theories see (Bacon 
1958:4, Schurmann 1962:115; Poladi 1989:15, 22; Mousavi 1998:23-25). 
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shift in relations and the local elites have become dedicated allies of the central 
government, especially since late 2001. In this section I will provide a brief overview of 
this evolution.  
Until the late 19th century, the Hazarajat region was seen as an independent and 
autonomous territory, ruled over by local khans or mirs (Kakar 1979; Harpviken 1996; 
Poladi 1998; Emadi 2007:365). These leaders acted as more or less independent 
intermediaries or allies to the government in Kabul and state penetration in the area 
was limited.  
In the late 19th century, funded by British subsidies, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan 
embarked upon a violent state expansion and taxation programme (Emadi 2007:365). 
Having succeeded in incorporating Pashtun groups into the state apparatus, the 
pacification of the Hazarajat region became one of the prime aims of the Amir’s mission 
to expand the Afghan state (Kakar 1979:xxiii). He started by selectively patronising 
some of the local mirs and instigating local rivalries, but soon these tactics were 
replaced by a full-on military confrontation. Using ethnic and religious identities, Abdul 
Rahman Khan framed this mission as a ‘jihad’ against heretic Shiias and mobilised 
Pashtuns to fight Hazaras. The campaigns resulted in enslavements, land confiscation, 
and large scale migration of the Hazara population from their native region (ibid.). The 
purpose of incorporating Hazarajat into the central state was mainly to establish local 
state administrations and initiate a harsh form of taxation (Harpviken 1996:31). The 
new state administration at the district and provincial levels had, since Abdul Rahman 
Khan came into power, been dominated by Pashtuns who acted as government 
administrators by setting up deals with local notables (Kakar 1979; Harpviken 1996:32). 
This also meant that the patrimonial system of rule remained in place for patrons to 
operate between the state and their clients as mediators (Harpviken 1996). In the 
context of Hazarajat, mediators continued to be mirs who operated through arbab or 
qaryadar representatives.  
The Amir’s successors eased some of the discriminative practices against the 
Hazaras290 but discrimination in different forms continued for decades to come, from 
political isolation to negligence in terms of access to resources and services (Harpviken 
1996; Emadi 2007:367). Since the 1950s, in the new democracy period, Hazara 
leaders have continued to demand further recognition and rights that has resulted in 
                                            
290 For instance, Habibullah Khan (1901-1919) who replaced Amir Abdur Rahman allowed those 
who were forced to leave their lands to return. Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) banned slavery 
and reformed land rights and evicted some of the nomads who were occupying the Hazara 
grazing lands by order of Amir Abdur Rahman (Harpviken 1996:32). 
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their gradual inclusion in the political system and greater access to services (Harpviken 
1996). Village governance has never been part of the formal government institutions, 
but according to Monsutti (2005) in the Hazarajat region, the term qaryadar was used 
to refer to the person who, prior to the 1964 constitution, was known as a mehtar and 
whose role was to represent a cluster of villages or a manteqa. The qaryadar was 
proposed by the heads of families and appointed by the government representative 
(Monsutti 2005:91). 
By the 1970s, Hazara elites had managed to access some influence and political 
representation at the national level. For instance, in the Afghan parliament of 1946-
1948 there were only six representatives from Hazarajat, whereas in the 1969-1972 
parliament there were seventeen (Nayel 2002:444, 446). Hazara intellectual elites 
gradually became part of various political movements, but the rest of population in 
Hazarajat continued to live under patron-client relationships (Harpviken 1995:33-36; 
55). However the years of Soviet invasion, civil war and the years of conflict that 
followed afterwards would see dramatic shifts in the relationship between Hazarajat 
and the centre.  
During the PDPA rule, from 1978 onwards, the Hazarajat region was one of the areas 
where the communist government launched its rapid reforms, including land reform and 
challenging the existing role of traditional and religious leaders such as mirs and 
sayyeds (Roy 1986:97; Harpviken 1996:55).291 Therefore the reforms targeted the 
prevailing power structures that constituted the ‘feudal’ patrimonial system. This 
prompted the rapid mobilisation of the population, led by the traditional and religious 
leaders to organise uprisings and revolts against the regime and Soviet invasion 
(Harpviken 1995:55, 62; Mousavi 1998; Dorronsoro 2005:8-9). In the context of 
Hazarajat, ‘traditional’ leaders referred to the mirs or khans, who in the pre-war context 
were the major land-owners and mediating actors between the central state and 
population, as well as the religious clergies or sayyeds who were closely allied with the 
khans. Sayyeds’ religious status and their economic privileges of earning a fifth of the 
Islamic taxation or khums292 gave them higher status.293 As Monsutti (2005) points out, 
the sayyeds’ historically self-bestowed superiority over Hazaras on the basis of 
                                            
291 Interview with aid worker #67, 03.04.2012. 
292 Khums refers to one fifth of all gains or the annual taxation that as part of the five pillars of 
Islam, every Shiia Muslim is obligated to pay. For Sunni Muslims, however only Zakat is 
obligatory. 
293 For more elaboration on the socio-political aspects of sayyeds’ relations with Hazaras see 
(Monsutti 2005:91-92). 
  164 
religious belief has become a source of Hazara - Sayyed conflict particularly since the 
broader turmoil experienced by Afghanistan and the Hazarajat region.294  
The Hazarajat elites have, since the 1980s, included the mirs, the ‘traditional 
mullahs’295 or sayyeds, the sheikhs and the radical seculars (Harpviken 1996:28). All 
these different elites have played an important role in managing the political and 
economic relations in the region. Five important characteristics have defined 
Hazarajat’s political economy of governance relations since the 1980s:  
1) The Hazarajat region, in particular Bamyan, was one of the first areas liberated by 
local anti-government forces as early as 1980.296 The years of war, similar to other 
parts of the country, resulted in the emergence of a new class of politico-military actors, 
who were externally financed through the Iranian government as well as Shiia religious 
networks. By 1989, there were at least eight different groups or parties. In 1989, Hezb-
e-Wahdat (Unity Party) was formed,297 and its leadership moved to Kabul to take part in 
the civil war in order to gain their share of power at the national level (Harpviken 
1996:vii; Ibrahimi 2009b). 
2) Once the government had been toppled, and an autonomous form of rule 
established (Harpviken 1996), a civil war broke out among different rival factions that in 
part were supported by Iran, and internal conflicts continued until 1992. In this period, 
the major conflict was between the traditional leaders – mirs and Sayyeds on the one 
hand and the newly emerging Sheikhs,298 trained, financed and supported by Iran, on 
the other hand. This conflict intensified in the 1990s after the Sheikhs united under the 
banner of Hezb e Wahdat (Unity Party) and adopted a more Hazara nationalist agenda.  
3) During the collapse of the Kabul regime in 1992, the Hezb-e-Wahdat elites decided 
to move to Kabul, so as to take part directly in the civil war over power sharing at the 
national level. This move by the party although led to violent participation as every 
                                            
294 According to (Monsutti 2005:240), despite their reputation among the Hazaras as ‘lazy and 
smug’, sayyeds are indeed mediators who follow different norms of conduct on the basis of 
moderation and equanimity. 
295 In the context of Hazarajat, Mullah-e-Sunnati or traditional mullah refers to those mullahs 
who were not part of the newly formed Shiia Islamist groups. 
296 According to (Harpviken 1996:62) by the summer of 1979 most of Hazarajat was already 
liberated from the government’s control for the first time since Abdur Rahman’s campaign in the 
1890s. 
297 According to (Ibrahimi 2009a) the establishment of Hezb-e-Wahdat is considered an 
important move to avoid the smaller scattered Shiia groups’ dependency on Iran and the party 
emerged stronger and acted more autonomously. 
298 Sheikh refers to the clergy who were trained in Iran, both in terms of religious studies as well 
as military training and were financed to form their own fronts or politico-military groups. 
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other Mujahiddin groups,299 it has opened the space for the Hazara factions to join the 
national level conflict over power and authority. At the same time, some of the Sayyed-
led factions of Hazarajat joined other, non-Hazara groups in the massacre of Hazara 
civilians in Afshar in Kabul as the capital was engulfed in a civil war amongst the 
victorious Mujahiddin (ibid.). According to many of my Hazara informants300 the Sayeed 
groups’ support of the massacre led the Hazara leadership to declare that the khums 
payment to Sayyeds should be stopped, fuelling the conflict even further. 
4) Taliban rule from 1996 pushed Hazarajat leadership back to the peripheries, 
although the Hazarajat leaders continued to struggle for political and military authority 
for the region and beyond.301  
5) In terms of economic resources and revenues, the years of war also resulted in three 
different forms of external revenues flowing into the region. The external funding to the 
politico-military factions (primarily from Iran) contributed to monetising the overall 
political economy of the Hazarajat region, including Bamyan. For the ordinary 
population, one form was remittances, a result of increased levels of mobility and 
migrations (Monsutti 2005). Another form was the provision of basic services through 
NGOs contributing to social welfare in the absence of service provision by central 
government. 
In sum, in this part, I have highlighted how Hazara elites evolved after years of 
marginalisation and discrimination by the central state, to become strong players in the 
regional politics of their own area as well as pushing their way through means of 
violence (participating in the civil war) to political power at national level. The changes 
in the economy of the region due to years of war, mobility and migration to a large 
extent also affected the overall socio-political aspects of governance relations. Local 
governance relations throughout the years of war was organised through the different 
politico-military elites of the region who took part in the turbulent and volatile history of 
anti-Soviet war (1979-1982), the Hazarajat civil war (1982-1986) and the battle for 
power sharing (1992-1996) followed by retreat to local resistance against the Taliban 
(1996-2001). Subsequently, the Hazara elites were to evolve as comparatively 
                                            
299 There are records of drastic human rights abuses and severe destruction of Kabul city by the 
Mujahiddin in fighting during the early and mid 1990s in which Hezb-e-Wahdat was also an 
active player. United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Afghanistan (2003) 
Information on Hezb-e Wahdat. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5203a34.html 
(accessed 22 September 2014). 
300 Based on author’s conversation with Hazaras from Ghazni and Kabul. 
301 The Hazara anti-Taliban fronts in Bamyan, Balkh’s Mazar-e-Sharif and Samangan’s Robatak 
areas came under the worst attacks by the Taliban. See (Canfield 2004; Ibrahimi 2009b). 
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significant actors both at the regional (within Hazarajat) and national level. They were 
included in the post-2001 political settlement and became a strong and committed 
strategic partner to the US and its allies in the War on Terror.  
7.2.3. Governance characteristics in the post-2001 
Following the inclusion of key Hazara leaders in the Bonn Conference (in 2001), 
ostensibly acting as a unified group, the Hazarajat leadership continued to be scattered 
in the later years of post-2001 political settlement. Nevertheless, this strategic choice of 
the Hazara elites collectively allying themselves with the Kabul government and its 
international supporters, resulted in a significant level of stability and security in the 
Hazarajat regions. 
Formal and informal local governance in Bamyan was divided, reflecting the fault lines 
at the national level and the linkages between local networks and constellations of 
power in Kabul. As mentioned, the apparent homogeneity of the Hazara leadership at 
the national level and their collective influence over Hazarajat and other areas with a 
Hazara population, does not apply to its internal politics, which continue to be shaped 
by factions and regrouping (Ibrahimi 2009b). For instance, in Bamyan, different actors 
affiliated with war-time politico-military factions compete for key appointments within the 
administration including provincial and district posts of governors, police chief, heads of 
primary and district courts, as well as members of parliament (Canfield 2004; Ibrahimi 
2009b). Political affiliations are a pre-condition to gaining a governmental position or 
provincial representation.302 MPs and other individuals aiming to gain a certain 
governmental position reach out to the leadership of one of the major Hazara elite 
factions in Kabul and use this as a channel to get a position at the sub-national level. 
An example of this was a provincial council member from the Yakawlang district who 
once ran as an independent candidate and was accused of having armed men, thus 
disqualifying him for office, but when he ran a second time as a member of Hezb-e-
Wahdat, he won and no accusations were made against him.303 This example 
illustrates the level of influence of different established politico-military groups and the 
continuance of their strong patronage networks.  
                                            
302 Habiba Sarabi’s appointment as the governor of Bamyan was somewhat of an exception. It 
was ordered directly by President Karzai (bypassing his second Vice-President Karim Khalili’s 
preference). Sarabi was later able to secure international backing too. Her support by the 
Palace, international support and the fact that she was not part of any of the Hazarajat 
competing political factions enabled her to serve as a relatively popular governor for much 
longer than many others in the position. Sarabi stepped down in late 2013 to run for a vice-
presidential position in the first round of presidential elections in 2014. 
303 Interview with Provincial Council Member Mr Haidar Ali Ahmadi #99, 24.05.2012. 
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The actors and power brokers in post-2001 Bamyan are allied to a diverse number of 
groups and factions who rose to power at different times over the past three decades. 
Some pre-war elites (mirs and Sayyeds) remain important, maintaining relations with 
clients in which the latter provide loyalty in return for access to resources, positions of 
power and, indeed, protection as a whole (Lemarchand and Legg 1972:151 cited in 
Beekers and van Gool 2012:6). These patronage relations though, are not solely 
regionally based. Instead, within the same locality one could find loyalties to different 
elites who live in the same village, manteqa, district or province. Monsutti points out 
that geographical identity among the Hazaras in general was seen as a more important 
form of identity than tracing family origins and tribal identity (Monsutti 2005). An 
interesting additional form of identity has also been created as a result of war where 
individuals or families were referred to in relation to their politico-military affiliations, for 
instance as followers of a particular tanzim or politico-military group. Consequently, 
multiplicity of actors meant the existence of competing patronage networks where a 
population within the same locality can be divided by choosing to support one or 
another elite.  
The key Hazara political elites included Karim Khalili who is currently (2014) Karzai’s 
second vice-president; Haji Mohammad Muhaqiq, a running mate for Abdullah Abdullah 
in the 2014 elections; and Akbari, an MP who supported Muhaqiq in the recent political 
coalitions during elections in 2014. They all lead different factions of Hezb-e-Wahdat. 
Sadiq Mudaber who works in the president’s office and has his own political party is 
also emerging as a new power broker in the region.304   
Women’s role in Hazarajat politics, particularly in the pre-2001 context has been under-
researched. Most scholars who have studied the political processes in Hazarajat, have 
referred to women as victims, both historically and in the recent years of war 
(Harpviken 1996:52; Canfield 2004:243; Monsutti 2005; Emadi 2007:366, 368, 381). 
Emadi (2007) writes about the wives of traditional mirs known in Hazaragi as ‘agha’. He 
points out that a wife from the same social class as her husband was able to play an 
active role in social affairs and to stand next to her husband at public events (Emadi 
2007:364). In the post-1979 context however, the only reference to the public and 
political role of women is in relation to the inclusion of women as members of the Hezb-
e-Wahdat central council (Emadi 2007; 385-386; Ibrahimi 2009:5). In the post-2001 
context, most of these women remained relatively invisible, none having as much 
                                            
304 See (Ibrahimi 2009b) for further details on Hazarajat political elites in the post-2001 context. 
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public presence as much as their male counterparts.305 Canfield (2004) briefly 
references Benard who mentions Hazara women complaining about the Wahdat party’s 
discriminatory behaviour towards women (Benard 2002 cited in Canfield 2004:261). 
The inclusion of a few women in the party’s leadership could be also seen more as a 
token gesture by the party, in order to attract the attention of future potential western 
allies and funders.306  
Post-2001 context: The international footprint in Hazarajat 
The presence of the International Security Allied Forces (ISAF), a large New Zealand 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan city and a smaller unit in Yakawlang, 
was seen as a source for stability by the majority of local residents although they were 
not involved in any military or combat operations within Yakawlang.307 The funding 
channelled through the military here was far less than in Nangarhar. The total 
expenditure of USA-funded projects managed by the New Zealand PRT was US $25 
million. The NATO mission in the province spent US $29.3 million while the 
Singaporean Army spent only US $481,000 (ibid.). Most of this funding in Bamyan was 
used for service provision in close cooperation with the governor’s office.308 The ISAF 
presence was also seen as support for Habiba Sarabi, the provincial governor who, 
unaffiliated to the Hezb-e-Wahdat party, was repeatedly challenged by her rivals; the 
faction led by Vice President Karim Khalili tried many different ways to replace Sarabi 
with a member of their own patronage network. However Sarabi, who had President 
Karzai’s support, managed to use the presence of the ISAF and PRTs as leverage to 
resist these local rivalries. The ISAF and the PRTs had little direct interaction with local 
communities; instead the governor’s office took the lead in directing how the PRT 
project, particularly the Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP), 
funding should be spent.309 Bamyan was seen as a ‘success story’ for the ISAF forces 
(Prendergast 2010) but stability was in the main, less to do with the international 
                                            
305 (Ibrahimi 2009a) provided a full list of the ten Women’s Committee members. Although, Dr 
Sima Samar’s name is not included on the list, she was said to be affiliated with the party in the 
earlier years. 
306 In a video of the meeting (1988) in which the Wahdat council of leadership confirms Dr Sima 
Samar’s membership and thanks her for her social services to Hazarajat, there are English 
speaking representatives (perhaps from the UN and NGOs) and Karim Khalili’s words are 
translated into English for them. http://youtu.be/RDExEoE8LAU (accessed on 31.05.2014). 
307 During its presence in Bamyan, the New Zealand Army has spent approximately NZ$ 80.36 
million on Afghanistan in different sectors such as sustainable development (37%), education 
(15%), governance, justice and rule of law (21%), humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 
(22%) (The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2013) 
308 Interview with Governor Sarabi #11, 20.08.2011; Interview with Richard Prendergast (PRT 
NZ Chief of Mission) #112 28.05.2012. 
309 Interview with Governor Sarabi #11, 20.08.2011; Interview with Richard Prendergast (PRT 
NZ Chief of Mission) #112, 28.05.2012. 
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presence than the political coalitions formed by power-brokers and elites from the 
region.   
The Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) is represented by two 
major offices in Bamyan: one the ministry’s provincial directorate and the second a 
separate office for the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). It should be noted that the 
NSP, by its nature, was designed to bypass most of the district and provincial 
governance procedures. In other words, relations between the NSP office and the rest 
of the provincial governor’s office were minimal and the office left its representation to 
the MRRD provincial department. Funding approval for most of the MRRD programme, 
including the NSP was highly centralised and led from Kabul.310  
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) in Bamyan operates through 
the provincial and district governors’ offices. They maintain direct relations and provide 
administrative support to the governors at provincial and district offices. Given that 
IDLG’s major programmatic funding was focused on insecure provinces, which Bamyan 
was not, programmes such as Afghan Social Outreach or District Delivery Programmes 
did not operate in Bamyan province. IDLG’s key role in the province included providing 
support to the provincial and district governor’s offices and approving the appointments 
of the governors (provincial and district) from Kabul. 
7.3. Village governance interventions  
7.3.1. Katakhana and Akhundan as micro site(s) of interventions 
 
                                            
310 Interview with Eng. Sayyed Anwar, the provincial director of NSP in Bamyan #6, 17.08.2012. 
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Figure 8: a) Map of Yakawlang District ©AIMS. b) Locations of Upper Katakhana 
(west), Lower Katakhana (south) and Akhundan (east) ©Google Maps 
Katakhana and Akhundan311 are located in the northern part of the centre of Yakawlang 
district (see Figure 8) The valley is divided by a river and the two villages lie on the 
north bank, separated by a big rocky hill known locally as ‘Kala Sang’ or ‘The 
Headstone’. Katakhana is the larger village and divided into lower and upper parts. In 
total, 212 families live in the villages,312 the majority of whom are Sayyeds although 
Akhundan also has a smaller community of Hazaras. Katakhana is the location of one 
of the two main wheat mills in the area. There are two mosques and two hussainias313 
in both the upper and lower parts of Katakhana314 Akhundan, historically formed around 
a small old mosque, has one of two large madrasas in central Yakawlang and a new 
building that includes the renovated old mosque and a hussainia.315 The villages are in 
relatively close proximity (around 0.5-1.5km) to the district centre where the Yakawlang 
district headquarters and central market (Nayak Bazaar) are located. The residents 
from both villages have access to the resources at the centre such as the high school 
for girls and boys, and the health clinic in Nayak Bazaar. There are also more chances 
                                            
311 See chapter three in this thesis for further elaboration on selection of field sites. 
312 UNH’s 2003 survey for NSP listed 220 families. The number of 212 families is based on 
BRAC’s survey and mapping of the village which was shown to me by district officer. The 
breakdown is: Upper Katakhana 78, Lower Katakhana 67 and Akhundan 67 families.  Interview 
with BRAC representative in Yakawlang #110, 25.05.2012. Interview with UNH District Manager 
in Yakawlang #22, 01.10.2011. 
313 A hussainia is a congregation hall for Shiia commemoration ceremonies, marriages and 
other ceremonies especially those associated with the Remembrance of Muharram. 
314 A mosque is only used for prayers, while entrance to hussinias is less restricted (especially 
for women). The hussiania in Akhundan is a large hall with a capacity of over 2000; it is also 
used for commemorating Martyrs’ Day. 
315 The ex-chief of CDC for both villages, Haji Sayyed S., took care of building the new madrasa 
in 2005. He claimed US $40,000 was spent on the mosque, however, the estimated costs 
according to local informants was at least US $100,000. The source of funding was not openly 
spoken about but I learnt from different sources that traditional religious institutions in Najaf, Iraq 
financed it. 
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for them to attract resources from NGOs in comparison to some of the very remote 
villages in the district. During the time of field research around five NGOs were active in 
Katakhana and Akhundan.316 This also included a UN agency UN-Habitat who is the 
NSP Facilitating Partners in Yakawlang district. Both villages have small (or tiny) paved 
roads suitable in most parts only for a motorbike. Residents of both villages have 
access to electricity through a joint intra-village cluster project funded by the NSP.317  
 
Figure 9: Akhundan Mosque and Hossainia. 
The banner refers to the commemoration of the Taliban massacre’s Martyrs Day in 2014. 
According to the organisers around 2500 men and women took part in the event. Photo by 
(c)SAAJS.com  
Historically, this area and some neighbouring villages were under the rule of a local 
arbab. Ahmad Hussain Arbab, who is in his late 70s and lives in Katakhana was the 
arbab for this area before the years of war.318 According to local residents, when there 
were issues that required help and support, they would first go to Ahmad Hussain 
Arbab, and as he himself explained, if he could not solve the problem then he would 
refer them to the district headquarters.  
After the NSP intervention, the first elected CDC chief for both Katakhana and 
Akhundan, Haji Sayyed S., became one of the most influential figures in the two 
villages. A resident of Katakhana, he leads the Sadeqia Madrasa in Akhundan and was 
                                            
316 Interview with villager from Katakhana, also head of agricultural cooperative #38, 
01.10.2011; Interview with an old farmer from Akhundan #29, 29.09.2011; Interview with female 
CDC chief #24, 30.09.2011; Interview with ex-CDC chief, Katakhana #16, 23.08.2011. 
317 See section 3.1. in this chapter for details on this project. 
318 Most of villages in central Yakawlang were under Hussain Arbab’s control. His role was 
mainly to mediate local residents’ relations with the district government, collect taxes, etc.; 
Interview with local arbab for the area, Katakhana #30, 30.10.2011. 
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in charge of renovating the large Akhundan mosque and hussainia. He is also a leading 
member of the Shora-e-Ejtemayee or Social Council of Yakawlang. This council is 
mainly Sayyed-led and brought together district elites who are not affiliated with the 
different factions of the Wahdat Party. After the qaryadar positions were formalised in 
Yakawlang (in 2010), Haji S. was no longer in formal contact with the district 
headquarters, both villages having their own qaryadar. The two village mosques each 
have an imam, both appointed upon the suggestion of locals. Both imams are unpaid, 
earning their living apart from their religious duties. Another influential actor in 
Akhundan before his death was Ayatullah Sadeqi, a highly respected traditional 
religious leader who founded the Akhundan Madrasa in the 1970s. The grand mosque 
in Akhundan is led by Sayyed Nabi, an imam who holds dual degrees (religious and 
secular) from Islamabad and Kabul. To conclude, the leadership of the two villages is 
more fragmented and not monopolised by one person or group, as it was during the 
pre-war period. However, as the former arbab and other informants in the village 
confirmed, the ex-CDC chief (Haji S.) remains one of the most influential people in the 
village. 
The old arbab recounted some of the history of local governance and how it had 
evolved over time. Changes are partly generational with relatively younger leaders 
taking over from the elderly, but what the history of Hazarajat and, in particular the 
history of this village shows, is that there has been more than simply a generational 
transitional shift, and this is linked to new classes of actor emerging during the war 
years. The ex-arbab was surprised when asked to speak about his role in the past: “I 
am a dead person, no one coming here talks to me any more. I wonder why you are 
interested in what I think?”319  
His words are illustrative of a more general phenomenon in which the ‘traditional’ 
village elites have been replaced by new elites who came to power in war time and 
have maintained their position during the post 2001 period. He agreed that the CDCs 
have taken over the entire leadership of the village:  
[…] Now it is the CDC who is doing it all [leading the village]. They do not let the 
people know about anything. There are lots of disputes and arguments. In the 
past, we had good leadership, all were unified. Now everyone speaks and walks 
                                            
319 Interview with local village elder and old arbab, Katakhana #30, 30.10.2011. 
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according to their own way. Now, the CDC chief is the hamakara [jack of all 
trades].”320  
His reference to ‘everyone speaks and walks according to their own way’ reflects on 
the multiplicity of the actors involved in dealings with the district centre on behalf of the 
village, as well as in everyday practices of governance at the village level. I will 
elaborate on this below: 
The overall political economy of the two villages is characterised by a massive loss of 
human resources, particularly men, due to the war. The most significant event in these 
two villages’ recent history was the Taliban massacre of local villagers in January 2001. 
According to local informants, in January 2001 as many as 178 men of different ages 
were massacred, most of whom were from the central part of Yakawlang district, 
including a large number from Katakhana and Akhundan.321 A large number of war 
widows depend entirely on the rest of the village for survival.322 By 2003, after three 
years of drought and heavy fighting in the area, the displaced families started to return 
to their half or completely destroyed houses to resettle. NGOs were active in providing 
shelter and housing as well as health and emergency assistance. The politico-military 
groups (mainly different factions of Hezb-e-Wahdat and Harakat-e-Islami- Anwari) were 
focusing their energy on the national level bargaining for seats in the cabinet and 
finding their place in the post-2001 new political settlement. This meant that initially 
they did not pay much attention to developments at the very local level. However, with 
the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005 respectively, the need to 
restore and strengthen patronage networks at the local level was revived. Competing 
actors among Hazarajat elites returned to districts and villages campaigning for 
people’s votes. Consequently, their influence through formal and informal governance 
and religious institutions continued to shape local governance relations in the local 
settings and beyond.  
It has to be stated that the linkages between micro (village) level elites and the politico-
military and other political elites was not highly visible or openly discussed by village 
informants. Almost none of the village informants discussed their political affiliations, 
                                            
320 Interview with local village elder and old arbab #30, 30.10.2011. 
321 The Taliban massacre in the winter of 2000-2001 affected mostly the Kot-e-Sadaat or areas 
closer to the district centre (HRW 2001). 
322 A collective decision by most of the Yakawlang residents was that the younger war widows 
should be married off. So, only relatively elderly widows and those who had teenage or older 
sons remained unmarried.  
Interview with male resident of neighbouring village #21 20.08.2011; Interview with female 
school teacher #106, 26.05.12 
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due, I believe, to the violent history of political factionalism that led to the massacres 
and human losses in the area. Nonetheless, by looking at the socio-political 
background of some of the village elites, it is possible to assume that most of the 
current actors in the two villages are still loyal to Hazara political elites who are not part 
of the Hezb-e-Wahdat factions. 
7.3.2. Introducing NSP in the villages 
Like Behsud in Nangarhar, Bamyan province and Yakawlang district were one of the 
initial sites for the NSP programme.323 According to NSP records, the Katakhana and 
Akhundan324 (K&A) Community Development Council (CDC) was granted US $96,326 
in total which was dispersed in two rounds of block-grant in two phases. Projects 
included transportation, solar power panels, building a gabion (retaining) wall to protect 
the village from seasonal floods and another road.325 
The introduction of NSP in Katakhana and Akhundan was experienced by local 
communities as a novel form of encounter with the Kabul government. Rather than the 
historical practice of extracting resources through taxation or conscription, Kabul 
representatives came asking them about their needs and how they could help. 
Therefore, the introduction of a service delivery programme (as it was seen by people) 
was well received and supported by village elites in K&A who, in most cases, continued 
to have politico-military affiliations to the previous factions in Hazarajat. Their focus was 
to ensure that they and their clients could benefit from these development 
interventions. Hence, the NSP introduction was relatively smooth and easy.  
As in the QJK case in Nangarhar, the UN-H Social Mobilisers (SMs) first introduced the 
NSP to community elders from Katakhana. The Social Mobilisers received 
comprehensive training before starting their work in the field326 and follow predefined 
steps outlined in the NSP operational manual.327 The starting or entry point of NSP is 
communication with the village elders and elites, defined as ‘community mobilisation’ in 
the manual.328 Social mobilisers are a pair of male and female staff who go together to 
                                            
323 The Programme was launched in May/June of 2003 and by October the Bamyan office was 
established. Within the same year, the programme implementation was begun by UN-Habitat 
(UNH) in Yakawlang and Bamyan city. Interview with Eng. Sayyed Anwar, the provincial director 
of NSP in Bamyan #6, 17.08.2014; Interview with UN-Habitat representative, Bamyan, #111, 
29.05.2012 
324 I will use K&A as an abbreviation for Katakhana and Akhundan villages in this section. 
325 Email communication with NSP Office at MRRD, Kabul, 28.12.2013 
326 Interview with SMs in Yakawlang #17, 23.08.2011. 
327 See chapter five, section two for further analysis of the NSP operational manual. 
328 “The FP holds preliminary discussions with key stakeholder groups in each community to 
introduce the NSP” (MRRD 2009:15) NSP Operational Manual Version V. 
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a village and meet men and women separately. “Men went to mosques and we went to 
a house to meet women and inform them about the NSP”, one female social mobiliser 
said.329  
Often ‘stakeholders’ were defined as Resh-Safeedan or elderly men, arbab/malik/mir, 
imam/mullah and other key figures in the community. Although commanders or sub-
commanders in the villages are also important players with power across the country, 
in the case of K&A none of the informants, including social mobilisers, specifically 
mentioned that such actors had participated in the NSP process. The social mobilisers 
explained NSP goals and objectives and also what conditionalities the programme 
required. 
The NSP manual has a specific emphasis on the “local-governance and capacity 
building” role of NSP: “the emphasis should be on the local-governance and 
capacity building aspects of the programme and not be limited to the potential 
block grant and sub-projects alone” (MRRD 2009:15, emphasis in original). The 
‘capacity building’ included two forms of training to be provided in the course of the 
programme implementation. These were ‘informal’ training on the CDC election 
procedures and organising formation of CDCs and a series of ‘formal’ training on 
techniques and management skills around the ‘sub-projects’’ preparation and 
implementation. However, recipients generally only attended the training sessions in 
order to get the block-grants, and had little interest in broader questions of local 
governance.  
As Chapter Five illustrated, some of the facilitating partners (FPs) of NSP insisted that 
the programme’s goal went beyond small-scale projects and charity. However, the 
broader agenda of the NSP; a more democratic and participatory form of governance at 
the local level, was rarely explained to the communities by the facilitating partners who 
themselves were often more familiar with charity work. Often, the conservative outlook 
of the facilitating partners made them reluctant to frame their efforts in terms of an 
apolitical agenda that would transform local governance.330 Hence, in K&A too, the 
financial and resource provision aspect of the programme was highlighted by the social 
mobilisers, leading to misunderstandings. As the previous CDC chief explained: 
They [the SMs] told us that the NSP entitles each family to $200 and this created 
a big misunderstanding until we learnt how it really worked. I remember in one of 
                                            
329 Interview with SMs in Yakawlang #17, 23.08.2011. 
330 Interview with development practitioners from DACAAR # 124, UNH #87, SCA #128 in 
Kabul, 11.06.2012, 18.04.2012 and 18.06.2012 respectively. 
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the introductory sessions held in our mosque, when they said this again, I asked 
them: so give us a letter signed by your boss that confirms this. The officer was 
not ready to do it. Still, this news spread around the village and every family was 
expecting to receive $200! It was only later in the process that we realised this 
funding entitlement was for the public interest of village. It took us a long time to 
explain that to people. Villagers felt that either UN-Habitat or we at CDC were 
stealing that money! The SMs were very weak.331  
The ‘weakness’ of the UN-Habitat staff in conveying the aims, objectives and 
mechanisms of NSP is evident in the account narrated above. Often the SMs were not 
highly trained development practitioners. They were hired locally and their knowledge 
of development limited to a few workshops and courses at best. Female SMs were 
even less qualified than men, given the restrictions they faced due to their family 
responsibilities, gender roles and lack of access to education. According to some of the 
senior facilitating partner staff in Kabul, this was one of their main challenges.332 The 
‘weakness’ of facilitators is not unique to this context or even to Afghanistan, but in a 
context of war and its associated effects on human capital, and relatively large funding 
flows, they were particularly pronounced.333  
As a comparatively less conservative area, Hazarajat saw fewer constraints on 
women’s participation than Nangarhar. Moreover, the villages of K&A had been 
exposed to NGOs’ projects and programmes for a very long time, and women benefited 
from these projects too. However, local residents’ previous experience with earlier 
projects made them understand NSP in similar terms; as a way of gaining access to 
resources. In other words, and as illustrated below, the participation of women was 
seen as a way of securing access to additional resources that came through the NSP 
rather than substantive change in women’s participation in local governance.334 
At the mobilisation stage, the Operational Manual of the NSP emphasises women’s 
participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups.335 However, speaking with SMs on the 
ground, it was clear that they primarily relied on village elders to identify participants. In 
                                            
331 Interview with Ex CDC chief of K&A #16, 23.08.2011. 
332 Interview with development practitioners DACAAR, UNH, SCA in Kabul. 
333 Mansuri and Rao summarise experiences from all different contexts in which either due to 
lack of experience, rush to achieve results, or simply overlooking the project goals because they 
contradicted their personal interests or incentives, the facilitating field workers failed to explain 
the actual goals and objectives of the programme (Mansuri and Rao 2004:24). 
334 Interview with female CDC chief #24, 30.09.2011; Interview with CDC secretary #27, 
30.09.2011. 
335 “Inclusion of vulnerable groups is an absolute must in this process.” NSP Operational 
Manual, Version V (MRRD 2009:15). 
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other words, the power of inclusion (or exclusion) of the village population was not in 
the hand of the SMs, but that of the elders who gathered in the mosque and the women 
who gathered on their suggestion.  
It was hard to establish whether the SMs were able to include all the different groups of 
‘vulnerable’ members of the village as questions of vulnerability are complex in a 
context like Katakhana and Akhundan, where almost everyone – including the old 
arbab and the young teacher – had been victimised by different phases of war and its 
implications as well as suffering from poverty. It is obvious that each community has its 
own dynamics, people who are privileged and those who are not. The fact that the 
manual for the initial phase suggested meeting ‘stake-holders’ as the entry point to 
village means the SMs had no choice but to rely on the existing village power 
structures and actors to allow them to meet and inform villagers.  
7.3.3. Local governance through NSP in Katakhana and Akhundan  
When the social mobilisers introduced the NSP to villagers in Katakhana and 
conducted a full survey counting the families in the two parts of the village, they 
realised that the village was too small to form a CDC on its own.336 Hence, the 
facilitating partners suggested that Katakhana and Akhundan form a joint CDC.337 
 
There is no formal record of the negotiations between the two villages leading to the 
agreement to form a joint CDC, but local informants explained that both were well 
aware that the opportunity to get access to resources would be lost if they did not. 
These negotiations also included an important point about the leadership of CDC: the 
elites from both villages agreed that that if the CDC chief elected was from Katakhana, 
the Deputy Chief of CDC ought to be from Akhundan.338 The facilitating partners were 
not present in this meeting, but they later informed the villagers that the deputy chief 
position should be occupied by a woman.339 As a result, the village elites agreed that 
this woman who will fill the deputy chief postion, should be from Akhundan.  
The CDC formation process itself began with a mass gathering of villagers in the local 
grand mosque.340 The social mobilisers who facilitated the process divided villagers into 
                                            
336 The NSP criterion for CDC formation is a minimum of 200 families. 
337 Interview with male SMs of UNH in Yakawlang #17,: 23.08.2011; Interview with ex-chief CDC 
K&A #16, 23.08.2011; Interview with female deputy chief CDC in K&A #105, 27.05.2012. 
338 Interview with female deputy chief of CDC in K&A #105, 27.05.2012; Interview with CDC 
member from Akhundan #25, 30.09.2011; Interview with CDC secretary #27, 30.09.2011. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Interview with ex-chief CDC K&A #16, 23.08.2011; Interview with CDC secretary #27 
30.09.2011. 
  178 
five clusters and each cluster elected one representative. A female CDC member, who 
became the deputy chief explained the process:  
When the UN-Habitat people first came and gathered us, all the women looked at 
me and said, ‘You are the best choice to represent us.’ They said to UN-Habitat 
staff: ‘We want her to be our representative.’ I don’t know why they wanted me. 
But maybe because they knew I was outspoken in demanding support for widows 
and poor families and also because I am a widow myself. So the UN staff divided 
us into five clusters and I got votes from all clusters.341  
The results, as predicted by the village elites, was the election of Haji S. from Katakhan 
as chief and N. from Akhundan as deputy chief. The CDC chief and his deputy are the 
two main actors in the village contacted by NGOs and other institutions. This gave N. 
an important gatekeeping role where, for instance, she became the prime point of 
contact for NGOs and other institutions who were interested in bringing in women-
focused projects and resources to the area:  
When other NGOs come and contact me, I distribute their material to all the 
women. For example, COAR NGO came here and they had 2100 chickens to be 
distributed for 300 women, so for each woman we gave 7 chickens. I helped with 
the whole process.342 
In the past, generally only men were approached by outsiders regarding the distribution 
of aid. In other words, despite the fact that N.’s voice within the village CDC leadership 
was not heard or given much importance, the fact that she was received by other 
external interveners positively affected her status and position in the community and 
beyond.343 In the case of the CDC chief Haji S., the CDC position bolstered his already 
influential position. The role he played as CDC chief and gatekeeper for different 
resources coming to the two villages, including overseeing the reconstruction and 
expansion of the large grand mosque and hussainia in Akhundan, no doubt added 
further to his authority.  
                                            
341 Interview with female deputy chief of CDC in K&A #105, 27.05.2012. 
342 Interview with female deputy chief of CDC #24, 30.09.2011 
343 This status helped her to go beyond her village or K&A CDC to representing men and 
women in the district DDA for ten villages. 
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Figure 10: The previous CDC chief posing next to his guest hall. ©photo by author 
He is an influential figure in Katakhana and Akhundan; in the background is his private 
guesthouse ©Photo by author. 
The major activity of the CDCs was to identify and then prioritise the village needs. 
Both male and female CDC members listed their priorities which were then voted on. 
The projects approved for the K&A CDC were mainly infrastructural and beneficial to 
both villages.344 They included paving the roads between the villages and the district 
centre, solar power for both villages, and a gabion wall to protect villages from 
seasonal floods from Akhundan to Katakhana and the district centre.345 According to 
male CDC members these projects were for the public benefit, but female CDC 
members complained that none of their demands and priorities were addressed in any 
of these projects.346  
According to Haji S., the CDC did not play much of a role in resolving conflicts in the 
village. Instead, the social shura, or Shura-e-Ejtemayee, took care of non-
developmental or project related matters. As Haji S. stated: “The mother of all shuras in 
Yakawlang is the social shura.”347 
The villagers of both K&A dealt with intra-village issues themselves rather than bring 
them to the CDC, which was more of an ad hoc and pragmatic institution set up to meet 
                                            
344 Interview with the new CDC Chief #23, 01.10.2011; Interview with CDC secretary #27: 
30.09.2011. 
345 Email communication with NSP Office at MRRD, Kabul, 28.12.2013; Interview with the new 
CDC Chief #23, 01.10.2011. 
346 This will be further elaborated on in the following sub-section on NSP’s women conditionality. 
347 Interview with ex-Chief CDC K&A #16, 23.08.2011. 
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the NSP requirements. As in Nangarhar’s case, the second election in 2012 for the 
CDC did not go as smoothly as the first. Once villagers had seen how the CDC could 
bring resources into their communities and increase their own authority, anyone with 
ambition nominated him or herself for the next round of elections.  
In the end, there were four candidates for the leadership. Residents of Akhundan 
wanted a man from their village to replace Haji S. who had resigned after returning 
from a pilgrimage. Haji S.’s resignation was not widely known, but in his absence, 
another member of CDC (from Katakhana) became acting chief until the second round 
election was convened. Haji S. explained the reason for his resignation: “After I 
returned from Zyarat and Haj (pilgrimage) I did not want to get involved in things that 
made me vulnerable to committing a sin by not doing justice in distributing things that 
arrive in the village. I wanted to leave the CDC leadership”.348  
None of the informants in the two villages spoke openly about any issue of corruption 
or unfair distribution of NSP resources, although UN-Habitat reported that once some 
villagers approached with a complaint about the CDC chief, but were told to resolve it 
among themselves.349 Haji S.’s decision to leave the CDC was not entirely clear and it 
would seem that he had ambitions beyond the local politics of the CDC in K&A. He was 
actively involved in the social council,350 which had been registered separately as the 
‘Katakhana Social Council’ at the Ministry of Justice351 and supervised the madrasa. 
And, by placing a new person of his choice as the new CDC chief, he would ensure 
that the leadership of CDC remained under his influence despite his formal absence.  
In accordance with NSP regulations a second round of elections for CDC membership 
and the CDC chief positions were held in the community. But the narrative shared by 
Haji S. informs us that once again pre-election negotiations within the villages had 
already decided the outcome:  
One Friday, as our prayers were over, I pulled Sayyed D.’s hand and made him 
touch the holy flag swearing that he would take the CDC chief position and would 
perform honestly and not commit any sin or injustices in his job. He agreed to 
become chief of the CDC.352 
                                            
348 Ibid. 
349 Interview with Yakwalnag UNH official #15, 22.08.2011. 
350 See section 7.4.1. of this chapter for more on the social council in Yakawlang. 
351 The ‘Social Council of Katakhana’ is registered with the Ministry of Justice under the ‘social 
organisations’ category under the name of Sayyed Abdul Ahmad 
http://moj.gov.af/Content/files/SocialOrgs.pdf (accessed 25.08.2013). 
352 Interview with ex-CDC chief of K&A #16, 23.08.2011. 
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Another informant from Akhundan pointed out that there were four candidates for the 
same post, but the winner, Sayyed D., won simply because “he [Sayyed D.] had the 
support of Haji S.353 
This, and earlier examples of how villagers ‘elected’ or agreed on CDC leadership, 
demonstrates how a new actor who did not necessarily have an elite or leadership 
background used the CDC privileges to legitimise his role and emerge as one of the 
key patrons for the villages. The example of his support for the second CDC chief and 
possibly the appointment of the qaryadar for Katakhana (said to be subject to his 
approval) demonstrates he has emerged as an elite, maintaining his power and 
influence over the village governance relations as a whole. More importantly, it also 
informs us that there is a performative and theatrical element in this overall process of 
institution building in the two villages. The theatrical element is related to the discursive 
landscape that has been used by elites such as Haji S. in order to strengthen his 
position in leading everyday practices of local governance.  
In sum, although the two villages succeeded in forming a CDC and securing the block-
grants, they maintained their existing power structures under the old settlement of the 
individual villages. The CDC structure allowed local or village level patrons or elites to 
gain more power and influence, however, as a modern form of governance institution at 
the village level, it did not entirely replace the existing power structures. 
7.3.4. Women’s role in local governance and donor conditionality  
 
Figure 11: Women’s Committee session 
Participants are women from Akhundan and Katakhana, session led by deputy CDC chief © 
Photo by author.  
The socio-cultural fabric of Afghan society is structured by patriarchy which involves the 
systematic subordination of women (Kakar 1979:172-173; Barakat and Wardell 
                                            
353 Interview with CDC member from Akhundan #25, 30.09.2011. 
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2002:920; Ahmed-Ghosh 2003; Kandiyoti 2007a; Kabeer et al. 2011). As discussed in 
chapter two, patrimonialism and patriarchy are inter-linked and mutually supporting of 
each another. Men are considered superior to women who are perceived as inferior 
subjects that should obey the rules set for them (Charrad 2011:51-53). In Afghanistan 
too, this mind-set dominates men’s and women’s views on women’s roles and 
responsibilities, although it should be noted that the years of war have also resulted in 
exposing women and men from rural Afghanistan to urban life, education and different 
mind-sets. Here, I explore further how women in the K&A context entered the public 
domain as ‘elected’ representatives of their communities.  
As pointed out in chapter five, among the different actors involved in the NSP 
formulation process, the facilitating partners were the ones most concerned with the 
gender conditionality of the NSP, arguing that it would not work in practice due to the 
conservative practices of Afghan society. Azarbaijani-Mughaddam (2010) notes that 
statements such as ‘our women are uneducated’, ‘we cannot change our culture’, ‘our 
people are not ready’ were amongst the most common phrases heard in conversation 
with NSP and FP staff when questions around women’s participation in local decision-
making were raised (Azarbaijani-Mughaddam 2010:47). This concern was also shared 
by some of the senior FP leaders such as the current provincial head of UN-Habitat 
who used to be directly involved in the NSP facilitation at the provincial level. However, 
he came to change his mind;  
This is perhaps the first time in history that there is an opportunity for women at 
village level to play a role that is formally recognised and required by the 
government. We thought that this would not work, but in fact, it did work. (…) 
We thought, women will not take part actively, they will not express their views, 
but we were completely wrong. I personally find women in most of our Hazara 
communities in the central highlands very active in this regard. In fact, in some 
cases women have played an even more active role than men!354  
It is true that the NSP’s conditionality on women’s participation (as CDC members and 
reserving a position for women as deputy chief of CDC) was not openly confronted by 
local residents in Katakhana and Akhundan. However, the role of women was seen by 
most of the informants as symbolic and not significant.355 This resonates with other 
                                            
354 Interview with Provincial Manager of UN-H in Bamyan #111, 29.05.2012. 
355 Interview with mullah of Akhundan #104 26.05.2012. Interview with PC Member from 
Yakawlang #99, 24.05.2012. Interview with ex-CDC chief in K&A #16, 23.08.2011. 
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findings; Beath et al. (2013) for example, in their nationwide survey of the programme 
suggest that women’s role in local decision-making is still limited (Beath et al. 2013). 
The social mobilisers, both male and female, introduced NSP’s conditionality at the 
early community mobilisation stage in 2003/4. The key factor that determined local 
residents’ responses to the conditionality in K&A was their degree of need for 
development assistance after years of poverty, drought, war and human losses that 
resulted in a lack of fundamental facilities. Additionally, the presence or absence of 
strong or radical religious actors opposing women’s public role could also play an 
important part in whether communities said yes or 
no to this demand from the centre.356 More 
generally, women in Shiia communities often have 
more possibilities to gather on different occasions 
for prayers and other religious ceremonies at 
hussainias (large halls where they go to listen to 
religious discussions and preaching). In K&A such 
possibilities of socialising in public spaces gave 
women the opportunity to participate in meetings 
with men (although separated by a curtain or wall), 
unlike in Nangarhar where socio-religious 
interactions between men and women were almost 
totally absent.  
In an earlier section (7.3.3), I discussed how the 
NSP conditionality to reserve the deputy chief 
position for women led the residents of K&A 
villages to select N. for the position. Here, I find it 
necessary to look at her background in order to 
understand what made her the best choice for this 
position.  
N. is her late 50s and a native of Akhundan. She is 
the most well-known female in the two villages. A 
mother of five, her eldest son is a teacher, married with children. Her youngest 
daughter, in her early 20s, is divorced and she and her young son live with her mother. 
                                            
356 The person in-charge of the NSP in Bamyan city, shared an example from another district in 
Bamyan where a number of villages for a long period refused the NSP simply because of the 
women’s inclusion conditionality. It took them years to revise their position. Interview with the 
provincial head of NSP #6, 17.08.2011. 
Figure 12: The Deputy chief of 
CDC for Katakhana and 
Akhundan 
 
She is illiterate, but takes her 
notebook and pen to meetings 
and with the help of others notes 
important points. ©Photo by 
author 
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N. is illiterate but she has a mobile phone, a pen and notebook with important 
telephone numbers and her own way of finding people’s phone numbers and using her 
notebook. N. and her family also directly experienced the severe effects of war during 
the past three decades. Family members were killed during Soviet bombardments, an 
event that pushed her family to migrate, first to Pakistan and then Iran. In the mid-
1990s, her family returned to Afghanistan, but the worst was still to come. Akhundan 
was one of the communities worst affected by the Taliban massacre in the winter of 
2000. N., her husband ill in bed (he later died), became an active member of the 
community, conducting funerals and burial ceremonies for the victims of massacre. 
Although N.’s position came about as a result of a broader strategy agreed by the 
village elders, she has been able to influence local governance relations through her 
role as the deputy chief of the CDC. She became a member of the DDA at district level 
and was also able to control (to some extent) the distribution of different donor 
resources, especially those focused on women.357 At the same time, as this example 
demonstrates, women’s inclusion was negotiated and agreed within the framework of a 
patriarchal mind-set among the village elites. Hussani’s age and her position as a 
widow were important factors in making her an acceptable choice for the leadership 
position (Kakar 1979:172-173; Kabeer et al. 2011; Mielke 2013:19): older women have 
less reproductive responsibilities and obligations such as taking care of household work 
and child bearing which allows them to take part in public activities more so than 
younger women with children.  
The other female CDC member, L., joined the K&A CDC in the second elections. In her 
late 30s, she was a university graduate and religious studies teacher who had recently 
returned from Iran. In her case, her position as a local teacher helped her become a 
member of CDC. As a native of Katakhana, however, she was precluded from winning 
the majority vote because of the broader pre-election consensus already made by the 
village elites to select a woman from Akhundan.  
Both women in the CDC leadership were unable to secure women-specific projects 
through the NSP block-grant. In L.’s view, the ‘weakness’ of women in the CDC or in 
the village was not the only reason. She also suggested that the way in which SMs 
arranged the process resulted in the failure of the women to secure any of their 
prioritised projects:  
                                            
357 Interview with female CDC member who worked as a clerk #17, 23.08.2011; Interview with 
female CDC chief #24, 30.09.2011. 
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(…) We [women] all agreed to go for electricity as need number one. Women 
also highlighted other needs. For example, literacy, chicken farms, tailoring, 
carpet weaving, bakery, etc. But as the female SMs were very weak, they failed 
to help us make strong proposals. We gathered all of the suggestions and 
presented them to Haji S. who was CDC chief. Then they were presented to 
UN-Habitat, who were in charge of decision-making for accepting or rejecting a 
proposal and because our proposals were not written well, they were all 
rejected.358  
N. agreed with her colleague, adding that the women’s share was spent on the 
riverside wall.359 According to the new CDC chief, however, the reason the women’s 
requests were denied was because “women do not have the ability to implement 
projects by themselves”.360 He also confirmed it was the CDC leadership’s decision to 
use the part of the block-grant allocated for women-focused projects for another 
project. It is possible, although there is no evidence either way, to note that as the 
gabion wall was more beneficial to Akhundan residents, N., representing the interests 
of her village as a whole, might not have objected to this if the men in her constituency 
wanted the riverside wall to be built. Nonetheless, the question remains why did none 
of the women’s projects make it to the final stage of approval? As different accounts 
demonstrated, there were two factors involved: First, the CDC leadership preferred 
Akhundan’s suggestion for a gabion wall over the suggested women’s projects. 
Secondly, the female SM’s limited skills in terms of turning priorities into ‘good projects’ 
may also have been a reason. Consequently, what can be concluded is that although 
men in K&A did not object to women’s inclusion in the CDC, they were reluctant to 
agree to their substantive demands; instead choosing priorities identified by men. 
There were two factors involved in this: other village priorities by men were given 
higher importance than women’s priorities and secondly, the social mobilisers were not 
well-equipped to articulate women’s priorities into justifiable proposals technically, 
hence, this has become another reason why women did not succeed in benefiting 
directly from the NSP block-grants allocated for K&A. 
In sum, this section discussed how the NSP intervention’s conditionality on women’s 
inclusion was negotiated and materialised in Katakhana and Akhundan. I demonstrated 
that the NSP intervention played a role in formalising women’s position in local 
leadership in this particular case. While it is evident that their role to some extent 
                                            
358 Interview with secretary of the female CDC K&A #17 23.08.2011. 
359 Interview with female CDC chief #24, 30.09.2011. 
360 Interview with the new CDC Chief #23, 01.10.2011. 
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remained symbolic, it nonetheless opened up space for local women leaders to play a 
gatekeeper role in the distribution of some resources. Finally, the way the male elites 
were able to prioritise their own preference (the gabion wall) over the women’s projects, 
was a reminder of the patriarchal relations that still inform the way local actors view 
women.  
7.3.5. Intended goals and unintended outcomes 
In this part, I provide an analysis of various interpretations of the NSP intervention and 
how the local structures created through the NSP (i.e., the CDCs) are seen by different 
actors at the village level and beyond.  
The local recipients or subjects’ interpretation of the NSP intervention was directly 
linked to the way the programme was introduced to them by the social mobilisers who 
represented the facilitating partners.361 They did not articulate the political and social 
engineering goals of the project, instead focusing on its developmental and technical 
dimensions. Thus, at different levels, with different actors, the programme used 
different justificatory stories and narratives. For instance, in discussions with donors, 
the MRRD leadership emphasised the social engineering and institution-building 
aspects, while at local sites they highlighted its economic and social benefits.  
The evaluation of the NSP’s first phase had recommended that its political goals should 
be ‘overtly’ transmitted to people in order to assure its sustainability.362 However, this 
was not shown to be the case in the follow up for the second and third phases, at least 
in the context of K&A CDC. Moreover, according to members of the K&A CDC, the 
NSP II experience was not very well received by the local population due to fewer 
meetings with FPs and, perhaps, because it did not deliver any significant projects in 
this phase.363 In other words, it is arguable that neither the political goal of the NSP nor 
its governing role was transmitted openly to the local population – who thus saw the 
intervention solely as a form of service delivery to their communities (Ferguson 1994; 
Monsutti 2012:586). Also, people’s understanding of a service delivery project is that it 
lasts only for the duration of a project cycle. As discussed earlier in this section, the 
                                            
361 In section 7.4.1. I provided an example in which the SMs’ explanation of the programme was 
confusing for the villagers in the first place. 
362 “The political objectives of the NSP (e.g. the establishment of CDCs within the formal system 
of local governance) need to be expressed more overtly within the Programme objectives” (Mid-
Term Evaluation of NSP in Afghanistan 2006:22). 
363 Several members of the CDC decided to withdraw from membership, either because they 
found it ineffective or they were upset with the new CDC chief who did things according to his 
own wish without consulting with the rest of the CDC members (interview with female CDC 
member worked as clerk #17, 23.08.2011; Interview with ex-CDC male member who was also 
secretary, Katakhana #27, 30.09.11). 
  187 
local elites’ attitude towards the CDC was to keep it ‘half alive’ by occasionally meeting 
when the FPs visited the village in order to ensure that channels for future resources 
remained open. But the CDC never fulfilled its active role in terms of operating as an 
elected local governance structure in Katakhana and Akhundan.  
Different village level actors; CDC and non-CDC members, youth and elderly, male and 
female, educated and illiterate, as well as religious actors, agreed that the NSP was a 
means to help them improve their economic life conditions. The aim of the NSP, in their 
view, was to help people stand on their own two feet by providing them with support. It 
was to bring people together after decades of war and hostility, helping them through 
public infrastructure resources such as roads, riverside walls, electricity, schools, 
clinics, etc.364  
The intended and unintended effects of the NSP at the local level could be seen in 
different ways. For instance, the NSP’s aim “to build, strengthen, and maintain 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) as effective institutions for local governance 
and social-economic development” (MRRD 2012:11) was only partially achieved by the 
K&A CDC. Local people perceived the NSP through its projects; the absence of such 
projects was seen as the end of the CDC and therefore, the NSP intervention. 
However, the programme nonetheless did create a few leaders and powerbrokers, 
including for the first time, a female as gatekeeper for, at least, partial distribution of 
resources that came through NGOs for women-focused projects. Although very limited 
and challenged, the push for women’s presence in the CDC and in its leadership was 
an important shift from no women’s representation at the public decision-making level 
to the emergence of women within the village and beyond it as community leaders and 
public actors. Although the NSP goal to see the CDCs as local governance ‘institutions’ 
was not achieved, the local population’s understanding of the programme as a 
mechanism to bring people together could be seen as a contribution to part of the 
NSP’s political goals.  
                                            
364 Based on interviews with male and female residents of Yakawlang district, Katakhana and 
Akhundan villages #23; #24; #25; #27; #47; #100; #111 conducted during the field research 
period at the province, district and village levels 2011-2012. 
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7.4. District governance under patrimonial system of rule 
7.4.1. Yakawlang district: A site for contested interventions 
 
Figure 13: A view of Nayak Market, Central Yakawlang 
©Photo by Author 
Yakawlang is considered an important district in Bamyan Province.365 The district is 
categorised as a first grade [daraja awal] district by IDLG366 and is a fertile area for crop 
cultivation and animal husbandry and includes nomadic livestock summer feeding 
grounds. Hence, the notion of village in the context of Yakawlang (like many parts of 
Hazarajat region) is understood in two ways: qishlaq or qarya, the villages where 
families are permanently based and ailaq where some members of the family (mostly 
elderly) temporarily graze their livestock. The Yakawlang population was estimated at 
83,000 by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), with an estimated 23,333 families (CSO 
2012). The population includes Hazaras, Sadaats/Sayyeds and small numbers of 
Tajiks. There are 363 villages represented by 143 CDCs.367 The district is divided into 
four parts.368 Kot-e-Sadat, the central district, includes the national park (Band-e-Amir), 
                                            
365 This relates to its geo-political location (bordering the northern provinces) and also its tourist 
potential. Band-e-Amir, Qala-e-Barbar and Chehl Borj are part of the historical heritage for 
Afghanistan. The Band-e-Amir Lake area was recently named as Afghanistan’s first national 
park. 
366 According to the Local Administration Law, the provinces and districts are divided into grades 
1, 2 and 3 based on population, size, number of districts, distance from other provinces, 
municipality and capacity to generate revenues (Nijat 2014: 16). Interview with Governor Sarabi 
#11, 20.08.2011. 
367 According to the district governor, this was the number of villages registered in the CSO in 
2009. Interview with district governor of Yakawlang Muhammad Naser Fayaz #13, 22.08.2012; 
Interview with UN-Habitat Social Mobilisers #15, 22.08.2011. 
368 Kot-e-Sadaat (centre), Kot-e-Qamyaba (north-west); Kot-e-Takana (west); and Siah Dara 
(south). The first three areas are mainly where sayyeds live, whereas in Siah Dara, Hazaras are 
in the majority although some sayyed families are also present (Solidarites 2002:3). 
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the Yakawlang-Bamyan city road, the main market district Nayak, and the district 
headquarters.369  
Yakawlang operated as an important hub for the Hazarajat leaders, especially during 
the years of war and conflict. Although there were few linkages with the central 
government for most of the 1980s and 1990s, the district institutions operated as usual 
under the leadership of Shura-e-Etifaq in the earlier war years and later under different 
factions who led the area. After the establishment of Hezb-e-Wahdat in 1989, the 
district came under the direct leadership of the party. The people in the district 
experienced several military offensives, including the Taliban offensive in the winter of 
2000/1 in which hundreds of people were massacred.  
The political leadership of Yakawlang during the time of this research was shared 
among different Hazara and Sayyed influential elites who had been involved in Hazara 
politics at local and national levels over the past decade.370 There were three main 
competing factions active in the district: the Alyar brothers, sons of Alyar, an important 
figure previously part of Sazman-e-Nasr who operated as ‘minister of defence’ in the 
Hezb-e-Wahdat for a long time;371 the Elkhanis, who used to be part of the pre-war 
traditional leadership of mirs for the whole of Yakawlang, the most important of which 
are Ghulam Ali Wahdat who was Deputy Minister of Interior during 2010-2013 and, 
since October 2013, governor of Bamyan. Safora Elkhani, his sister, is an MP372 and 
the Sayyeds of Yakawlang, mainly led by influential traditional religious networks and 
intellectual figures such as the Hussaini brothers.373 The district governor was 
                                            
369 The district headquarters has representatives of all of different ministries. Interview with 
district governor of Yakawlang Muhammad Naser Fayaz #13, 22.08.2012. 
370 Interview with a Yakawlang resident #14, 20.08.2011. Interview with ex-CDC chief #16, 
23.08.2011. Interview with Kabul based aid-worker active in Hazarajat #135, 10.11.2012. 
371 The Alyar family were close allies of Karim Khalili and remained very active in Yakawlang 
politics for a long time. They are Hazara and in the past were affiliated with Nasr, one of the 
Islamist groups supported by Iran. Nasr later merged with Sepah and other groups to form 
Hezb-e-Wahdat. 
372 Ghulam Ali Wahdat’s father was a khan from the well-known Elkhani family in Yakawlang 
who was a Khan for the whole of Yakawlang. He himself was affiliated with the Khalqi 
government and later joined Hezb-e-Wahdat. In recent years he has worked in different senior 
positions for Ministry of Interior. 
373 The Hussaini brothers: Sayyed Sarwar Hussaini who served as Deputy Minister for the 
Ministry of Education during 2008-2012. He is also the chairperson of the CCA office 
(Cooperation Centre for Afghanistan). His brother, Haji Mohammad Jawad Safwat who lives in 
Yakawlang’s Dara-e-Ali is involved with the Shura-e-Ejtemayee or social councils that are active 
across the district.  
It has to be noted that among the sayyeds there are more than family who are influential in the 
district. But in this part, I see their relation to broader patronage networks beyond Bamyan as an 
indicator. 
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Mohammad Nasir Fayaz, a Hazara from the Waras district and previously374 a member 
of Nasr, an Iranian supported militant group loyal to Karim Khalili. Fayaz had been 
district governor for the past four years and had been recently dismissed for a short 
while due to local residents’ accusations of land grabbing and distributing key posts in 
the new township of Yakawlang amongst his network alliances.375 During 2012 rumours 
circulated that the Bamyan governor was going to dismiss him; according to local 
Yakawlang residents, he went to Kabul and ‘re-confirmed’ his position as district 
governor with support from Karim Khalili. The national media outlets reported that the 
deputy governor of Bamyan was about to introduce a new district governor, when 
Fayaz returned from Kabul with a letter that extended his governorship for another 
three years (ibid.). 
 
Figure 14: Opening ceremony of a new township in Yakawlang (October 12, 2012) 
Hassan Abdullahi (second on left) Minister of Urban Development (an ex-Hezb-e-Wahdat 
member), Second Vice-President Karim Khalili (centre) and Habiba Sarabi, Governor of 
Bamyan mark the launch of the new township. © Picture courtesy of @pajhwok 
According to local residents, there were different councils (shuras) in the district, 
including Shora-e-Adalat led by Karim Khalili loyals and Shora-e-Refah led by Haji 
Mohammad Muhaqiq supporters. The Ulema Council or Shora-e-Ulema, nominally a 
religious council, is based in Yakawlang, but it is perceived to be under the influence of 
                                            
374 Nasr was set up among Hazaras in Iran, and adhered to strict Khomeinism according to 
Harpviken (1996); it operated actively during the 1980s civil war in Hazarajat. Some Nasr 
members in particular were known for being radical in terms of targeting the traditional leaders 
in Hazarajat (Harpviken 1996:59, 73; Ibrahimi 2009). 
375 According to local residents there were rumours of his being dismissed, but some news 
channels reported as fact the introduction of a new district governor after the demonstration. 
Pajhowknews 08.02.2012 http://www.pajhwok.com/en/node/169528 (accessed on 04.02.2013) 
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these two groups, hence local clergies and ordinary people do not see the Ulema 
Council as a non-political or impartial actor.376  
It should be noted that the concept of shura (as in all of Afghanistan) has been used by 
people in Yakawlang and Bamyan in different ways.377 In the recent past, the term 
shura primarily denoted structures created by military factions, but in the post-2001 
context, the NSP’s CDCs, also known as Shura-e-Enkishafi Qarya (Village 
Development Councils), brought about a new understanding of shura. A senior UN-
Habitat staff member in Bamyan who used to be a war commander explained the 
difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ shuras:378 
The old shuras were only shura by name and did not follow Islamic principles; 
they were led by war commanders, decisions were unilateral, the leadership 
was selective and the chief commander’s order was law. Whereas the new 
shura is closer to the Islamic principle of how it has to be. Members are 
elected, they consult and decide by majority votes, there is no outsider; a 
person from the village gets elected and they consult with the people on major 
issues, there is more consultation and less authoritarian form of rule in our new 
shuras [He refers to the CDCs].379 
This informant had been one of the leading actors in the implementation of the NSP 
from the early days, so in part, his analysis and comparison reflects how his own 
understanding of, and approach to, the shura as an institution has changed. An 
important aspect of his statement highlights the power relations underlying the ‘new’ 
and ‘old’ shura. In the old shuras, the commander was king and no one could challenge 
his position; however, in the ‘new’ shuras, the power is somewhat divided among 
different members of the council, although as evidence shows, the village elites and 
most powerful men still control the ‘new’ village shuras. Nonetheless, the post-NSP 
intervention context shows us that the village leadership is no longer monopolised by 
one man and that access to leadership is more open than in the past. However it has to 
be noted that the NSP intervention is only one of many broader factors that led to such 
openness. 
                                            
376 Interview with a Yakawlang resident #14, 20.08.2011. Interview with ex-CDC chief #16, 
23.08.2011. Interview with Kabul based aid-worker active in Hazarajat #135, 10.11.2012. 
377 See chapter four, 4.4. for further elaboration on different forms of shuras created during the 
years of war at the national level. 
378 Shura is originally an Arabic term and it means consultation. See chapter four (4.3.1.) for 
further elaborations on the concept of shura in the village context. 
379 Interview with UN-Habitat official, Bamyan, #111, 29.05.2012 
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Yakawlang as a site of multiple interventions 
Central Yakawlang houses two high schools and a large madrasa located close to the 
bazaar. There are two additional madrasas (religious schools) in or close to the district 
centre. The older madrasa, Madrasa-e-Emam-e-Sadiq, was established in 1976 and is 
in the southern part of Akhundan.380 The newer one was built by Sazman-e-Nasr led by 
Karim Khalili in 1989 and is currently led by Mohammadi, the district governor prior to 
Taliban rule.381 The madrasa in Akhundan is apparently under influence of the sayyed 
community382 and what is considered among the locals as the ‘traditional religious 
networks’ while the one built through Sazman-e-Nasr (previously led by Karim Khalili) is 
seen as a political form of representation of the interests of Shiia Islamists.383 Ironically, 
the madrasas are located less than half a kilometre from each other. This could be 
seen as a sign that the competing patronage networks of the war time, still maintain 
their influence and control over the sources of power.  
The secular public schools in central Yakawlang are supported by the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), NGOs and some government funding (New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2013). While religious networks also operate in a 
similar manner by having their own sources of support, mostly linked to the religious 
hierarchy that leads to either Qum (Iran) or Najaf and Karbala (Iraq), depending on 
which imam the local residents follow. The presence of these different institutions in 
central Yakawlang is illustrative of the different and sometimes competing forms of 
external influence and funding. Institution building and education are a strong focus of 
western funding through the PRT, NGOs and government channels.384 Religious 
                                            
380 This madrasa was built by Ayatullah Sadiqi who was a senior clergyman (Hujat-ul-Islam) 
from Akhundan. He was educated in Najaf (Iraq) and was an avid follower of Imam Khumini 
prior to the Iranian revolution. He died in 2002. Politically, Ayatullah Sadiqi was not part of the 
Wahdat or other Hazara or sayyed parties and only supported the Shura-e-Etefaq that ruled 
Hazarajat briefly in 1980s. A new Grand Mosque in Akhundan was built and named after him in 
2005. See more on this point in the following sub-section. 
381 According to local informants, the land this madrasa was built on is owned by a family from 
Qarya-e-Shatughan and was taken by force from its owners. The owners recently took the case 
to court and were successful, but due to interference from Khalili (the vice president) and his 
followers they are still unable to reclaim their land. (Interview with Yakawlang resident #21, 
20.08.2011; Interview with local informant #95, 23.05.2012.) 
382 I was unable to track the most accurate financial source for building this madrasa and Grand 
Mosque in 2005. However, according to an online source (Aqayee 2012) the rebuilding of the 
Grand Mosque and madrasa was financed through Ayatullah Sadiqi’s supporters network 
(Aqayee 2012). 
383 Harpviken (1996-vi-vii) introduces the traditional clergy and the formally trained clergy who 
are represented as sayyeds and shaikhs in the context of Yakawlang. The two madrasas in 
Yakawlang respectively represents institutions for the two. 
384 In addition to 58 schools (including primary, secondary and high schools), around 85% of the 
district’s population have access to health services; there are 6 agricultural cooperatives, 2 
farmers’ unions and 4 veterinary clinics. 12% of the district has access to electricity. Most of 
these services are provided by the government through international funding (NABDP 2010). 
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institutions, on the other hand, continue to supply local religious-political networks with 
support to build madrasas and mosques. Local patronage networks ally themselves 
with these different intervening forces in order to secure benefits from both.  
The whole of Yakawlang District is covered by the NSP385 with UN-Habitat (UNH) as 
the main facilitating partner. The first two phases of the NSP programme had been 
completed for all the CDCs in the district by 2010. In the first phase 72 CDCs were 
formed in the district, all with the required male and female members.386 Although 
CDCs are mainly concerned with their own village development, they sometimes take 
part in cluster-led projects identified through the District Development Assemblies 
(DDAs) that benefit more than one village in an area. In the case of Yakawlang, for 
example, five CDCs in the centre (including the K&A CDC) joined together to work on 
the hydropower source project.387 The project cost US $300,000 according to local 
informants and provides electricity for most of the five villages in the district central 
area. According to FPs and local residents, this is one of the most successful projects 
in the district.388 
In Yakawlang, the IDLG provided support in terms of infrastructure (renovation of the 
district headquarters), training the district civil servants in public administration and 
working with the district office on enhancing its administration systems of reporting, 
management etc. (NABDP 2013). At the IDLG’s request, a sub-directorate of village 
affairs was established in 2010.389  
The procedure that the provincial governor had followed to dismiss the district governor 
was in line with the IDLG’s stance on the Civil Service Reform process which aims to 
appoint district governors through a bureaucratic procedure known as Capacity 
Building for Reform (Nijat 2014). However, as Nijat points out, since the overall rentier 
nature of the current state is based on patrimonial relations, this ‘reform’ procedure of 
the IDLG has also been turned into a mechanism of privilege that is controlled by 
powerful patrons at the centre (ibid.:48). Khalili’s intervention as vice-president to block 
the dismissal of the district governor could be seen as evidence of how the patrimonial 
                                            
385 According to the NSP Office at MRRD (Kabul) Yakawlang is fully covered and 144 CDCs are 
contracted to receive a second round of block-grants. Email communication with NSP Office at 
MRRD, Kabul, 28.12.2013 
386 Although the Social Mobilisers claimed that the CDCs were mixed, when speaking to people 
in the villages, it appeared that in fact separate women’s committees had been set up for the 
first two phases. Interview with local CDC member in K&A #17, 23.08.2011. 
387 Interview with ex- CDC leader of Katakhana & Akhundan #16, 23.08.2011. 
388 Interview with local resident of Katakhana #28, 30.09.2011; interview with teacher in 
Bedmushki #37, 02.10.2011. Interview with elder in Akhundan #29, 29.09.2011. 
389 Interview with district governor of Yakawlang Muhammad Naser Fayaz #13, 22.08.2012. 
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system of rule is still more powerful than the promotion of ‘good governance’ and merit-
based appointments. One complaint among local sayyeds about the district governor 
was that he still played ‘party politics’ by using his old networks.390 
In sum, Yakawlang District presents a site of contested interventions that has both an 
internal dynamic with locally competing factions and groups with divergent agendas 
trying to reach positions of power and authority, as well as outside interventions by 
competing forces that are internationally funded and channelled through either the 
government’s formal institutions (such as the IDLG and MRRD) or patronage based 
political elite networks that have been influential in the region historically – although 
there is an overlap between the two that has to be considered. This overlap may 
explain why the neopatrimonial system of rule dominates governance relations in a 
district where public offices and positions of power are occupied by people through 
informal patronage networks.  
7.4.2. Competing forms of central government interventions 
In this section I present two specific governance interventions at district level in 
Yakawlang, one by the MRRD and one by the IDLG to a) show how interventions 
reflect the competition between the two institutions at national level over the ownership 
of governance relations and b) to unpack how, in Yakawlang, locals have maintained 
control over the resources that come through these interventions. The first example is 
the MRRD’s National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) that focused on 
establishing district development assemblies or DDAs.391 The DDAs operate in a 
similar way to the CDCs but at district level. The second example is the IDLG’s attempt 
to revive the sub-directorate of village affairs and start the process of registering ‘village 
administrators’ or qaryadars.  
As Yakawlang was not categorised as an ‘insecure district’, it was excluded from 
USAID’s ASOP coverage,392 therefore the IDLG had a limited role in service provision 
and disbursement of financial support. The district had a new building which contained 
offices for the district court and other administrative institutions. The sub-department of 
Village Affairs is mainly concerned with registering qaryadars who, according to a letter 
and ToR set by the IDLG, act as ‘village administrators.’393 Qaryadars, previously 
known as mehtars, were traditionally appointed by government representatives 
                                            
390 Interview with a local resident from Yakawlang #14, 20.08.2011; Interview with a local 
resident in Nayak Bazaar #37, 02.10.2011. 
391 For introduction of NABDP, refer to chapter five 5.2.1. 
392 For further details about ASOPs refer to chapter five, 5.3.3. and chapter six, 6.4.2. 
393 Interview with the sub-director of village affairs, Yakawlang #18, 24.08.2011 
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(Monsutti 2005:91). In the present context, however, every village was asked by this 
department to introduce a representative to the district.394 According to one informant it 
was very unclear what the government’s goal for having an ‘arbab’ for each village was:  
I heard they want to bring back an arbab for each village. They call it qaryadar. 
This is too much and it will go out of control as the district government is not 
strong enough to manage over 300 arbabs. The question is, how will he [the 
district governor] manage to oversee 300 people if they face problems?395  
In this informant’s view, it would be far better having fewer representatives for each of 
the four parts of the district: “We have 4 regions in Yakawlang and ideally having 10 
representatives from each should be enough rather than having over 300 qaryadars, 
which is surely going to create huge chaos”.396 The officer in charge of the procedures 
at the district headquarters elaborated on how they proceeded with the selection of 
qaryadars:  
There is no written rule on how a qaryadar should be appointed by the IDLG but 
we are asked to find out who is most influential in the village. The way to monitor 
this is by asking the candidate to bring a waseeqa [a legal document] that states 
the person has volunteered to become the qaryadar and that paper is signed by 
different village leaders.397  
According to the sub-director of village affairs in the district, the position of qaryadar is 
open to all with no specific requirements.398 The qaryadar’s responsibility is similar to 
the arbab’s role in the past and according to a policy paper by the IDLG is to “formalise 
and improve” these old systems (IDLG 2012:20-21). Yet, for the local communities, 
having both a qaryadar and an elected village chief like the head of the CDC, became 
confusing:  
As a qaryadar, I have solved a number of issues within the village with the help of 
the sub-directorate of village affairs. We avoided making it official. (…) In terms of 
assistance, the NGOs can all get our help in providing them with lists of people 
and introducing the needy families in the village. (…) I am so far not officially 
working. But if there is any problem in the village, I try to solve it. I keep the 
Moder e Qaryajat [sub-director of village affairs at district headquarters] informed 
                                            
394 Interview with the sub-director of village affairs, #18, 24.08.2011 
395 Interview with the ex-CDC Chief from Katakhana, #16, 23.08.2011 
396 Interview with the ex-CDC Chief from Katakhana, #16, 23.08.2011 
397 Interview with the sub-director of village affairs, #18, 24.08.2011 
398 Interview with the sub-director of village affairs, #18, 24.08.2011 
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about issues and we find solution for problems. I provide a monthly report to the 
sub-directorate. (…) So far I do not have any salary, but this has been 
promised.399 
The role of the CDC chief is also to solve problems and to help facilitate NGOs’ work in 
the village. However, the roles differ in relation to the mechanism for reporting to district 
headquarters. There is no written rule that the chief of the CDC has such an obligation, 
but qaryadars are obliged to ‘keep the Moder-e-Qaryajat informed’ about events in the 
village. More importantly, CDC leadership and membership was entirely voluntary, but 
the government for the qaryadar position promised a salary. Hence, as seen in the 
descriptions of the qaryadar, this post created a new gate-keeper in the village who 
was more closely under the surveillance of the district headquarters. Since the 
establishment of CDCs it has been common practice that all NGOs and other 
institutions working in the villages relied on the CDC leadership to get access to the 
village; this was particularly so in Bamyan. However, when the qaryadar talked about 
providing “lists of needy families to NGOs”, or “solving the problems” of people, this 
meant a direct confrontation with the CDC leadership who were already acting as 
gatekeepers. Another aspect of this new ‘system’ as referred to by the IDLG, is that it 
could be seen as an expression of direct IDLG interest in having control over local 
village level affairs, for example through the monthly report mechanisms or by seeking 
the help of the sub-director of village affairs with daily conflict related matters.400 Given 
that there are no hard and fast qualifications for appointment, some qaryadars claim 
they were elected while others merely satisfied the local district officials by presenting 
the ‘volunteer’ legal document.401  
The MRRD, in comparison to the IDLG has a stronger operational presence in the 
district. The MRRD’s provincial directorate, with the help of UNDP, has worked to form 
the District Development Assembly (DDA). They comprise representatives from all 
CDCs in Yakawlang District. The DDA in Yakawlang was established in November 
2006 and is still functioning (NABDP 2010).  
The DDA formation process is conducted by staff from the MRRD’s National Area 
Based Development Programme (NABDP) who facilitate the elections and project 
                                            
399 Interview with qaryadar of Katakhana #32, 02.10.2011. 
400 Monthly reports are required by the sub-directorate of village affairs on events happening in 
the village that includes list of population, births, deaths, security incidents and so on. Interview 
with the sub-director of village affairs, #18, 24.08.2011 
401 The qaryadar of Katakhana claimed that he was ‘elected’ by his fellow villagers from among 
three other candidates, but this was not confirmed by other villagers. It is possible that a smaller 
group of village elders selected him. Interview observation #32, 02.10.2011. 
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management. The Yakawlang DDA has 30 members and so far has had two rounds of 
elections, one in 2006 when the DDA started its work and a second in June 2010. The 
process of DDA establishment was explained by a member as follows:  
All CDC chiefs (143 persons) across Yakawlang are called to come together at 
the district main hall. They were brought together and the DDA’s goals and 
objectives were explained to them. The CDC chiefs (and female deputies) were 
divided into 15 clusters and each cluster included 10 villages. Once they had 
elected one representative from each cluster, that representative became a 
member of the DDA. He or she was then responsible for bringing the concerns of 
all those CDC chiefs he represents to the rest of the district assembly. After this, 
the cluster heads gather and choose the DDA chief, deputy, secretary and 
treasurer from among the members. The chief of DDA in Yakawlang is Haji 
Mohammad Payam Alyarzada, the son of late Haji Alyar, a senior commander of 
Hezb-e-Wahdat.402 
The leadership of the DDA is an important post at district level in terms of attracting and 
distributing resources for the whole district. The importance of this role goes back to the 
question of distribution of resources and how district needs and priorities are 
decided.403 The district assemblies produced the district development plan, a key 
document referred to and used by most of the interested donors and organisations in 
the district.404 Therefore, being able to influence and lead the DDAs can be seen as an 
indicator for how these new forms of institutions or mechanisms for distribution of 
resources, are controlled by de facto district elites who are linked with the pre-2001 
politico-military groups in different ways.  
To conclude, in Yakawlang District local elites competed within the district to gain 
access to resources and to build relationships with the new post-2001 political regime. 
The lines between the political, the social and the developmental were blurred and an 
actor with a strong background in one of these fields could be easily become an actor 
using resources from another. Informal politico-military actors of the past still 
                                            
402 Interview with DDA member in Yakawlang #26, 02.10.2011. 
403 The DDA clusters are tasked to first bring in list of needs from all different parts of the district 
and then prioritise their clusters’ immediate needs and how they want these needs to be 
addressed. The categories include: security; rule of law; infrastructure and natural resources; 
education; health and nutrition; agriculture and rural development; social security; natural 
disaster preparedness; and private sector and economic development. These needs are then 
prioritised and the document produced is the DDP or District Development Plan. Translated 
from the NABDP questionnaire (Second hand form, District Profile) accessed through personal 
communication, 08.06.2010. 
404 Conversation with an aid worker in Kabul, 23.08.2011; Interview with Governance Advisor of 
IJC #82, 05.04.2012. 
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maintained their own power and influence over the population by using their formal 
governance positions in the district. The different interventions from the centre by the 
MRRD and the IDLG (i.e. the formation of CDCs and DDAs by the MRRD and the 
IDLG’s attempts to formalise the old qaryadar system) created confusion over the roles 
and responsibilities of the institutions and legitimacy of village representation on the 
one hand, and allowed the government elites to strengthen their patronage networks 
whilst ostensibly supporting democratic processes, on the other. 
7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced Bamyan Province and two villages (Katakhana and Akhundan) 
in Yakawlang District as micro site(s) of intervention where the MRRD and IDLG’s local 
governance programmes’ interventions and implementation processes were examined.  
It has provided a historical context of the governance relations that characterise 
Bamyan, its socio-political context, and how it has evolved and changed as a result of 
external interventions, war, migration, and the flow of NGO funding as well as the 
emergence of a new class of political elites who, for most of the post-1980s, have led 
the region and created their own patrimonial system of rule based on party and 
factional patronage and financial and military support from external resources.  
The chapter highlighted a much weaker international footprint in Bamyan compared to 
Nangarhar. However, central state interventions sponsored by international donors 
provided political, financial and infrastructural support for Bamyan, leverage for its 
provincial leadership to strengthen their power bases across the province and 
resources to provincial and district governors’ offices.  
The chapter pointed out that the NSP programme that was framed with a purpose of 
building local governance institutions and creating a mechanism for distribution of 
resources, was understood by locals as being mainly for the latter purpose. It was 
discussed that MRRD’s village intervention through the NSP resulted in the political 
merger of the two villages of Katakhana and Akhundan in order to form a Community 
Development Council (CDC) and an agreement to divide the chief and deputy chief 
positions of the CDC between them in order to meet NSP standards. The chapter 
critically examined the overall process of the NSP implementation which resulted in the 
consolidation of a newly emerged village elite’s role who gained his legitimacy through 
the CDC elections as its first chief and then started to take the lead in broader aspects 
of village governance by maintaining his role as a gatekeeper for resources, influencing 
positions of power. The chapter argued that, although limited and still symbolic, the 
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NSP’s conditionality for women’s inclusion gave women the opportunity to assume a 
gatekeeping role, at least in regard to women-focused resource distribution within the 
area they were representing.  
The chapter highlighted that at district level, the creation of District Development 
Assemblies by the MRRD, gave the institution a significant amount of leverage in 
district and village governance relations, as most development projects offering 
economic resources were channelled through the DDAs. For the IDLG, however, the 
district governor’s office has become a place to expand influence over local 
governance through the formalisation of qaryadar positions at the district level. The 
formal registration of a qaryadar for all the 300 villages of Yakawlang could be seen as 
an attempt by the IDLG to claim that they too have village level governance appointees, 
who moreover are legitimised through an official certificate approved through a court 
procedure. 
In sum, this chapter highlighted how the same types of local governance interventions 
by the central state can have different outcomes on the ground. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
In this final chapter, I conclude by first summarising the overall thesis. I then revisit and 
address the three core research questions and finally I draw out and elaborate upon 
the theoretical contribution and implications of the research.  
8.1. Summary of the thesis  
This thesis focuses on the everyday practices and underlying politics of two local 
governance interventions in post-2001 Afghanistan. In chapter two, it engaged with 
two inter-related bodies of literature which provide contrasting analytical lenses for 
looking at local governance in Afghanistan. First, it drew upon research and writing on 
liberal peace-building, institution building and ‘good governance’. This was followed by 
a brief examination of the literatures on hybridity, and the ethnography of aid, which 
provide a more critical and nuanced analysis of international interventions than the 
positivist literature on liberal peace-building. This body of work – both its policy oriented 
and critical variants – provides an analytical framework and entry point for 
understanding the declared goals and underlying logic of international intervention in 
the area of governance. Second, it drew upon historical political economy perspectives 
in order to examine governance, less as an ideal type model, than an empirical reality, 
shaped by competing material interests and power relations in specific contexts at 
particular historical moments. The chapter addressed the discursive nature of liberal 
peace-building and the complexity of studying liberal interventionism and proposed a 
combined set of theoretical lenses for the study of evolving local governance relations.   
This thesis examines governance interventions in the context of broader post-Cold War 
shifts towards liberal interventionism. It highlights the complexity of liberal 
interventionism and how liberal peace-building is driven (in most cases) by an 
ahistorical and functionalist view of the state. It also examines how discourses on 
gender, state-building and governance converge around notions of the ‘protection’ and 
‘liberation’ of women by the intervening forces. Discourses related to gender equality 
and the ‘liberation’ of women are, on the one hand, adopted to promote liberalisation 
and democratisation and gender equality, whilst on the other hand, they are used to 
justify various forms of interventions (including efforts purportedly aimed at societal 
transformation) that are not necessarily based on liberal and democratic norms. 
Drawing on the example of the World Bank’s Community Driven Development model, I 
explored the link between local level resource distribution and social engineering. The 
chapter highlighted that programme interventions – to borrow from Li, are not ‘invented 
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ab initio’ (Li 2007:6). Neither are such interventions simply the ‘product of a singular 
intention’ (ibid.). Rather, they are the result of a dynamic process of bargaining, 
contestations and negotiations between the conflicting interests of international and 
national actors. The chapter introduced a historical political economy approach as an 
alternative framework for the study of local governance relations that result from 
interventions by the state and its international sponsors. It was posited that a political 
economy approach provides a lens for unpacking the workings of power and its effects 
on local governance programmes. I looked at patrimonial and (neo)patrimonial 
approaches to studying governance relations in developing countries affected by 
conflict and interventions. This work highlights the complex entanglements between 
formal and informal institutions, the sedimentation of old and new structures in societies 
undergoing transition and the linkages between patriarchy and (neo)patrimonial 
systems. I also attempted to link (neo)patrimonial systems with the concept of hybridity 
as an alternative lens for studying liberal peace-building interventions; given the 
complexity and multi-dimensional nature of governance relations that result from 
central government and international interventions, it is necessary to develop a 
combined conceptual framework that can help us respond to the key research 
questions in this thesis, both in terms of understanding the logic, rationale and 
assumptions of liberal interventionism and also the power relations that evolve as a 
result of it.  
In chapter three, I introduced and explained the research methodology. I first 
positioned myself in the research process, as an ‘insider/outsider’ and explored the 
implications of this for my approach to the research. The chapter then outlined and 
justified the extended case method that was adopted, and elaborated in further detail 
on the specific research methods. The chapter also highlighted the security and ethical 
challenges of the research and how these were addressed during the process of 
conducting this research.  
Chapter four provided historical background on local governance relations in 
Afghanistan. It showed how a complex range of factors at the international, national 
and local levels shaped local governance arrangements. The chapter explored how 
notions of ‘the village’, ‘the local’ and ‘local governance’ are understood within the 
political and economic context of the country. I argued that villages have been central 
to efforts to create order, authority and legitimacy in Afghanistan historically. Rather 
than seeing them as autonomous ‘village republics’, the chapter highlighted how 
Afghan villages are inseparable from wider networks of power and authority. Changing 
local governance relations spanning three time periods were examined; pre-war (pre-
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1978), the years of war (1978-2001) and post-international intervention (2001-2014). 
By examining different local governance interventions in different phases, I highlighted 
how traditional forms of patron-client relations, in which the economic basis was mostly 
agricultural, have evolved during the years of war (and after) as a result of external 
interventions. The chapter demonstrated how the political economy of war had an 
important impact on local governance with the emergence of a new class of actors, war 
commanders, who in many places supplanted the traditional khans and maliks. The 
status of women in Afghan society and efforts to ‘protect’ them or change their status 
has been a recurring and highly politicized theme in Afghan history. The chapter 
discussed how radical approaches to change women’s status were met with resistance, 
whether it was the ‘emancipation of women’ under the PDPA regime or the Taliban’s 
restrictive rules to imprison women in their own homes. It also highlighted the post-
2001 Afghanistan, where debates on women’s inclusion were frequently linked to 
creating economic opportunities rather than fundamentally challenging patriarchal 
systems.  
Chapter five, the first of three empirical chapters presented an historical analysis of 
two different central government donor funded village and district governance 
programmes by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the 
Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). By analysing the emergence of 
the MRRD’s National Solidarity Programme (NSP) as one of the largest national 
programme interventions, I demonstrated the competing interests of different actors 
and institutions that shaped the programme’s design. The chapter also explored the 
extent to which gender issues were incorporated into debates and policies on local 
governance; it became an unconditional part of the MRRD’s programmes, while for the 
IDLG women’s inclusion was not prioritised in the structures of the district councils they 
sponsored, nor did the IDLG provide quotas for women’s inclusion at district and village 
councils in its Subnational Governance Policy. Changes in donors’ policies, especially 
that of the US, played an important role in this process. The involvement of national 
elites who took part in rationalising, formulating and designing the local governance 
programmes, as well as international donors as funders and technical advisors, led to 
two contrasting local governance programmes. The MRRD’s source of influence and 
power at the local level was primarily through its provision of resources in the form of 
block-grants. IDGL, in contrast, was largely a broker of influence in the form of formal 
positions – including through the qaryadar system and creating councils through district 
governors’ offices. The chapter concluded by contrasting MRRD’s efforts towards 
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building modern institutions based on ‘good governance’ principles with IDLG’s efforts 
which largely aimed to strengthen and centralise patronage networks.  
Chapters six and seven examined how local governance programme interventions 
were operationalised and implemented in two varying contexts in the provinces of 
Nangarhar and Bamyan, and how local populations at village and district levels 
received them. The chapters outlined the different historical, political and economic 
characteristics associated with each context, followed by an analysis of the socio-
political and economic characteristics of the villages and districts that were studied. The 
chapters observed how war-time politico-military elites continued to play an important 
role in district level governance by inserting themselves in key patronage networks and 
occupying key positions, though at the village level customary leadership was still 
important in some places. In Nangarhar the village elites, who consisted of elders and 
politically influential actors, played a strong gatekeeping role in controlling different 
aspects of the programme intervention. In the two villages in Bamyan, in contrast, 
power and control was not monopolised by any one family or actor and the programme 
intervention opened the possibility for the emergence of new patrons who legitimised 
their position by using the programmes’ external resources. Both chapters exposed the 
sedimentation of local governance institutions with new structures and organisations 
being grafted on top of older ones, leading to complex hybrids of the formal and 
informal settings.  
8.2. Addressing the research questions: studying local governance  
This section is structured around the first three core research questions of the thesis. 
The fourth question will be responded to in the final section.  
These three research questions are:  
1. What were the underlying rationales and interests behind the MRRD and 
IDLG’s interventions and how was this reflected in their design and planning at 
national level?  
2. How were the MRRD’s NSP and the IDLG interventions, including their gender 
conditionality, received by elites and the wider population of women and men at 
the local level?  
3. What effects did these interventions have on local governance and power 
relations, and how, if at all, did they differ from those intended by the 
programme planners and implementers? 
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8.2.1. What were the underlying rationales and interests behind the MRRD and 
IDLG interventions, and how were these reflected in their design and planning at 
national level?  
Local governance relations have been at the centre of contests for control and authority 
in Afghanistan historically and also in the post-2001 political context. The battle for 
governance and its ownership constitutes the centre of gravity of conflicts between the 
Afghan government, international institutions and the forces fighting the government, 
each justifying its actions to legitimise its influence or rule. Consequently, Afghan 
leaders whether at national or local level, are not passive recipients of the outcomes of 
such contests. Rather, they are active participants seeking to turn interventions to their 
advantage by accepting and accommodating advantageous elements and resisting or 
subverting those that endanger their power and authority.  
This thesis examined the underlying rationales and interests of international and 
domestic actors and institutions which shaped the formulation and implementation of 
local governance interventions. It should be noted at the outset that the mainstream 
discourse on ‘good governance’ and liberal peace-building has little to say about why 
and how local governance programmes are developed and implemented on the 
ground. A blueprint of a one-size-fits-all model of Weberian institution-building is 
typically replicated in different contexts, usually adapted to some extent, but with the 
expectation that the model will operate through its prescribed set of rules and produce 
local governance institutions. Critical accounts on liberal peace-building interventionism 
usually take a macro-approach, in part inspired by competing theories of international 
relations (Mallaby 2002; Duffield 2003, 2007; Etzioni 2004; Paris 2006; Aguirre and 
Borgh 2010; Roberts 2009; Richmond 2009; Chandler 2010). Of these, some 
emphasise, and arguably overstate the hegemonic role and homogeneity of 
international actors while understating the agency and role of national actors involved 
in the process (Duffield 2003; 2007; Chandler 2010). Other analysts focus on institution 
building as a priority or insist on rapid reforms or reliance on existing informal or 
‘illiberal’ structures to solve the problems the interventions encounter.405  
This thesis has demonstrated a far more complex reality of liberal interventionism and 
its implications on the ground. First, it was observed that international intervening 
institutions cannot be all homogenised as one. The official discourses and stated goals 
of international intervening institutions were in general different from their actual 
behaviour on the ground. This was, for instance, reflected in international donor support 
                                            
405 See chapter two section 2.3.6 for further elaboration on these different positions. 
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to the IDLG from 2008 to 2012, when both donor and national institution rhetoric was 
about decentralisation, whereas in reality most resources were channelled to 
strengthen patronage networks loyal to the President and the central government.  
Second, the thesis demonstrated that there is a great variability over time and between 
different international actors and their positions. It was demonstrated how shifts in over-
arching policies affected the way governance programmes were funded, prioritised and 
operated on the ground. The shift from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency (COIN) 
that resulted in channelling development funding through the military is a case in point. 
The research also showed the differences between various international actors 
including the World Bank (using the example of Community Driven Development 
intervention in Afghanistan or the National Solidarity Programme), the UNDP (through 
the example of supporting the MRRD’s National Area Based Development Programme 
for building district councils) and the USAID and Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) (for supporting IDLG’s various programmes at the district level). While focusing 
their interventions mostly on the same site(s), these institutions had very different 
working approaches. 
Third, the multiplicity of donors and variance in their approaches translated into ad hoc 
and often contradictory programming. These contradictions provided a space for 
domestic actors to more forcefully insert themselves into the process and broker 
programmes according to their own interests. The agency of national actors in the 
context of liberal peace-building is frequently downplayed by critical scholars who, from 
the perspective of international relations, view donors as hegemonic and unified in their 
attempts to impose external views, ideas and norms on the recipient nation. By 
contrast, a close examination of the history of the formulation and design of the 
National Solidarity Programme, for instance, showed how national actors, including the 
government or NGOs, negotiated with international donors on various aspects of the 
programme on the basis of their own expertise, experiences and interests, and in this 
way significantly shaped the way the programme was operationalised.  
Fourth, personalities and individuals do make a difference in the process of programme 
formulation and interventions. This was evident in the way gender conditionalities were 
applied as part of the MRRD’s programmes on local governance institution building. 
Despite scepticism by national and international actors, for instance, Ashraf Ghani as 
the finance minister and Haneef Atmar as MRRD minister (at the time) used their 
positions of power and authority in relation to both international donors and national 
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actors to accept this as a fundamental part of all the MRRD’s programmes and to this 
date, MRRD follows this principle in all its programmes. 
Fifth, the thesis reflected on the distinction between ‘the national’ and ‘the international’. 
Often considered as binary and mutually exclusive, the line between them, in many 
contexts, has been quite blurred. Take, for example, the case of Dr Ashraf Ghani and 
his political career as an Afghan-international hybrid. An Afghan native, he has studied 
the country’s social and political history and worked with various international 
institutions, including the World Bank. He also emerged as a member of the national 
elite in the post-2001 political context, using and relying on patronage networks during 
both the 2009 and 2014 elections while running for president. In his relations with 
international intervening forces, he is capable of negotiating using their language and 
interests, while at the national level; he has been able to harness his national identities 
(including dressing in traditional attire) and experiences. All these capacities give him 
and similar actors a significant level of authority which they use to influence the way 
programme interventions are directed. More importantly it also informs us of the 
hybridity and transnational alignments that are reflected in examples like this, where 
dichotomies of ‘national’ versus ‘international’, local versus global and so forth are 
blurred.  
Sixth, as a source of power that signifies material resources and positional goods to be 
fought over, these programmes alter incentives, structures and institutions. Whether in 
the form of material resources or positions of authority, these goods enable actors to 
mobilise support, build up their power bases and strengthen their patronage networks. 
In terms of material resources, however, the block-grant entitlement in the NSP gave 
members of the village and district councils stronger leverage in comparison with those 
sponsored by the IDLG whose members’ access to resources was reliant on the 
international military’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other donors’ 
interest in their area.  
Seventh, and related to the point above, in addition to their material role, the 
programmes are important symbolically. Aid programmes are performative and 
theatrical in some respects and they enable international and national actors to become 
players and to assume different roles. This was evident in programme formulation, 
design and implementation. For instance, the MRRD’s interventions could also be seen 
as a nationwide effort to familiarise its recipients with liberal norms such as 
democratisation processes, elections and women’s participation, or in other words, 
trying to change socio-political norms by introducing these values. At the same time, 
  207 
looking at the performative and theatrical aspects, one should not underestimate the 
changes these interventions bring to local power dynamics. 
Eighth, the programmes are introduced at different levels with varying justificatory 
stories and narratives. For instance, the senior leadership of institutions such as the 
MRRD, when communicating with donors, would emphasis the social engineering and 
state-building aspects of the programme; when facing local populations, the same 
actors would highlight the socio-economic benefits. In other words, within the same 
programme, there are different ways of engaging with and talking about the 
programme’s politics at different levels.  
Ninth, and finally, because of the complex amalgam of actors and interests involved in 
the process, the very notion of ‘ownership’ of local governance relations by different 
government institutions is far more complex and contested than publicly acknowledged 
by aid donors who invoke the term to mobilise support and legitimise a particular 
intervention.  
8.2.2. How were the MRRD’s NSP and the IDLG interventions, including their 
gender conditionality, received by elites and the wider population of women and 
men at the local level? 
This question addresses the interface between the recipients of the programme 
interventions, on the one hand, and the international and national actors and 
institutions as intervening forces on the other. After examining the dynamics 
surrounding the programmes when they ‘enter’ the local terrain, I summarise the overall 
findings.  
The main difference between the MRRD and IDLG interventions should be noted at the 
outset. The MRRD’s intervention through the NSP focused on the creation of a new 
institution, the Community Development Council (CDC), and provision of services 
through block-grants that each CDC received. Similarly at the district level, the MRRD’s 
District Development Assemblies (DDA) had access to financial resources to fund CDC 
cluster projects. In contrast, the IDLG played an indirect role by using its district office 
authority to formalise the role of the qaryadar (village administrator). The IDLG’s 
intervention did not include service provision in a direct form, but by formalising the 
qaryadar position, it entitled the individual to become a ‘legitimate’ gatekeeper of 
resources to the village.406 Thus, while the MRRD’s intervention was directly linked to 
                                            
406 This is in case we assume that legitimacy is defined as ‘formal’ and formal is defined as 
being officially, through a court certificate, registered as a village administrator or qaryadar. 
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power relations and resource distribution, the IDLG’s intervention (being very much still 
in its initial stages when this research was undertaken) was mainly centred on power 
and influence without direct links to resource distribution. If the CDC and its leadership 
are not legitimised constitutionally, however, in the longer run a qaryadar could use his 
authority and legitimacy to become the main gatekeeper of all resources and become 
superior to the CDC leadership. 
Throughout the thesis, I have made a distinction between the village population that 
refers to men and women of all identities and socio-economic status, and what I term 
the village elites.407  
In the two cases presented in the thesis, elite formation had followed different 
trajectories. In Nangarhar, the village elite represented a collection of actors who had 
emerged as ‘elites’ at different phases in recent history. It now included the khans, the 
commander, the ex-PDPA official, the mawlawi or religious scholar, and some newly 
emerged young politicians from the post-2001 political settlement. In Bamyan, 
however, the village elites were not as visibly representative of previous regimes as in 
Nangarhar. One important reason is the history of Yakawlang district as a battleground, 
a central hub for factional rivalries during the early 1990s and then experiencing huge 
loss of life in the Taliban massacre. Almost none of the informants in Bamyan’s case 
spoke openly about their factional affiliations with any of the politico-military groups. 
The elites in the two villages in Bamyan consisted of community elders, non-factional 
religious scholars who ran the local grand mosque and madrasa and the first CDC 
chief, who emerged as a patron by gaining his authority and legitimacy through the 
CDC. Similar to Schetter’s argument, each of the ‘local’ or village elites were also 
players at higher levels of governance – district, provincial and national – as well as 
interacting with international actors (Schetter 2013:5).  
The dynamics of programme implementation in the villages studied revealed how 
similar interventions can have different outcomes in different contexts: in the Nangarhar 
village, the village elites maintained full control over the overall implementation of the 
programme, from its introduction to elections for CDC members and representation in 
the clusters that formed the CDCs. The first CDC elections took place without major 
conflict. This was due to the fact that all members (including women) running for CDC 
membership were carefully selected by the village malik who was backed by the 
existing village leadership. And so the malik was ‘elected’ by these members as the 
CDC chief. Similarly, when the district office called on villages to register their formal 
                                            
407 For further elaboration on definition of elites see chapter two, section 2.4.4. 
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village representative or qaryadar, the same malik appeared in this role in the village 
studied. The Nangarhar case thus exemplified a dynamic whereby the existing power 
structures and village elite maintain full control over interventions by both the MRRD 
and the IDLG and use the programmes to suit their needs and interests.  
In the villages studied in Bamyan, I observed a much more complex form of power 
relations: the administrative merging of two neighbouring villages meant that the two 
villages not only shared representation in one CDC, but also had to share the 
resources accessed through it. The sharing was probably made easier because the 
power structures in these villages in the immediate post-2001 context – when the NSP 
was introduced – were not as entrenched as in the Nangarhar case. Representatives 
from both villages agreed to form one CDC and share positions by allocating the CDC 
chief to the larger village and the deputy-chief position (reserved for women) to the 
smaller. All these arrangements were made prior to the formal establishment of the 
CDC, hence the first CDC elections were mostly a staged performance. The CDC in 
this case became an important power hub for attracting resources and for the exercise 
of public authority by both its chief and deputy chief. The CDC chief, who had not 
previously been a part of the village elite, emerged as an important patron for both 
villages by taking up more intra-village responsibilities, although he was still not as 
‘important’ as the malik in the Nangarhar case.  
With regard to village representation through the district office, each village registered 
its qaryadar separately. The qaryadar registration took place after the second CDC 
elections when the preferred candidate of the smaller village did not win, and a new 
CDC chief was ‘elected’. This led to a different dynamic between the two villages in 
terms of selection of qaryadars: the larger village selected a young man in his mid-
twenties who was probably supported by the ex-CDC chief, the smaller village selected 
a man in his sixties who also was a CDC member. The selection suggests that the 
smaller village was trying to maintain its position and identity as a separate entity by 
having a qaryadar who was older and therefore possessed more authority. It also 
meant that the creation of the CDC did not result in a full and sustained merger of the 
two villages, but was seen as a temporary agreement for securing access to resources.  
In both the Nangarhar and Bamyan cases, the second CDC elections were not as 
smooth as the first. This was due to programme specifics as well as external factors. 
By the time of the second election, the programme’s higher visibility as a source of 
resource distribution drew the attention of other village elites who wanted to get 
involved. Moreover, national level elections and the related prominence of patronage 
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based politics had changed people’s views and understandings about elections. The 
result was a sharper contestation and conflictual CDC elections in both cases. In the 
village in Nangarhar, conflict emerged when another village elite with a dual 
background (the son of the old malik and a war time commander) tried to become a 
member of the CDC and run for the CDC chief position. This was contested by the 
existing CDC leaders who mobilized other elites in the village to declare that the whole 
village wanted the previously elected CDC leadership to continue its work and ignore 
the results of second elections. In Bamyan, conflict emerged when the smaller village 
failed to get its candidate elected as the CDC chief. Thus, in both cases greater 
awareness that the MRRD intervention meant resource distribution caused conflict; and 
in both cases disagreements were addressed through mediation, negotiation and 
interactions between villagers and village elites outside the formal CDC structures.  
In both Nangarhar and Bamyan the general village population in the field sites readily 
accepted gender conditionality that made women’s inclusion a prerequisite for receiving 
the MRRD’s programmes. Situating this finding in the broader historical context of the 
cases, I argue that this acceptance is linked to changes in the socio-political and 
economic relations that occurred as a result of decades of war, migration and mobility 
that altered the attitudes of rural populations. However, the lack of objection should not 
be mistaken for allowing women full and effective participation in everyday village 
governance affairs. Patriarchy remains a dominant mind-set. Men, as well as women, 
operate within this system rather than challenging it. The programme conditionality to 
include women was accepted by local elites mainly because it ensured resource 
provision that was badly needed. However, it was also evident that the women 
themselves, by showing agency, managed to use their leverage of inclusion – even 
though symbolic – to make their own way towards a greater public role.  
In both cases studied, the village elites very carefully used strategies to meet the 
programme intervention’s demand for inclusion of women, while continuing to set limits 
on what women could and could not do. Seniority (in terms of age) was the principal 
criterion for the selection of female representation to the CDCs, but other factors were 
also relevant. In Nangarhar, an older woman who belonged to the largest kinship group 
in the village, had prior experience of a public role and was married to a man who was 
not native to the village, was selected by the village elites to become deputy CDC chief. 
In the Bamyan case, a widow, who also had previously had a public role in her 
community and did not have any particular link with the village elites, was selected not 
only to represent women from her village, but her entire village as deputy CDC chief.  
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Conservative norms constrained the female CDC member in Nangarhar from taking 
part in broader village governance matters beyond CDC meetings. This was especially 
evident when matters were discussed after Friday prayers in the mosque, which 
women do not attend. In Bamyan no similar spatial limitation was observed for the 
female CDC members. However, the Bamyan case illustrates another tendency. When 
the female deputy chief of CDC had to choose between spending part of a block-grant 
on a project that would benefit women from both villages, or use it solely for the benefit 
of her own village, she chose the latter. Women’s inclusion in the CDC did not 
necessarily mean that the female participant privileged ‘women’s issues’ in the village 
governance sphere. The existing power structures, dominated by a patriarchal 
mentality, succeeded in compromising the NSP intervention’s conditionality to include 
women, limiting women’s meaningful participation in village governance. What the two 
cases revealed was that the intervention’s conditionality was, in fact, only concerned 
with the façade of women’s representation, not how effective and meaningful such 
representation should be. 
Meanwhile, the two cases also demonstrated how recognition of female inclusion 
through the NSP conditionality was used by women in the villages who were able to 
extend their active role beyond the villages into the district councils and governance 
relations. In both Nangarhar and Bamyan, one woman from each CDC was elected to 
the District Development Assembly (DDA). Here, both – in their own capacity – were 
able to attract a large amount of resources for their constituencies. The woman in 
Nangarhar also used her position as a DDA member to approach other sources of 
funding. This included joining a male member of her village to obtain financial 
assistance from the international militaries through PRT’s funding for the village school. 
The woman in Bamyan represented women from five neighbouring villages in the 
Yakawlang district DDA. She, too, was able to mediate distribution of resources 
through her membership. Additionally, in both cases, but particularly in Bamyan, CDC 
membership contributed to opening up the space for women’s gatekeeping role. The 
Bamyan member became a key point of contact for NGOs and other organisations 
interested in providing services for women. In general, the village leader or elders 
operate as gatekeepers but the MMRD interventions have modified this general pattern 
to an extent; when resource providers approach male members with projects for 
women, they are referred to the female CDC deputy chief. Nevertheless, women’s 
gatekeeping role for women-focused resources is still at an early stage and remains 
strongly influenced by the broader power dynamics and governance relations in the 
villages.  
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8.2.3 What effects did these interventions have on local governance and power 
relations, and how are these effects different from those intended by the 
programme planners and implementers? 
The intervening actors and institutions did not follow a commonly-held goal in either the 
design and formulation phases of the programmes, or during their implementation. 
Instead, the various actors involved in the processes had their own ambitions and 
personal or institutional interests. The thesis highlighted the complex nature of local 
governance relations that developed around the interventions, thereby confirming that 
such programmes cannot be studied and understood simply in terms of success or 
failure; they involve a far more complex process of interactions, contestation and 
negotiations, leading to mixed and often ambiguous outcomes. It was also clear that 
local governance relations cannot be analysed without a historically informed 
understanding of how the relevant elites have evolved over time and how different 
kinds of power are exercised through informal as well as formal institutions.  
As for the sustainability of the organisations, structures and mechanisms introduced at 
the village and district level, the research suggested a number of determinate factors. 
In terms of local governance institution building, both the MRRD and IDLG’s 
interventions were overwhelmingly donor dependent, i.e. their continuation was entirely 
subject to financial commitment from external donors. At the village level, in both 
Nangarhar and Bamyan, the local population, whether involved in the CDC or not, saw 
the programme interventions by the MRRD solely as a mechanism for service delivery. 
In both provinces, the formal objective of the CDC to serve as a village governance 
institution was not clearly communicated to the recipients, nor was it understood or 
accepted by the villagers as such. The example in Bamyan where both villages 
registered separate qaryadars confirms the point that the CDC did not become a 
replacement for existing power structures and governance relations. Hence, for the 
recipients of the NSP, the CDCs only became activated when the programme brought 
in projects or resources.  
In Nangarhar, the resources attracted through both the village and district councils 
were highly significant. This brought the programmes to the attention of various power-
brokers in village and district elites, each having an interest in gaining further access to, 
and benefits from, the CDCs and DDAs. The Behsud District DDA, led by an ex-
commander, exemplifies how war-time elites could influence these structures. At the 
village level, the conflict that emerged during the second CDC elections, when the 
village commander tried to replace the existing CDC chief, illustrates how the 
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programme intervention affected local power dynamics. Although in Nangarhar the 
CDC was entirely controlled by village elites, the conditionality, both in terms of 
women’s representation and representation from different parts of the village, opened 
up opportunities for both women (albeit only those of particular identity and socio-
political status) and men from other parts of the village to participate in at least some 
aspects of village governance. The CDC leadership and village elites in general were 
not as open to youth representation, and their selection of a younger man to represent 
one part of the village was a tactical choice to avoid potential competition for CDC 
leadership and a village elite from that part.  
In Bamyan, similarly, CDCs and DDAs were seen more as a service delivery 
mechanism than as an alternative local governance institution. However, unlike 
Nangarhar, in Bamyan some of the newly emerged village elites gained their legitimacy 
through the CDC elections and their authority by acting as gatekeepers to the flow of 
resources coming to the two villages from different sources. In Bamyan, the active 
participation of young men in their mid-20s or 30s, both within the CDC and in other 
aspects of everyday practices of village governance, was quite significant. For 
instance, a young villager in his mid-20s who held dual degrees from religious and 
secular educational institutions led the large mosque, and partly the madrasa. The 
newly emerged patron (the ex-CDC chief) in the Bamyan field site chose mainly young 
men for positions of power such as the new CDC chief, qaryadar for the larger village 
and imam for the grand mosque and elders such as the village arbab become more like 
retired village patrons. This also presents an interesting dynamic in comparison with 
Nangarhar where the existing power structures were not open to the younger 
generation. In Bamyan’s case, this move could be linked to the newly emerged patron’s 
efforts to build his power basis by backing younger men for different roles in village 
governance.  
In both cases, there seemed to be a process of sedimentation whereby newer 
initiatives were layered on top of older ones. For instance, the MRRD began with the 
NSP intervention creating CDCs, followed by the district level councils or DDAs. 
Because of national and international level changes in policies and institutions, the 
IDLG was then established and took on its role as an ‘owner’ of local governance 
affairs by creating district level councils formed by district level ‘notables’. This was 
followed by formalisation of the qaradyar positions. Although the latter action is not 
considered by the IDLG officials as a ‘local governance’ intervention, the IDLG clearly 
had the ambition of a state institution, seeking to formally expand its influence in this 
area as evidenced by the re-launching of the formalisation of the village representative 
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through district offices and the addition of a sub-directorate of village affairs in the 
district administrative structure.  
The result of these different interventions was a complex and hybrid set of power 
relations at the district and village levels. At both the national level and in the villages, 
this hybridity was reflected not only in formal and informal institutions, but also in 
individuals whose combined identities, titles, roles and positions challenge the notion 
that an actor is only identified by one form of identity or status, for example ‘traditional 
leader’. In the Nangarhar case, for example, the same individual occupied different 
positions and easily played different roles as malik, qaryadar and ‘elected’ CDC chief. 
Similarly, the village commander was the son of an old malik and belonged to the same 
kinship/tribe as the majority of village elites. As mentioned previously, this was also 
evident at the national level when programme intervention formulations were discussed 
by national elites who also had multiple identities. This complexity of the nature of the 
power relations requires a much more thorough and deeper understanding of these 
blurred boundaries and the hybrid forms of relations that emerge as a result as well as 
the implications of liberal interventionism in the short as well as long term.  
This thesis has shown the huge differences that developed between what was planned 
and the actual outcomes of the programme interventions. Socio-political and economic 
characteristics, historical events and overall power dynamics in different contexts 
shaped the results of the interventions in particular directions. I have shown in this 
study how local governance relations in the context of Afghanistan, and particularly the 
sites selected for this thesis, were conditioned by the complex on-going interactions, 
negotiations and contestations between local elites and different external institutions, 
including state and non-state, national and international, actors and institutions.  
8.3. How does this research relate and contribute to wider theoretical and policy 
debates on the efficacy and desirability of local governance programme 
interventions in conflict-affected contexts? 
As already noted, much of the literature on liberal peace-building – both from its 
proponents and critics – lacks an appreciation of the complexities and nuances of 
interventions on the ground. There is, however, an emerging body of work which takes 
us towards a more fine-grained understanding of liberal peace-building and local 
governance interventions in practice. This thesis aims to build upon and contribute to 
this body of literature, drawing upon insights generated by discussions of hybridity, aid 
ethnography and historical political economy approaches.  
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The historical political economy approach advanced in this thesis, has placed a focus 
on power dynamics, material interests and sources of legitimacy in the context in which 
programme and policy interventions are implemented. In light of the literature on 
patrimonial and (neo)patrimonial systems of rule, I was able to present an in-depth 
analysis of power relations historically, and, how they have changed in post-2001 
Afghanistan. This analysis contributes to our understanding of how pre-war political and 
economic relations were transformed by protracted conflict and international 
engagement leading to the emergence of new sources of power and authority and the 
flow of resources controlled by external powers in the economy of war and violence.  
I have, therefore, proposed alternative frameworks from the liberal peace-building 
literature such as hybridity and ethnography of aid to further interrogate the logics and 
rationales of interventions.  
Meagher, in her study of African hybrid governance systems, highlights the complex 
outcomes of efforts to transform local governance through external interventions using 
the examples of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria. She emphasizes the 
importance of understanding the historical context and looking at empirically informed 
analysis of how hybrid political orders operate on the ground (Meagher 2012:1077). 
The empirical evidence in this thesis, too, demonstrated how local governance 
interventions’ rationales and logics differ and produce different and sometime 
inconsistent outcomes in varying contexts. Scholars who worked on liberal intervention 
alternatives such as hybridity (MacGinty and Williams 2009; MacGinty 2010, 2011; 
Pugh 2005; Pugh et al. 2009; Mallett 2010) and ethnographies of aid (Crewe and 
Harrison 1998; Mosse 2005; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Li 2007) have added to our 
understanding of how international interventions interact with local political economies 
in conflict-affected societies. However, I have used the concept of hybridity with some 
caution – I see it as useful analytically but it is not necessarily something to be 
celebrated or prescribed (see, for example, Wardak and Hamidzada 2012; Aguirre and 
Borgh 2010).  
The literature on (neo)patrimonial systems of rule has been helpful in expanding further 
the changing contexts in which actors are no longer bound to the classic form of 
patron-client relations. The (neo)patrimonial lens is helpful in informing us how the 
loyalty, dependency and socio-political relations change between patrons and clients 
(Médard 1982; Khan 2005; Beekers and van Gool 2012). This thesis has developed 
this further by linking (neo)patrimonial systems with the concept of hybridity which is 
helpful in expanding our understanding of the role external interventions play in this 
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process of changing power dynamics and governance relations in conflict-affected 
settings.  
I have, therefore, drawn on insights generated by the literature on hybridity, 
ethnography of aid and (neo)patrimonialism in order to unpack the complex nature of 
liberal interventionism in general, and more specifically local governance programmes 
and policy interventions. This theoretical orientation eschews universal templates and 
highly normative analysis. Instead, it aims to reach a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of how governance interventions are negotiated, mediated and played 
out in particular times and contexts. 
Conceptually, I have looked at governance and, more specifically, at local governance 
as an empirical reality rather than an ideal, blueprint model. Following Long and Long’s 
(1992) analysis, I argued that local governance interventions are not “simply the 
execution of an already-specified plan” (Long and Long 1992:35) of activities and 
actions, but rather develop as an unplanned, complex set of processes with multiple 
dimensions. By focusing on power relations and material interests in specific contexts 
under difficult circumstances, (both in terms of the broader nature of studying conflict-
affected settings and different aspects of my own position as a researcher), this study 
provides a unique empirical contribution to the limited body of work on local 
governance relations in the broader context of international interventionism by using 
Afghanistan and selected villages and districts as sites of intervention. A particular 
contribution of this study is its enhancement of the existing scarce ethnographic data 
on villages and their power dynamics in Afghanistan. 
Schetter, in his edited volume on Local Politics in Afghanistan, highlighted the urgent 
need for a deeper understanding of how Afghan societies work (Schetter 2013). His 
critique of existing academic discourses on ‘failed/fragile’ states that portray Afghan 
local politics in a distorted way by highlighting the ‘deficiencies’ (ibid.) was one of the 
inspirations for this study (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Justino 2012). In 
the research I followed a historical political economy approach combined with 
ethnographies of aid and hybridity lenses in my examination of local governance 
relations, not in order to generalise the findings or to prescribe ‘solutions’ for the 
‘deficiencies’ and ‘problems’, but rather to look at the local settings or villages as site(s) 
of multiple forms of interventions, and to study the complex and hybrid nature of the 
interactions, negotiations and, indeed, contestations between the local elites, formal 
and informal actors and institutions, beyond the local settings that shape everyday 
practices of local governance.  
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Limitations of this research 
The research also has its limits. It is important to note that in the study of local 
governance, generalisation can be risky. I do not claim that the findings from these two 
particular local settings should or could be generalised. But while taking cautious 
measures to avoid generalisation of particular local events in given times, it is also 
important to highlight that villages or local settings and their governance relations 
cannot be understood in complete isolation and disconnection from general events and 
situations beyond the local boundaries.  
Another limitation to acknowledge here is the potential for bias while studying people 
and their socio-political and economic relations. As addressed in the methodology 
chapter, my position as an ‘insider/outsider’ and my world views as the individual who 
carried out this research, inevitably have generated some bias in the analysis of the 
events and processes I followed.  
Areas for further research 
In this thesis, I looked at the gender dimension of local governance programme 
interventions and how women found, or were given, the opportunity to have their space 
in certain aspects of local governance relations. This area deserves further research to 
examine the state-building and gender relations from a political economy perspective.  
Writing in a different subject area, Kalyvas (2005) makes an important point on the 
problem of social science research reducing the study of warfare to military details 
instead of looking at the social and political factors that affect the onset and/or 
termination of civil wars (Kalyvas 2005:88). His point is relevant to this thesis too, which 
shows how different phases of war and conflict have directly affected not only politico-
military and formal structures of governance, but has also changed people’s 
behaviours, world views and the structures of political economy that shape the way 
they govern their communities. Relatedly, Justino (2012) highlights the emergence of 
local governance structures during civil wars in the ‘absence’ of ‘government’ or when it 
is “deposed or heavily contested” as an area that is seriously under researched 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004) cited in Justino 2012:14). She rightly points out 
that ‘absence’ of government does not necessarily mean absence of governance 
relations as there are always different non-state actors who wield means of violence 
and contribute to reshaping and reconfiguring local power dynamics and governance 
relations.  
The work of both Kalyvas and Justino point to the importance of empirically grounded 
studies of the local or micro dynamics of civil wars. Although this thesis did not directly 
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address the violence aspects of micro or macro level governance, by looking at the 
local settings as a site of intervention, I showed how armed conflict that is linked to, or 
openly conducted by, external forces reverberated on the local level through the rise (or 
demise) of elites, and generated programme interventions that reconfigured local 
governance relations.  
In the broader field of local governance relations in the context of international 
interventionism, there is a strong need for longitudinal, micro level research that 
examines institutional adaptations to war and interventions over time. This study sought 
to capture a particular time frame: local governance interventions in post-2001 
Afghanistan. As I have highlighted across this thesis, the nature of intervention, policies 
and approaches to local governance programme initiatives continuously changed and 
were reshaped over time. At the time this thesis was completed (30th September, 2014) 
Afghanistan is entering a new phase in its relationship with international intervening 
forces; it also is on the verge of having a new government in place. Both events have 
direct implications for the future of the programme interventions examined in this thesis. 
Hence, one of the areas for future research could be the expansion of this study in the 
context of the political and security transitions to re-examine how local governance 
relations are affected by these changes.  
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Annex One: Sample of Key Informant, Semi-structured Interviews and Participant 
Observation Notes 
 
Example of key informant questions:  
 
Interview # ______ 
Time: ___________ 
Date: __________ 
Place:  _________ 
Name of informant/designation: __________ 
Agreement with sharing the information: __________ 
Observation notes:  
1. Can you explain, the overall process of NSP formation: like who was involved, what 
were the key points negotiated among actors involved and how the programme 
started?  
2. How is NSP seen at MRRD and beyond (i.e. overall government and its donors)? Is 
it seen more as a development/charity/governance/political all, none or one? 
3. How do the external actors such as World Bank and the central government 
institutions such as Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and 
IDLG foresee the changing roles of CDCs in the future? 
4. How does the CDC leadership deal with conditionality such as gender, participation 
etc. How were they were included in the first place and how were they 
operationalised? 
5. What are the main challenges the NSP face this stage? Please elaborate how these 
challenges are different at different levels?  
6. Is there a variation in terms of methodology on CDC formation? If not, did any issues 
emerge as a result of following the same rule in very different contexts?  
7. How many districts are there? How many DDAs are formed? How many villages? 
8. How does the MRRD or specifically the NSP staff define the village?  
9. What are the routine activities of CDCs? Are they expected to take the lead on 
village governance? How?  
10. Can you provide an estimation of how many % of CDCs are sustainable, i.e. how 
many can survive after the block-grant is ended?   
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Interview # ______ 
Time: ___________ 
Date: __________ 
Place:  _________ 
Name of informant/designation: __________ 
Agreement with sharing the information: __________ 
Observation notes:  
1. Under what conditions IDLG was formed? What were the main justification for 
creation of a Directorate and not a ministry for instance? 
2. What is the perspective of IDLG on local governance? How does IDLG understand 
village governance and the way it operates?  
3. How do you define local governance? Can you elaborate how you distinguish 
between various layers of local governance? e.g. provincial, district and village.  
4. What mechanisms are in place to ‘watch’ local governance practices at village level 
and district level? Do you have specific plan on how government is represented 
beyond the district level?  
5. Where does the CDC and Village Council debate stand at this stage? Is there an 
administrative/executive role for both? Do you foresee the CDCs as future Village 
Councils? If, yes or now, how?  
6. How to get some general understanding of Darajabandi [ranking] of provinces and 
districts? Is there such thing for villages? 
7. a.) Has IDLG or any other institution made any attempt to define the village? Or 
mapping them? Mapping districts? b.) Do we have officially recognised boundaries 
for districts and villages?  
8. Who is the right person to explore further questions on the following matters:  
9. Is there a law/act presented to parliament on LG?  
10. Can you elaborate how you have IDLG programmes have been operating? How 
are their future, in terms of financial support and sustainability?  
11. Is there a research unit at IDLG?  
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Examples of semi-structured informant questions:  
 
CDC Members  
Interview # ______ 
Time: ___________ 
Date: __________ 
Place:  _________ 
Name of informant/designation: __________ 
Age: ___________ 
Family origins/kinship:_________ 
Agreement with sharing the information: __________ 
Observation notes:  
1. Before becoming a CDC member where did you live (did you migrate? Where) and 
what is your source of income? What job did/do you have? 
2. How have you become a CDC member and since when? Tell us about how you 
were informed about the NSP, how CDC was formed and how were you elected? 
2. What are your responsibilityse and role as a CDC member and what position do you 
have within the CDC?  
3.Please explain in detail your experience in the CDC, how often do you meet? What 
do you discuss in the meeting, how you decide about priorities etc.?  
4. How was the CDC introduced to you? Did you know about what conditionality the 
programme had? For instance, about women’s inclusion in the Shura, how was it 
received in your village?  
5. Was there any problems, disagreements about the programme’s conditions? Women 
women’s inclusion and other matters? If yes, please elaborate. 
6. How many times did you have CDC elections since the CDCs are formed, tell us 
about each elections and how it happened.  
7. In your opinion, what is the purpose of CDC or its broader programme the NSP? 
Why you think this programme is introduced in your village?  
8. Tell us about your village,  how different people receive this programme and the 
CDC?  
9. Did your village introduce a qaryadar to the district? When? Who is this person and 
what is his role/responsibilities? 
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On village history, mostly elderlies:  
Interview # ______ 
Time: ___________ 
Date: __________ 
Place:  _________ 
Name of informant/designation: __________ 
Age: ___________ 
Family origins/kinship:_________ 
Agreement with sharing the information: __________ 
1. Please inform us about your village. How many people live here? Who they are, 
what are their profession or sources of income, does your village have divisions? How 
many, who lives in each division?  
2. What is the history of your village, or what do you know about it, how was it formed, 
who lived in it, are you native from this place of have you moved in recently? What is 
the name of your village and why does it have this name?  
3. Do you have a job? How did you earn living in the past/present? Do you have older 
children? What is their job and their role in the village?  
4. Who represented your village in the past [divide past with before war, during war -
Mujahiddin period, Taliban period- and since 2001], how was this person selected for 
this representation?  
5. How this person (malik/arbab) engaged with the district headquarter, explain with an 
example of how this relation worked, for example in terms of tax collection, dispute 
resolution etc.  
6. Since past ten years, which political or previous regime actors are active in your area 
and what are their roles?  
7. When did you hear about the NSP and the CDC? How? Did you participate how?  
8. Who are the CDC members? What were/are their role in the village before CDC 
membership and now?  
  223 
9. What activities/projects did the NSP implemented in your village? How did you or 
your community benefit or did not benefit from these project?  
10. Who is Qaryadar in your village? Tell us about his role and responsibilities in the 
village and how he handles relations with the district and other institutions outside the 
village?  
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Examples of participant observation notes: 
 
 
Interview # _______ 
Date visited:  13-19th March 2012 
Time:  6 days 
Place: Nangarhar, Jalalabd, Behsud, Qala-e-Janan Khan  
Participants:  13 people in total 
 
My third visit to the village included spending four days and three nights in the village, 
the observations will be all noted in detail in this document, while full details of the 
interview notes will be in separate interview notes.  My visit this time included 
interviews with more informants in the village, a day trip to the district centre and 
meeting some actors in Jalalabad city.  Although some of the Jalalabad city interviews 
were postponed, as the Nowroz holidays have begun.  
(…) 
“This time, I was back in the village on the Friday before Nowroz [The Persian new year 
which is widely celebrated across Afghanistan]. When the men in the family returned 
from the Friday prayers after lunch, the head of family Gh. [Name withheld] said to his 
family over dinner that ‘Mullah again proved us that celebration of Nowroz was Harram 
[forbidden], he bashed out all about it and said the villagers should not celebrating it.’ 
This was not welcomed by female members of the family as they have an engaged son 
and an engaged daughter and one common practice during Nowroz is sharing gifts with 
the bride’s family and this is a relatively public ceremony. Gh’s daughter-in-law [who is 
a teacher in the village school] responded to her father: ‘But it is the tradition all the way 
from our great-grand parents’ time, how come this Mullah discover this now?’ Gh. 
responded: ‘I know what you mean, but you know that if things decided in the mosque, 
it must be followed, so no public event, just do it within families, do not make a big 
noise about it.’ Gh’s daughter-in-law: ‘We shall do what everyone is doing, we need to 
bring some Nowrozi [the gifts shared during new year] to our brother’s fiancée’ she 
adds. Gh.  Doesn’t react to this statement and adds:  ‘No one buys anything, even 
preparing Haft Mewa [a traditional fruit salad served during Nowroz] is not approved, I 
don’t know, but he says so, he says no Haft Mewa, no Nowrozi and don’t even mention 
Happy Nowroz!’. So, after long discussions between Gh. One of his sons, his daughter 
and daughter-in-law they finally agreed to go” (…) 
———— 
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Observation notes from Bamyan:  
(…) 
“International Military actors at provincial/district/village:  After USA decided on civilian 
surge besides the military surge, the number of American forces in Afghanistan 
increased, besides army soldiers who arrived in Afghanistan to join in all provinces, 
there was also at least two civilian advisors at district level. For instance, in Bamyan 
province the military representation structure is as follows:  
Political Officer of PRT (Chief) 
Military Commander 
Police Commander  
State Department Officer (US) 
   A) USAID Coordinator  
   B) Two Advisors (RoL and Agricultural) - Provincial level 
   C) These two advisors have two representatives in districts through (CERP) 
[Commanders Emergency Response Program] - District level 
At the village level these actors do not have direct contact, though except when they 
are distributing material and speaking to people. In Bamyan and Yakawlang district I 
was told the New Zealand and Singapore forces are mainly engaged in health sector 
and helping with the local Yakawlang hospital.” (…) 
————— 
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Annex Two: List of Interviews 
 
 
Kabul Interviews 
 No. Name* and Position Date 
1 Barna Karimi, Deputy Director of IDLG 03/08/2011 
2 Tariq Ismati, NSP CEO MRRD 09/08/2011 
3 M. Asif Nang, Technical Deputuy MoE 15/08/2011 
4 Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program Officer 14/08/2011 
5 AKDN Officer 14/08/2011 
6 IDLG Officer 16/08/2011 
7 Sussane Schmidel, TLO 17/08/2011 
8 PTRO programme staff 18/08/2011 
9 Gender Consultant, MRRD  22/082011 
10 Abdul Basir, Tawanmandi DFID/UK 25/08/2011 
11 NATO Civilian Representative' Governance Advisor 31/03/2012 
12 ISAF IJC Representative 05/04/2012 
13 Lynda Grandfield, IDLG Embed/Ex-PRT Commander 10/04/2012 
14 Shahmahmood Miakhel, Country Director USIP 05/04/2012 
15 Ghulam Jelani Popal, IDLG Chief (Ex.) 12/04/2012 
16 Wais Ahamad Barmak, Minister MRRD 15.04.2012 
17 UN-Habitat NSP Staff in Kabul 18/04/2012 
18 Yama Torabi, IWA 10/05/2012 
19 PTRO Staff 13/05/2012 
20 Shafiq Samim, Deputy MoE on Islamic Education  14/05/2012 
21 Adivisor to Senior Minister Arsala  17/05/2012 
22 Mohammad Ehsan Zia, Ex-Minister MRRD 19/05/2012 
23 Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, Chairman of Transition 11/06/2012 
24 DACAAR NSP Staff 11/06/2012 
25 The World Bank Governance Advisor 19/06/2012 
26 DFID Officer 11/06/2012 
27 Cartography Directorate 19/06/2012 
28 Swedish Committee for Afghansitan, NSP staff 19/06/2012 
29 Snr. Minister Amin Arsala, Head of Governance cluster 20/07/2012 
30 Palwasha Kakar(NSP/AREU) 28/06/2012 
31 IDLG Governance Advisor 21/01/2012 
32 Jolyon Lesily, Ex- UN-Habitat 12/07/2012 
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33 Haneef Atmar, Ex-MRRD/MoE/MoI & Party Leader 05/11/2012 
34 IDGL Officer 03/11/2012 
  *Some names withheld for confidentiality purposes.  
 
 
Nangarhar: Jalalabd and Behsud Interviews   
No.  Name* and Position Date 
1 University Lecturer (Male) 26/11/2011 
2 PC Candidate part I (Female) 02/01/2012 
3 PC Candidate Part II (Female) 05/01/2012 
4 NGO leader (Male) 05/01/2012 
5 Ex RRD Director/OCNSP 14/03/2012 
6 Local resident 15/03/2012 
7 Dr. Alam Ishaqzai, Mustufi (DoMoF) Nangarhar 16/03/2012 
8 Behsud District Governor 17/03/2012 
9 Moderiat e Qaryajat - Behsud 17/03/2012 
10 Behsud MAIL district-Director 04/05/2012 
11 Behsud BRAC Social Organizer  04/05/2012 
12 Behsud DDA Chief  05/05/2012 
13 Nangarhar Haj and Auqaf provincial director  05/05/2012 
14 Nangarhar MoE Provincial director 04/05/2012 
15 Women's Affairs' Director 02/06/2012 
16 NABDP Office, Jalalabad. (Male and Female staff) 02/06/2012 
17 Independent consultant 03/06/2012 
18 Discussion with male group (FGD) 04/06/2012 
19 Discussion with women group (FGD) 04/06/2012 
20 Female NGO worker, Jalalabad 02/06/2012 
 
*some names withheld for confidentiality reasons.   
   
 
Village Interviews (Nangarhar) 
 
   No.  Persons Date 
1 Village Malik, CDC Chief  Part I 27/11/2011 
2 Mullah of  Qala-e- Janankhan  27/11/2011 
3 Deputy CDC (Female) 28/11/2011 
4 Farmer cluster head for CDC 29/11/2011 
5 Project beneficiary/female youth 30/11/2011 
6 Village Malik, CDC Chief Part II 01/12/2011 
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  Bamyan: Bamyan city Interviews 
 No. Persons Date 
1 MRRD/NSP's Bamyan OC 17/08/2011 
2 AKDN Bamyan 17/08/2011 
3 UN-Habitat Bamyan 18/08/2011 
4 Provincial Directorate of MoE 20/08/2011 
7 Ex-CDC member (Female) 03/12/2011 
8 School deputy Principal 03/12/2011 
9 CDC Secretary  03/12/2011 
10 CDC Treasury 20/12/2011 
11 Teacher, CDC member  20/12/2011 
12 Community Elder Part I 22/12/2011 
13 Cluster head from Mandes Qala 22/12/2011 
14 Deputy head cluster Shura Ghonday 23/12/2011 
15 Community Elder 23/12/2011 
16 Farmer and non-original 23/12/2011 
17 Village driver non-original resident 23/12/2011 
18 Mullah of non-registered Mosque Shuraghonday 24/12/2011 
19 Village doctor children specialist 24/12/2011 
20 AbdulWahab Banda Cluster head 25/12/2011 
21 Mullah of AbdulWahab Banda 25/12/2011 
22 Community Elder Part II 13/03/2012 
23 Son of community elder. 15/03/2012 
24 District council member/religious scholar 15/03/2012 
25 Community Elder Part III 16/03/2012 
26 District council member/religious scholar part II 16/03/2012 
27 Youth leader, QJK 16/03/2012 
28 Female Deputy CDC Part II 16/03/2012 
29 Women FGD (village women from central QJK) 15/03/2012 
30 Men FGD (CDC members on history of programme) 17/03/2012 
31 The commander QJK 15/02/2013 
32 Teacher and leading a local council 15/02/2013 
33 District council member/religious scholar part III 15/02/2013 
 
*some names withheld for confidentiality reasons. 
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5 Provincial Directorate of Haj and Auqaf 20/08/2011 
6 Governor Sarabi, Provincial Governor of Bamyan 20/08/2011 
7 Conversation with CCA Bamyan 20/08/2011 
8 Meeting with CCA - Kabul* 19/04/2012 
9 Sarwar Hussaini Deputy MoE - Kabul* 23/04/2012 
10 Conversation with CCA Part II 23/05/2012 
11 Shuhada Organisation, Bamyan  23/05/2012 
12 Provincial Council member (Female) 24/05/2012 
13 Provincial Council member (Male) 24/05/2012 
14 Religious scholar  24/05/2012 
15 Focus Group Discussion,  male and female  24/05/2012 
16 Mr. Mubariz of UN Habitat  29/05/2012 
17 Richard Prendergast, PRT Chief Bamyan. 28/05/2012 
18 NGO Leader (Male) 28/05/2012 
  
(*) These interviews were held in Kabul, but were 
related to Bamyan and its history so I list them here.  
 
    Yakawlang Interviews  
No. Persons Date 
1 District governor 22/08/2011 
2 CCA Yakawlang 20/08/2011 
3 UN-Habitat Yakawlang Social Mobilisers 01/10/2011 
4 Sub-director of Qaryajaat 24/08/2011 
5 Officer of Qaryajaat at dist. office 20/08/2011 
6 Elderly woman, Yakawlang 20/08/2011 
7 Conversation with Bedmushki villegers  20/08/2011 
8 UN-Habitat - Yakawlang DM (Male) 01/10/2012 
9 Social Council of Yakawlang 02/10/2011 
10 Agri- Cooperative 01/10/2011 
11 Yakawlang resident 26/05/2011 
12 Shopkeeper in Yakawlang Nayak 28/05/2012 
13 BRAC Officer, Yakawlang 28/05/2012 
14 Yakawlang resident 23/05/2012 
   
 
  
 
Village interviews (Bamyan) 
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   No.  Persons Date 
1 Ex-CDC Chief 23/08/2011 
2 CDC Female Member Munshi(writer) 23/08/2011 
3 CDC Chief for Katakhana/Akhundan 01/10/2011 
4 Famele CDC Chief Katakhana/Akhundan 30/09/2011 
5 CDC Member Farmer Akhundan  30/09/2011 
6 NGO Worker COAR on DDA 02/10/2011 
7 CDC Member Secretary from Katakhana 30/09/2011 
8 CDC Member Farmer Katakhana 30/09/2011 
9 Community Elder Akhundan 29/09/2011 
10 Community Elder Arbab Katakhana 30/10/2011 
11 Qaryadar of Akhundan 29/09/2011 
12 Qaryadar of Katakhana 02/10/2011 
13 Mullah Imam Katakhana 02/10/2011 
14 Mullah Imam of Akhundan 01/10/2011 
15 Madrasa Teacher (Male) 29/09/2011 
16 School Teacher 01/10/2011 
17 Ex-CDC Chief Part II 26/05/2012 
18 A young Scholar Mullah of Akhundan 26/05/2012 
19 Deputy CDC Chief from Akhundan (Female) 27/10/2011 
20 Literacy teacher, Akhundan 26/05/2012 
21 Girls high school Katakhana, Yakawlang 27/05/2012 
22 Women's Focus Group Discussion in Akhundan 26/05/2012 
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